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Recent development in multimedia and network technologies has made possible
the ubiquitous sharing and distribution of multimedia over networks. However, il-
legal alteration and unauthorized copying of multimedia data pose serious threats
to multimedia security and intellectual property rights, especially considering the
ease manipulation of digital data. Therefore, it is critical to secure and protect
multimedia content, and to ensure the integrity of rights by authorized users solely
for intended purpose. Digital fingerprinting is an emerging technology to address
post-delivery content protection and to enforce digital rights. In digital finger-
printing, unique identification information is embedded in each distributed copy,
and is used to trace and identify the source of illicit copies. Such a traitor tracing
is a fundamental problem in multimedia forensics, as well as an important tool for
enforcing digital rights.
This thesis addresses various issues in multimedia fingerprinting. We first inves-
tigate the order statistics based nonlinear collusion attacks on digital fingerprint-
ing, and analyze their effectiveness in defeating the fingerprinting systems. We also
compare the performance of several commonly used detection statistics under col-
lusion. We then examine the impact of scalable video coding and transmission on
digital fingerprinting systems and collusion attacks. We analyze the effectiveness of
the collusion attacks under the constraints that all colluders have equal probability
of detection, and analyze the collusion resistance of scalable fingerprinting systems.
We then consider the problem of traitors within traitors in digital fingerprinting,
in which some selfish colluders wish to minimize their own risk of being captured
while still profiting from the illegal redistribution of multimedia. We investigate
the possible strategy by the selfish colluders to reduce probability of detection, and
analyze their performance under the quality constraints. We also investigate the
possible countermeasures by other colluders to protect their own interest. Finally,
we investigate the secure distribution of fingerprinted copies for video streaming
applications, and propose two secure fingerprint multicast schemes. We analyze
their performance, including the communication cost and the robustness against
collusion attacks, and discuss the tradeoff between the bandwidth efficiency and
computation complexity.
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In the past decades, we have witnessed the revolution of digital information tech-
nology and its significant impact on our daily lives. The popularity of digital
camera, digital camcorder, MP3 player and DVD player, have inspired people all
over the world to create and enjoy multimedia in digital domain. Furthermore, the
ubiquity of broadband networks and the advance in multimedia technologies have
proliferated the delivery and sharing of multimedia data over networks.
However, illegal alteration, repackaging and unauthorized redistribution of mul-
timedia have serious consequences on governmental and military operations as well
as commercial applications. Attackers can easily alter the multimedia content, pro-
duce copies of high quality and redistribute without authorization, which threatens
multimedia security and intellectual property rights. Consequently, it is critical to
secure multimedia transmission and to protect the rights of content providers.
Take commercial applications as an example, the U.S. copyright industries,
including pre-recorded records and tape, motion pictures and videos, play a key
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role in the U.S. economy. In Year 2002, the estimated value added for the copyright
industries was $514.4 billion and 4.91% of the U.S. Gross domestic Product (GDP).
However, piracy drastically affected the sales revenue for these copyright industries
in Year 2002. For example, total foreign sales revenue for the copyright industries
grew by only 1.1% from 2001 to 2002 – a dramatic decline from 1999 where growth
was at 14.5% from 1998, largely attributed to piracy [51]. Consequently, content
protection and digital rights enforcement are crucial to safeguard this valuable
economic resource of copyright industries.
Digital rights management systems incorporate encryption, conditional access,
copy control, and media identification and tracing, and aim to protect the mul-
timedia security and the intellectual property rights [5, 27, 46]. Some important
standardization groups and bodies that have been working on DRM systems and
the integration of security into multimedia frameworks are the International Orga-
nization for Standardization (ISO) MPEG, Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI),
DVD/Copy Protection Technical Working Group (CPTWG), *C, Open Platform
Initiative for Multimedia Access (OPIMA), Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB),
Digital Audio-Visual Council (DAVIC), Bluetooth Special Interest Group, TV any-
time, etc. [27]
Access control and multimedia forensics are two fundamental modules in digital
rights management systems to protect content security and prohibit unauthorized
alteration and distribution of multimedia data. First, encryption and access control
protects the secure transmission of multimedia information over networks and con-
trols access to multimedia content [21,39,49,57,70]. Secondly, multimedia forensics
helps a digital rights enforcer to detect the illegal tampering on multimedia content
and to identify the people who generate the illicit copies [5, 27, 46, 71]. These two
2
approaches are complementary to each other: access control prevents unauthorized
users from accessing multimedia content, while multimedia forensics detects, and
therefore thwarts, illegal manipulation and redistribution of multimedia by users
who have access to the clear text representation.
Digital watermarking is one emerging technology in multimedia forensics and
offers the protection of multimedia content after the data are decrypted into clear
text [12,35,43,69]. In digital watermarking, a secondary information, often called
watermark, is seamlessly attached to the primary multimedia data (also called
host signal), and can be used for various purposes (e.g., ownership protection
and authentication) depending on the applications and requirements. Compared
with other possible solutions, digital watermarking has the advantage that the
embedded watermark is seamlessly bounded to and travels with the host signal,
which is desirable in many applications.
Digital fingerprinting is one application of digital watermarking, whose pur-
pose is to trace the distribution of multimedia and identify the source of illicit
copies [13,58,71]. Such a traitor tracing technique forces culprits to be responsible
for their behavior, and is a fundamental tool in multimedia forensics. In digital
fingerprinting, unique identification information is embedded in each distributed
copy and serves as a digital fingerprint. Digital fingerprinting applications require
that the embedded fingerprints can survive both common signal processing and
intentional attacks, and therefore, the content owner can still detect the identities
of the attackers with little ambiguity even if the data have been severely distorted.
In addition to the civilian usage in digital rights enforcement, digital finger-
printing can also be used in military applications. One example is to protect
digital maps that contain classified and important information for military and
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intelligence agencies [24,25].
Due to the uniqueness of each distributed copy, there is a cost effective attack
against digital fingerprinting systems, collusion attacks, by several users who re-
ceive copies of the same content but embedded with different fingerprints [3,13,52].
During collusion, the attackers (colluders) gather together, combine information
from different copies and generate a new copy where the original fingerprints are
removed or attenuated. If not properly designed, a fingerprinting system might
fail to detect the traces of any fingerprints under collusion attacks with only a few
colluders. Consequently, multiuser collusion poses new challenges on multimedia
forensics, and a digital fingerprinting system should not only survive attacks on a
single copy [14,28,42], but also be robust against multiuser collusion attacks.
In addition, the uniqueness of each distributed copy also challenges the secure
and efficient distribution of the uniquely fingerprinted copies over networks, espe-
cially for video streaming applications where a large volume of data have to be
transmitted to a large number of users under stringent delay constraints [1,31,65].
A simple solution of unicasting each fingerprinted copy to the corresponding user
is inefficient, since the required bandwidth grows linearly as the number of users
increases while the difference between fingerprinted copies is small. Multicast
technology provides a bandwidth advantage when distributing the same content
to multiple users [7, 11]. It reduces the overall communication cost by duplicating
packages only when routing paths to multiple receivers diverge [41, 59]. However,
traditional multicast technology is designed to transmit the same data to multiple
users, and it cannot be directly applied to fingerprinting applications where differ-
ent users receive slightly different copies. This calls for new distribution schemes
for multimedia fingerprinting, in particular, for networked video applications.
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This thesis addresses the issues regarding traitor tracing in multimedia forensics
and studies various aspects of multimedia fingerprinting.
1.2 Prior Art
The prior work in digital fingerprinting for multimedia forensics can be roughly
divided into three major areas: analysis of the effectiveness of the collusion at-
tacks and the collusion resistance of fingerprinting systems; design of anti-collusion
multimedia fingerprinting systems that jointly consider the multimedia fingerprint
code design, embedding and detection; and investigation of the secure and efficient
distribution of anti-collusion fingerprinted copies over networks.
Analysis of the Collusion Attacks
An important research area in digital fingerprinting is to study the effectiveness
of collusion attacks. It helps to understand the collusion resistance of a digital
fingerprinting system and plays an important role in the design of anti-collusion
fingerprinting systems.
An early work on collusion attack and digital fingerprint code design for generic
data was proposed in [3], which assumed that the colluders can detect a specific
fingerprint code bit if it takes different values between their fingerprinted copies
and can change it to any value. For those bits where different copies have the same
value, it was assumed that the colluders cannot change an undetected bit without
rendering the object useless.
Unlike generic data, multimedia has the unique characteristics that minor vari-
ations on the values will not introduce perceptually noticeable distortion. This
robustness makes it feasible and desirable to embed fingerprints seamlessly into the
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host multimedia data. Fingerprint codes designed based on the above assumptions
are usually too long to be reliably embedded into and extracted from multimedia
data. For generic data, colluders can easily detect a fingerprint code bit if it differs
between different copies and change it to any value. However, for multimedia data
such as images, the embedding is capable of spreading each fingerprint code bit
over the entire content. Thus, different bits embedded additively over the same
region are not distinguishable, neither can they be changed to any value due to
the perceptual quality constrain. Consequently, the above assumptions of the col-
lusion attacks are not always suitable for multimedia data. Instead, the average
attack and those order statistics based nonlinear collusion attacks in [52] are more
common when colluding multimedia data.
In [20], the collusion attack was modeled as averaging different copies followed
by an additive noise, and O(
√
N/ log N) colluders were shown to be enough to
break the fingerprinting system where N is the fingerprint length. Similar results
were given in [32]. The work in [64] studied the relationships between the max-
imum allowable colluders by a fingerprinting system and other parameters, e.g.,
the fingerprint length, the total number of user and system performance require-
ments. The collusion attack model was generalized to linear shift invariant filtering
followed by an additive noise in [54].
In [52], several types of collusion attacks were studied, including a few order
statistics based nonlinear attacks. For uniformly distributed fingerprints, nonlinear
collusion attacks were shown to defeat the fingerprinting system more effectively
than the average attack [52]. Simulation results in [52] also showed that normally
distributed fingerprints are more robust against nonlinear collusion attacks than
uniform fingerprints, but analytical study on the Gaussian fingerprint’s perfor-
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mance was not provided.
Anti-Collusion Fingerprint Design
The ultimate goal of analyzing collusion attacks is to design anti-collusion fin-
gerprinting systems for multimedia forensics. In an early work on collusion secure
fingerprint code design for generic data [3], fingerprint codes of length O(K4 log K)
were proposed to catch at least one out of at most K colluders with an arbitrarily
high probability. Similar work was presented in [9], which focused on tracing the
leakage of decryption keys in broadcast instead of tracing multimedia content.
Improvement was made upon the fingerprint code in [3] by replacing the lower
layer code with direct spread spectrum sequence in [73]. It relaxed the assumptions
in [3] and increased the total number of users that can be supported by three times.
In [22] and [44], new features were introduced in the fingerprint code in [3], such
as dynamic code design and asymmetric fingerprinting.
To address the unique characteristics of multimedia where it is feasible and
desired to embed the fingerprints seamlessly into the host signal, a two-layer fin-
gerprinting design scheme for multimedia was proposed in [75] where the inner code
from spread spectrum embedding [13,47] is combined with an outer error-correcting
code (ECC). The work in [29] jointly considered the fingerprint code design and
multimedia fingerprint embedding and studied the performance of error correction
code (ECC) based fingerprinting systems. In [19], the finite projective geometry
was used to generate codes whose overlap with each other can identify colluding
users. In [58], combinatorial theories were used to design the Anti Collusion Code
(ACC), and several colluder identification schemes were proposed with different
performance tradeoff. In [62], group oriented fingerprinting was proposed where
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prior knowledge of the possible collusion patterns was used to improve the collu-
sion resistance of the fingerprinting systems. Observing that some colluders are
more likely to collude with other due to social or geographical reasons, the group
oriented fingerprint design introduced a well-controlled amount of correlation into
the fingerprints assigned to different users to enhance the traitor tracing capability.
Secure Fingerprint Multicast
To address the secure fingerprint multicast issue, in [10], a two layer fingerprint
design was used where the inner layer of spread spectrum embedding [13] was
combined with the outer fingerprint code of [3]. Two uniquely fingerprinted copies
were generated, encrypted and multicasted, where each frame in the two copies
was encrypted with a unique key. Each user was given a unique set of keys for
decryption and reconstructed a unique sequence. Although their scheme reduced
the bandwidth requirement, their fingerprinting system was vulnerable to collusion
attacks. From their reported results, for a two hour video distributed to 10, 000
users, only when no more than three users colluded could their system detect
at least one colluder correctly with probability 0.9. Similar work was presented
in [6, 33,40].
In [4], the fingerprint design was similar to that of [10], and the sender gener-
ated and multicasted several uniquely fingerprinted copies. In their work, trusted
routers in the multicast tree forwarded differently fingerprinted packets to different
users. In [30], a hierarchy of trusted intermediaries was introduced into the net-
work. All intermediaries embedded their unique IDs as fingerprints into the content
as they forwarded the packets through the network, and a user was identified by
all the IDs of the intermediaries that were embedded in his received copy.
8
In [72], fingerprints were embedded in the DC coefficients of the luminance
component in I frames using spread spectrum embedding. For each fingerprinted
copy, a small portion of the MPEG stream, including the fingerprinted DC coeffi-
cients, was encrypted and unicasted to the corresponding user. Their distribution
scheme achieved the bandwidth efficiency by multicasting the rest of the video
content to all users. Since the fingerprints were only embedded in a small number
of coefficients and were of short length, the robustness against collusion attacks
was limited.
A joint fingerprinting and decryption scheme was proposed In [34]. In their
work, the content owner or the service provider encrypted the perceptually relevant
features extracted from the host signal with a secret key KS known to the content
owner/service provider only, multicasted the encrypted content to all users, and
transmitted to each user i a unique decryption key Ki 6= KS. At the receiver’s
side, user i could only partially decrypt the received encrypted bit stream, and
each user reconstructed a different version of the original host signal due to the
uniqueness of the decryption key Ki. In [34], the fingerprint information was
essentially the asymmetric key pair (KS, Ki), and the unique signature from the
partial decryption was used to identify the attacker/colluders.
1.3 Thesis Overview and Contributions
This thesis focuses on the study of the cost effective multiuser collusion on mul-
timedia fingerprinting as well as secure fingerprint multicast in networked video
applications.
We begin, in Chapter 2, with an introduction of digital fingerprinting for mul-
timedia forensics. We first introduce the general framework of multimedia finger-
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printing systems, and then discuss the multimedia fingerprint design and embed-
ding. In particular, we focus on spread spectrum embedding that is widely used in
multimedia fingerprinting, and review multimedia fingerprint design that jointly
considers fingerprint code design and embedding. We also consider several possible
applications of multimedia fingerprinting and study their system requirements.
In Chapter 3, we address nonlinear collusion attacks on Gaussian fingerprints.
We first consider from the colluders’ point of view and compare various nonlinear
collusion attacks on independent Gaussian fingerprints. We analyze the effective-
ness of the collusion attacks and the perceptual quality of the colluded signals.
We then shift our role to desinger/detector and analyze the performance of sev-
eral commonly used detection statistics [48,52,76] in the literature under collusion
attacks. We also propose a preprocessing technique that improves the detection
performance by utilizing the statistical features of the extracted fingerprints.
Most previous work on fingerprint code design and collusion attacks for mul-
timedia assumed that all the colluders receive fingerprinted copies of the same
quality. In practice, due to the heterogeneity of the networks and the end users,
it is often required to have scalability during video encoding and transmission,
which enables the users to recover physically meaningful information by partially
decoding compressed bit streams [60]. In Chapter 4, taking temporal scalability as
an example, we examine the impact of the scalability on multimedia fingerprinting
and collusion attacks. We consider fair collusion attacks where all colluders have
equal probability of detection, and analyze the effectiveness of the collusion under
the fairness constraints when different colluders receive copies of different quality.
We also investigate the collusion resistance of the scalable fingerprinting systems,
and analyze the number of colluders that are required to undermine the tracing
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capability of the scalable fingerprinting systems.
In addition, most prior work relied on the assumption that all colluders tell each
other the true information of their received copies during collusion, and they are
willing to share the same risk of being captured. However, some colluders might
be selfish and wish to minimize their own risk while still profiting from collusion.
To reduce their probability of detection, they process their received copies before
multiuser collusion, and hide information of their fingerprinted copies from other
colluders. In Chapter 5, we investigate the possible strategy that the selfish collud-
ers can use to reduce probability of detection, analyze their performance, and find
the optimal pre-collusion processing that minimizes the selfish colluder’s risk under
the quality constraints. We will also investigate the possible countermeasures by
other colluders to protect their own interests and prevent those selfish colluders
from processing their copies before collusion.
In Chapter 6 and 7, we address secure fingerprint multicast in networked video
applications. Most prior work in fingerprint multicast considered applications
where the goal of the fingerprinting system is to be resistant to collusion attacks
with a few colluders, e.g., seven or ten traitors, and designed the efficient distri-
bution schemes accordingly. In many video applications, there are a large number
of users (e.g., several thousand users), and therefore, potentially a large number
of colluders (e.g., a few dozen or maybe even one hundred colluders). Some prior
work [58, 61, 62] has shown that with proper design and embedding of the fin-
gerprints, the fingerprinting systems can resist collusion attacks with dozens of
colluders, e.g., up to 60 colluders. In Chapter 6, we consider video applications
where the fingerprinting system aims to survive collusion attacks with dozens of
or even a hundred colluders, adopt the fingerprinting systems with strong traitor
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tracing capability [58, 62], and investigate the secure and efficient distribution of
fingerprinted copies. In particular, we propose two secure fingerprint multicast
scheme: a general fingerprint multicast scheme that can be used with most spread
spectrum embedding based fingerprinting systems, and a joint fingerprint design
and distribution scheme that utilizes the special structure of the fingerprint de-
sign to further reduce the communication cost. In Chapter 7, we analyze the
performance of these two fingerprint multicast schemes, including the bandwidth
efficiency and the robustness of the embedded fingerprints against collusion at-
tacks. We also analyze the quality of the reconstructed sequences, and propose a
fingerprint drift compensation scheme to improve the quality of the reconstructed
frames at the receiver’s side without extra communication overhead.






2.1 General Framework of Digital Fingerprinting
Systems
Figure 2.1 shows a general framework for digital fingerprinting, which consists
of three parts: fingerprint embedding, multiuser collusion attacks and colluder
identification.
Fingerprint Embedding
Starting with an original copy of the host signal S, the content owner or the service
provider generates a unique fingerprint W(i) for each user u(i) in the system, and
embeds it into the fingerprinted copy X(i) that will be distributed to u(i). For
the purpose of traitor tracing in digital fingerprinting applications, the fingerprint









































Figure 2.1: The general framework for digital fingerprinting.
• Imperceptibility : The fingerprinted copy X(i) that is distributed user u(i)
is perceptually the same as the original host signal S, and the embedded
fingerprint W(i) should not introduce perceptually noticeable distortion into
the host signal S.
• Security : The embedded fingerprint W(i) should only be known to and ac-
cessed by authorized party. According to the Kerckhoff’s assumption in
cryptography [39], for a fingerprinting system that requires a very high level
of security, the fingerprinting system designer must assume that the adver-
sary has complete knowledge of the fingerprinting algorithm, and the secrecy
of the embedded fingerprints relies only on the secret keys that are used to
generate the unique fingerprints.
• Robustness : The fingerprints must persist in the host data after manipula-
tion, including both unintentional signal processing (e.g., compression) and
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intentional attacks to remove/attenuate the fingerprints (e.g., collusion at-
tacks).
After the fingerprint embedding, the content owner or the service provider dis-
tributes the fingerprinted copy X(i) to u(i).
Multiuser Collusion Attacks
At the attackers’ side, the colluders apply multiuser collusion attacks to the fin-
gerprinted copies that they receive, and try to remove or attenuate the embedded
fingerprints. A simple example of the collusion attack is to average all the finger-
printed copies, and each fingerprint’s energy is reduced by a factor of 1
K2
, where K
is the total number of colluders. The colluders can also apply order statistics based
nonlinear collusion attacks, e.g., taking the minimum values of the corresponding
components in the K copies. In this thesis, we consider fair multiuser collusion
attacks, where all colluders share the same risk and have the same probability to
be captured.
In addition to the multiuser collusion, the colluders can also apply single-copy
attacks, e.g., low pass filtering and compression, to further hinder the detection
process. Then, the newly generated colluded copy is redistributed without autho-
rization.
Fingerprint Detection and Colluder Identification
When the content owner discovers the existence of the illegally redistributed col-
luded copy, he applies a fingerprint detection and colluder identification process
to the suspicious copy. The detector first extracts the fingerprint Y from the
suspicious copy, compares this extracted fingerprint Y with each of the original
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fingerprints {W(i)}, and estimates the identities of the colluders.
Depending on the presence of the host signal S during the colluder identification
process, there are two main detection scenarios in data hiding applications, blind
and non-blind detection, respectively [46, 58]. In the blind detection scenario,
the host signal is not available to the detector and serves as an additional noise
during detection; while in the non-blind scenario, the host signal is available to
the detector and is first removed from the test signal before detection. Compared
with the blind detection, previous work has shown that non-blind detection has
better detection performance due to the following two reasons. First, compared
with blind detection, the non-blind detection first removes the host signal from
the test copy before fingerprint detection, and therefore, significantly reduces the
energy of the noise during the detection process [46, 58, 64]. In addition, in the
non-blind detection scenario, the detector can use the host signal to estimate the
possible modifications by the attackers, and therefore, compensate accordingly. For
example, by registering the test copy with respect to the original host signal, the
detector can successfully undo the geometric attacks with a very small alignment
noise [38,46].
In many data hiding applications, the host signal is often not available to the
detector and blind detection is preferred or even required [46]. For example, when
proving ownership of multimedia data, the host signal itself is questionable and
the blind detection must be applied [16,76]. However, for many fingerprinting ap-
plications, the fingerprint verification and colluder identification process is usually
handled by the content owner or an authorized third party who can have access to
the original host signal. Therefore, the host signal can be regarded as available to
the detector and the non-blind detection is feasible for fingerprinting applications.
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To improve the detection performance, in this thesis, non-blind detection is chosen,
and we further assume that the test copy has been registered to the original host
signal before the detection process.
2.2 Multimedia Fingerprint Design and Embed-
ding
In this section, we first introduce spread spectrum embedding that is widely used
in digital fingerprinting systems, and then discuss multimedia fingerprint design
that jointly considers the encoding, embedding, and detection of fingerprints in
multimedia fingerprinting systems.
2.2.1 Spread Spectrum Embedding
Spread spectrum watermark/fingerprint embedding borrows the idea of spread
spectrum modulation in communication systems, and is widely used in digital
watermarking and fingerprinting systems due to its robustness against many at-
tacks [12, 13, 47]. It fits watermarking into the traditional model of a communica-
tion system, where the watermark is regarded as the message that is to be sent
from the watermark embedder to the watermark detector, and the modifications
to the watermarked copies (both unintentionally and intentionally) are modeled as
the noise in the channel during transmission. If blind detection is applied at the
detector’s side, then the host signal is also considered as one source of the noise.
In additive spread spectrum embedding, depending on the applications and the
design requirement, the watermark can be embedded in the spatial domain [26],
the frequency domain (e.g., DCT or DWT) [13, 47], or the feature points selected
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from the host signal [34]. Assume that S is the host signal represented by a vector
of length N , and W is the watermark of the same length N to embed. The
watermarked copy X is generated by
Xj = Sj + JNDjWj, (2.1)
where Xj, Sj and Wj are the jth components of the watermarked copy, the host
signal and the watermark, respectively. JND is the just-noticeable-distortion from
human visual models [12,47], and it controls the energy and achieve the impercep-
tibility of the embedded watermarks.
At the detector’s side, given the suspicious copy Y of length N , to test the
presence of the watermark W in Y, the detection process can be modeled as a




H0 : Yj = nj (j = 1, · · · , N) if watermark is absent,
H1 : Yj = Wj + nj (j = 1, · · · , N) if watermark is present.
(2.2)
In (2.2), the deterministic signal W is the watermark to test, n is an additive noise
that comes from signal processing as well as attacks on the watermarked copy X,
and N is the number of the coefficients that carry the watermark information. If
n is modeled as i.i.d. Gaussian N (0, σ2n), then from the detection theory [48], the
optimum detector is the matched filter
TN = < Y,W >/||W||, (2.3)






N (0, σ2n) if watermark is absent,
N (||W||, σ2n) if watermark is present.
(2.4)
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Then, TN is compared with a threshold h and the detector decides H1 if TN > h
and H0 otherwise. The threshold h can be set according to the Bayesian rule or
the Neyman-Pearson rule [48], depending on the requirement of the applications.
The above hypothesis testing is to test if a watermark W is present or absent.
Another popular model considers the scenario where an one bit information is em-
bedded using antipodal model [58,68]. Assume that d is a deterministic sequence,
and b = {−1, +1} is the one bit information to embed, then the detection problem




H0 : Yj = −dj + nj (j = 1, · · · , N) if b = −1,
H1 : Yj = +dj + nj (j = 1, · · · , N) if b = +1.
(2.5)
The analysis of the detection statistics is similar to that for the model in 2.2.
2.2.2 Fingerprint Design for Multimedia Forensics
Orthogonal Fingerprint Design
A straightforward way of extending spread spectrum embedding to digital finger-
print is to assign users mutually orthogonal fingerprints [20, 32]. The advantage
of the orthogonal fingerprint modulation is the simplicity of the fingerprint design
and embedding. From the prior work in [64], orthogonal fingerprinting systems
can survive collusion attacks with up to a few dozen colluders, and are preferred
for applications with a small group of users. Given a total of M orthogonal basis,
orthogonal fingerprinting systems have limited capacity and can support no more
than a total of M users.
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Group Oriented Fingerprint Design
To improve the traitor tracing capability of multimedia fingerprinting systems,
group oriented fingerprinting systems take advantage of the prior knowledge of the
possible collusion patterns during the design of the multimedia fingerprints [62].
Observing that adversaries are more likely to collude with some users than others
due to geographic or social circumstances, in group oriented fingerprint design,
some users who are more likely to collude with each other are assigned correlated
fingerprints to enhance the collusion resistance performance.
Coded Fingerprint Design
Compared with orthogonal fingerprint design, given a limited cardinality of the
orthogonal basis, coded fingerprint design has the advantage that it can accom-
modate more users in the fingerprinting systems [58]. In coded fingerprint design,
given ν orthogonal basis signals {d(k)}k=1,··· ,ν , each user in the system is assigned
a unique code ~b(i) = [bi,1, · · · , bi,ν ] where bi,k = {−1, +1}. To generate the finger-
print W(i) for user u(i), there are two types of fingerprint modulation schemes: the
CDMA based modulation and the TDMA based modulation [68]. In the CDMA




bi,k · d(k). (2.6)
In the TDMA based fingerprint modulation, the host signal (audio, image or video)
is first partitioned into ν non-overlapping regions. For user u(i), the signal bi,k ·d(k)
is embedded into the kth region of the host signal.
A designer of the coded fingerprinting systems should design the fingerprint
code ~b with good collusion resistance property while supporting as many users
as possible. Prior work in the literature uses technologies from different areas to
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design collusion resistant fingerprint code for multimedia, including the projective
geometry [19], error correction code [29,75], combinatorial theory [58], etc.
2.3 Performance Criteria for Digital Fingerprint-
ing Systems
Although the overall goal of the digital fingerprinting system designer is to trace
traitors and prevent information leakage, different applications of multimedia fin-
gerprinting systems may have different concerns, and therefore, different require-
ments [64]. The digital fingerprinting systems should be designed according to the
requirements of the applications and the appropriate performance criteria. This
section analyzes the possible requirements of different applications and the corre-
sponding performance criteria.
Catch One
In the catch one applications, the goal is to maximize the chance to capture one
colluder while minimizing the probability of falsely accusing any innocent users.
An example of such applications is to provide digital evidence in the court of law.
In such applications, the performance criteria are the probability of capturing at
least one colluder Pd and the probability of accusing at least one innocent user Pfp.
From the detector’s point of view, the detector fails if either it fails to capture any
of the colluders or it falsely accuse an innocent user as a colluder. Consequently,
the system requirements are
Pd ≥ γd, and Pfp ≤ γfp, (2.7)
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where the parameters γd and γfp are determined by the requirements of the appli-
cations and are properly chosen by the designer of the fingerprinting systems.
Catch More
In the catch more fingerprinting applications, the goal is to capture as many col-
luders as possible, though possibly at a cost of accusing more innocent users. In
these applications, the detection process is combined with other components in
the decision making system and other evidences to make the final decision. The
set of performance criteria consists of the fraction of colluders that are successfully
captured E[Fd], and the fraction of innocent users that are falsely placed under
suspicion E[Ffp]. The system requirements for such applications are
E[Fd] ≥ λd, and E[Ffp] ≤ λfp, (2.8)
where λd and λfp are the parameters determined by the requirements of the appli-
cations.
Catch All
In this scenario, the fingerprints are designed to maximize the probability of cap-
turing all colluders, while maintaining an acceptable amount of innocents being
falsely accused. This goal arises when the data’s security is of great concern and
any information leakage could result in serious damage. An example of this sce-
nario is to protect the highly classified documents in military applications. Assume
that there are a total of M users and a total K colluders in the system. This set
of performance criteria consists of measuring the efficiency rate
R =
(M −K) · E[Ffp]
K · E[Fd] (2.9)
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that describes the number of innocents accused per colluder, and the probability










The system requirements for these applications are
R ≤ θr, and Pd,all ≥ θd. (2.11)
θr and θd are determined by the requirements of the applications.
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Chapter 3
Nonlinear Collusion Attacks on
Multimedia Fingerprinting
Most prior works on digital fingerprinting and collusion attacks for multimedia
employ the watermark embedding method in [13] and use a linear collusion at-
tack model. In [52], several types of collusion attacks were studied, including a
few order statistics based nonlinear attacks. For uniformly distributed fingerprints,
nonlinear collusion attacks were shown to defeat the fingerprinting system more ef-
fectively than the averaging attack [52]. Simulation results in [52] also showed that
normally distributed fingerprints are more robust against nonlinear collusion at-
tacks than uniform fingerprints, but analytical study on the Gaussian fingerprints’
performance was not provided. In addition to the robustness against collusion
attacks, compared with discrete watermarks and uniform watermarks, Gaussian
watermarks are proven to be resistant to statistical and histogram attacks [15].
Therefore, Gaussian distributed fingerprints should be used in multimedia finger-
printing systems for robustness against various types of attacks.
In this chapter, we mainly address the analysis of order statistics based nonlin-
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ear collusion attacks on independent Gaussian fingerprints. We first consider from
the colluders’ point of view and compare various nonlinear collusion attacks on
independent Gaussian fingerprints. We analyze the effectiveness of the collusion
attacks and the perceptual quality of the colluded signals under different collusion
attacks. We then shift our role to desinger/detector and analyze the performance
of several commonly used detection statistics [48, 52, 76] in the literature under
collusion attacks. The analysis of different detection statistics provides a guideline
for the selection of the detector in a multimedia forensic system.
This chapter is organized as follows. We begin, in Section 3.1, with a system
model of digital fingerprinting and collusion attacks. Then in Section 3.2, we
analyze the effectiveness and the perceptual quality of different nonlinear collusion
attacks, and investigate the detection performance of different detection statistics.
In Section 3.3, we first study the resistance of independent unbounded Gaussian
fingerprints to different collusion attacks. We then introduce bounded Gaussian-
like fingerprints to achieve both the robustness against collusion attacks and the
imperceptibility of the embedded fingerprints, and analyze their performance. In
Section 3.4, we propose a pre-processing technique of the extracted fingerprints to
improve the detection performance. Section 3.5 shows the simulation results on
real images. A few more nonlinear collusion attacks are discussed in Section 3.6.
3.1 System Model
3.1.1 System Model and Assumptions
We consider a digital fingerprinting and collusion attack system that consists of
three parts: fingerprint embedding, collusion attacks and fingerprint detection.
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We use the spread spectrum embedding [13,47] to hide fingerprints in the host
signal. Assume that there are a total of M users in the system. Given a host signal
represented by a vector S of length N , the owner generates a unique fingerprint
W(i) of length N for each user u(i), i = 1, 2, · · · , M . We assume that the M
fingerprints {W(i)}Mi=1 are independent of each other. The fingerprinted copy X(i)
that is distributed to user u(i) is generated by X
(i)
j = Sj + αjW
(i)





j are the jth components of the fingerprinted copy, the original signal,
and the fingerprint, respectively, and α is the just-noticeable-difference (JND) from
human visual models [47] to control the energy and achieve the imperceptibility
of the embedded fingerprints. Then, the fingerprinted copy X(i) is distributed to
user u(i).
Assume that K out of M users collude, and SC = {i1, i2, · · · , iK} is the set
containing the indices of the colluders. We further assume that the collusion attack
is in the same domain as the fingerprint embedding. With K different copies
{X(k)}k∈SC , the colluders generate the jth component of the attacked copy Vj
using one of the collusion functions shown in (3.1).





























j − V medj ,




V minj with prob. p,












minimum, the maximum and the median values of {Xkj }k∈SC , respectively. The
colluded copy is V = [V1, V2, · · · , VN ]. For our model, applying the collusion at-
tacks to the fingerprinted copies is equivalent to applying the collusion attacks to
the embedded fingerprints. For example, Vminj = min
(
{Sj + α ·W(k)j }k∈SC
)
=





In fingerprinting applications, the original signal S is often available to de-
tectors. To improve the detection performance [58], the detector first removes the
host signal from the attacked copy and extracts the fingerprint Y = g({W(k)}k∈SC )
where g(·) is a collusion function defined in (3.1). The detector analyzes the simi-
larity between Y and each of the M original fingerprints {W(i)}, and outputs the
estimated colluder set.
In the literature, there are three detection statistics available to test the pres-










N − 3 log 1 + ρ
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N − 1 .
In (3.2), ‖W(i)‖ is the Euclidean norm of W(i); N is the length of the fingerprint;









j are the sample means of Y and W






j − W̃ (i)) and σ̂2Y = 1N−1
∑
j (Yj − Ỹ ) are the unbiased estimates of the
original fingerprint’s variance and the extracted fingerprint’s variance, respectively;
and My and V
2
y are the sample mean and sample variance of {YjW (i)j }. Note that
all three detection statistics are correlation based in which the correlation between
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the extracted fingerprint Y and the original fingerprint W(i) is the kernel term,
and they differ primarily in the way of normalization.
3.1.2 Performance Criteria
We consider the following performance criteria to analyze different collusion attacks
and different detection statistics.
Effectiveness of Collusion Attacks and Detection Performance of Detec-
tion Statistics
To study the effectiveness of collusion attacks and the performance of detection
statistics, different criteria were used to address different applications in the litera-
ture. One set of criteria is the probability of falsely accusing at least one innocent
user and the probability of not identifying any of the colluders [20,32]. The second
set of criteria is the fraction of colluders that are successfully captured and the
fraction of innocent users that are falsely accused, as considered in [58] and [63].
We adopt these criteria and use the following measurements:
• Pd: the probability of capturing at least one colluder,
• Pfp: the probability of falsely accusing at least one innocent user,
• Fd: the fraction of colluders that are successfully captured, and
• Ffp: the fraction of innocent users that are falsely accused.
Perceptual Quality
When considering the perceptual quality, one of the commonly used objective
measurements on perceptual distortion is the mean square error (MSE) and equiv-
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alently PSNR for image applications. A major weakness of MSE is that it ignores
the unique characteristic of multimedia data: minor perturbations on the data
values will not cause noticeable distortion as long as they do not exceed the just-
noticeable-difference [47]. Furthermore, MSE only measures the average energy
of the noise introduced and does not consider the local constraints on each noise
component.




j=1 I[|nj |>JNDj ]/N , and











nj + JNDj if nj < −JNDj,
0 if − JNDj ≤ nj ≤ JNDj,
nj − JNDj if nj > JNDj.
(3.3)
MSEJND calculates the power of the noise components that introduce perceptual
distortion and FJND reflects the percentage of the noise components that exceed
JND. A large MSEJND or a large FJND indicates large perceptual distortion in-
troduced.
3.2 Statistical Analysis of Collusion Attacks and
Detection Statistics
In this section, we will analyze the statistical behavior of three detection statistics
under different collusion attacks.
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3.2.1 Analysis of the Correlation Term under Different
Collusion Attacks




cussed in the previous section, when measuring the similarity between Y and W(i),














g({W (k)j }k∈Sc)W (i)j , (3.4)
where N is the length of the fingerprint. For different collusion attacks, T
′(i)
N
follows different distributions. This section analyzes the statistical behavior of this
correlation term under different collusion attacks.
Under the assumption that {W (k)j , k = 1, · · · ,M}Nj=1 are i.i.d. distributed with
zero mean and variance σ2W , {g({W (k)j }k∈Sc)W (i)j }Nj=1 are also i.i.d. distributed.








































. We simplify the notation by dropping the sub-
script j. For a given K and a given collusion function g(·), due to the symmetry
of g({W (k)}k∈Sc)W (i) with respect to the user index i, all g({W (k)}k∈Sc)W (i) where
i ∈ SC have the same mean and variance, and similarly, all g({W (k)}k∈Sc)W (i)
where i /∈ SC have the same mean and variance.
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For i /∈ SC , because {W (i)}Mi=1 are i.i.d. distributed with zero mean and variance
































are needed for analyzing the correlation term
under each collusion attack.
















































Under the minimum attack, given the total number of colluders K, if f(·)
and F (·) are the pdf and cdf of W (i), respectively, from the probability and order






min = w′) = Kf(w′)[1− F (w′)]K−1. (3.9)
From (3.9), we can calculate the second moment of Wmin. For i ∈ SC , we can
express the joint pdf of Wmin and W (i) as follows by noticing that fW min,W (i)(w
′, w)
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breaks into two nonzero regions
fW min,W (i)(W





f(w′)[1− F (w′)]K−1 if Wmin = W (i),








































The analysis of the maximum and median attacks follows the same approach.







max = w′) = Kf(w′)FK−1(w′), (3.12)
and the joint pdf of Wmax and W (i) for i ∈ SC is:
fW max,W (i)(W





f(w′)FK−1(w′) if Wmax = W (i),
(K − 1)f(w′)f(w)FK−2(w′) if Wmax > W (i).





. If K = 2l + 1, the
pdf of Wmed is:
fW med(W





f(w′)F l(w′)[1− F (w′)]l, (3.14)
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and the joint pdf of Wmed and W (i) for i ∈ SC is
fW med,W (i)(W

















f(w′)f(w)F l−1(w′)[1− F (w′)]l if Wmed > W (i).






























































The results from the previous analysis on the minimum and the maximum
attacks can be applied to (3.16). In addition, we can find the correlation between
Wmin and Wmax from their joint pdf
fW min,W max(W
min = w′,Wmax = w′′) (3.17)
























tained based on the joint pdf of Wmin, Wmax, and W (i), which is
fW min,W max,W (i)(W





(K − 1)f(w′)f(w′′)[F (w′′)− F (w′)]K−2
if Wmin = W (i),
(K − 1)f(w′)f(w′′)[F (w′′)− F (w′)]K−2
if Wmax = W (i),
(K − 1)(K − 2)f(w′)f(w′′)f(w)[F (w′)− F (w′′)]K−3
if Wmin < W (i) < Wmax.
The analysis of the modified negative (ModNeg) attack is similar to that of the
minmax attack. If K = 2l + 1, then the joint pdf of Wmin and Wmax is
fW min,W med(W
min = w′,Wmed = w′′) (3.20)





f(w′)f(w′′)[F (w′′)− F (w′)]l−2[1− F (w′′)]l,
and the joint pdf of Wmed and Wmax is
fW med,W max(W
med = w′,Wmaxw′′) (3.21)





f(w′)f(w′′)[F (w′′)− F (w′)]l−1F l(w′).
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For i ∈ SC , the joint pdf of Wmin,Wmed and W (i) is
fW min,W med,W (i)(W










f(w′)f(w′′)[F (w′′)− F (w′)]l−1[1− F (w′′)]l






f(w′)f(w′′)[F (w′′)− F (w′)]l−1[1− F (w′′)]l




f(w′)f(w′′)f(w)[F (w′′)− F (w′)]l−1[1− F (w′′)]l−1




f(w′)f(w′′)f(w)[F (w′′)− F (w′)]l−2[1− F (w′′)]l
if Wmin < W (i) < Wmed,
(3.23)
and the joint pdf of Wmax,Wmed and W (i) is
fW med,W max,W (i)(W










f(w′)f(w′′)[F (w′′)− F (w′)]l−1F l(w′′)






f(w′)f(w′′)[F (w′′)− F (w′)]l−1F l(w′′)




f(w′)f(w′′)f(w)[F (w′′)− F (w′)]l−1F l−1(w′′)




f(w′)f(w′′)f(w)[F (w′′)− F (w′)]l−2F l(w′′)
if Wmed < W (i) < Wmax.
Under the randomized negative (RandNeg) attack, we assume that p is in-
dependent of {W (i)}. The colluded fingerprint can be written as W randneg =
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Wmin ·Bp+Wmax ·(1−Bp), where Bp is a Bernoulli random variable with parameter
p and is independent of {W (i)}. The m-th moment (m = 1, 2, · · · ) of W randnegW (i)


















= p · E [(Wmin)m] + (1− p) · E [(Wmax)m] . (3.25)
From all the above analysis, the correlation kernel term T
′(i)
N can be approxi-




















if i ∈ SC .
(3.26)
3.2.2 Analysis of the Detection Statistics
From (3.26), we can approximate the detection statistics T
(i)



























if i ∈ SC .
(3.27)







N − 3 log 1+E[ρ(i)]
1−E[ρ(i)] , where E[ρ
(i)] is the mean of ρ(i) defined
in (3.2) and is the estimated correlation coefficient of the extracted fingerprint Y











N − 3 log 1+E[ρ(i)]
1−E[ρ(i)] , 1
)
if i ∈ SC .
Here, for i ∈ SC ,
E[ρ(i)] ≈ cov
[













where σ2g,Y is the variance of the extracted fingerprint.
The q statistics normalize the correlation term with the unbiased estimate of












if i ∈ SC .
(3.29)
3.2.3 Analysis of the Performance of Collusion Attacks
and Detection Statistics
Analysis of Pd, Pfp, E[Fd], and E[Ffp]
In our system model with a total of M users and K colluders, given a signal to be
tested and given one detection statistics, K out of the M statistics {T (i)N }Mi=1 are
normally distributed with a positive mean and the others are normally distributed
with a zero mean, as analyzed in the previous section.

















If {T (i)N }Mi=1 are uncorrelated with each other or the correlation is very small, then








































2 dt is the Gaussian tail function.

























The analysis of Pd, Pfp, Fd and Ffp for the Z and q statistics are the same.
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Perceptual Quality
In our system model, the distortion introduced to the host signal by the colluded
fingerprint is nj = JNDj · g({W (k)j }k∈SC ), j = 1, 2, · · · , N . Given the collusion at-
tack g(·) and the number of colluders K, if A4=g({W (k)}k∈SC ) has the pdf fg,K(w),
we can simplify the MSEJND and E[FJND] to
MSEJND ≈ N × E
[




(w + 1)2fg,K(w) dw + N
∫ ∞
1
(w − 1)2fg,K(w) dw,







3.3 Effectiveness of Collusion Attacks on Gaus-
sian Based Fingerprints
It has been shown in [52] that the uniform fingerprints can be easily defeated by
nonlinear collusion attacks, and the simulation results there also showed that the
Gaussian fingerprints are more resistant to nonlinear collusion attacks than the
uniform fingerprints. However, no analytic study was provided in the literature
on the resistance of Gaussian fingerprints to nonlinear collusion attacks. In this
section, we study the effectiveness of nonlinear collusion attacks on Gaussian based
fingerprints.
3.3.1 Unbounded Gaussian Fingerprints
Statistical Analysis
We first study the resistance of unbounded Gaussian fingerprints to collusion at-
tacks. As before, we assume that there are a total of M users and the fingerprints
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{W (i)j } are i.i.d. Gaussian with zero mean and variance σ2W . Usually we take
σ2W ≈ 1/9 to ensure that around 99.9% of fingerprint components are in the range
of [−1, 1] and are imperceptible after being scaled by a JND factor.
Under the assumption that the Bernoulli random variable Bp in the random-





























= 0. From (3.30) and (3.31), the larger the variance, the more
effective the attack. Consequently, we take p = 0.5 and consider the most effective
attack.




, σ2g,H0 and σ
2
g,Y for Gaussian distribution with zero mean and variance
σ2W . Due to the existence of the Q(·) terms in the pdfs and joint pdfs, analytical
expressions are not available. We use the recursive adaptive Simpson quadrature
method [23] to numerically evaluate the integrals with an absolute error tolerance
of 10−6 and the results for σ2W = 1/9 are plotted in Figure 3.1.
From Figure 3.1, we find that, for a given number of colluders K, µg,H1 are the
same for all collusion attacks and equal to σ2W /K. Different collusion attacks have
different σ2g,H1 , σ
2
g,H0
and σ2g,Y . The relationship of σ
2
g,H1





= σ2max,H1 > σ
2
modneg,H1
> σ2ave,H1 ≈ σ2med,H1 ≈ σ2minmax,H1 ,
and σ2randneg,H0 = σ
2
min,H0















































Minimum, maximum and        
randomized negative attacks 
Modified negative attacks 
(a) (b)
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Randomized negative attack 
Modified negative attack 
Minimum and maximum attacks 
(c) (d)
Figure 3.1: (a) µg,H1 , (b) σ
2
g,H1
, (c) σ2g,H0 , and (d) σ
2
g,Y of the unbounded Gaussian
fingerprints with σ2W = 1/9.
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> σ2ave,H0 ≈ σ2med,H0 ≈ σ2minmax,H0 , (3.34)








> σ2ave,Y ≈ σ2med,Y ≈ σ2minmax,Y . (3.35)
Note that the extracted fingerprint Y under the minimum or maximum attack is
not zero mean. σ2g,H0 is proportional to the second moment of Y, and is the largest
under the minimum, maximum, and randomized negative attacks. However, the
variance of Y under the minimum or maximum attacks is small and comparable
with σ2g,Y under the average, median, and minmax attacks.
In order to compare the effectiveness of different collusion attacks, we define
the following notations:
• “ attack A > attack B ”: attack A is more effective than attack B in defeating
the system,
• “ attack A = attack B ”: attack A and attack B have the same performance
in defeating the system,
• “ attack A ≈ attack B ”: attack A and attack B have similar performance in
defeating the system.
From (3.30), (3.31), (3.34), and (3.35), with the TN statistics or the q statistics,
we can sort different collusion attacks in the descending order of their effectiveness
as:
Minimum = Maximum = RandNeg > ModNeg
> Average ≈ Median ≈ MinMax; (3.36)
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randomized negative attacks 
Average, median, minmax
and modified negative attacks 
Figure 3.2: Perceptual quality of the attacked copy under different attacks with un-
bounded Gaussian fingerprints. Here σ2W = 1/9. (Left) MSEJND/N . (Right) E[FJND].
and with the Z statistics, we can sort different attacks in the descending order of
their effectiveness as:
RandNeg > ModNeg > Minimum = Maximum
> Average ≈ Median ≈ MinMax. (3.37)
Therefore, the randomized negative attack is the most effective attack.
So far we have studied the effectiveness of different collusion attacks. As for
the perceptual quality, Figure 3.2 shows the MSEJND and E[FJND] of different
collusion attacks with i.i.d. N (0, 1/9) fingerprints. As we can see from Figure 3.2,
although the minimum, maximum, and randomized negative attacks are more ef-
fective in defeating the fingerprinting system, they also introduce larger noticeable
distortion that is proportional to the number of colluders.
Simulation Results
Our simulation is set up as follows. Since the number of embeddable coefficients
in 256× 256 and 512× 512 images is usually O(104), we assume that the length of
the fingerprints is 10, 000. To accommodate a total of M = 100 users, we generate
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Z under minimum attack
Tn, Z and q under
modified negative attack 
Tn under minimum attack 
q under minimum attack 
























Tn, Z and q under
modified negative attack 
Tn and q under minimum attack 
(e) (f)
Figure 3.3: (a) Pd of the TN statistics under different attacks, (b) E[Fd] of the TN
statistics under different attacks, (c) Pd of the Z statistics under different attacks, (d)
E[Fd] of the Z statistics under different attacks, (e) Pd of different statistics, and (f) E[Fd]
of different statistics with unbounded Gaussian fingerprints. Here σ2W = 1/9, M = 100,
and N = 104. In (a), (c) and (e), Pfp = 10−2. In (b), (d) and (f), E[Ffp] = 10−2.
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100 independent fingerprints of length 10, 000. Every fingerprint component is
independent of each other and follows the N (0, 1/9) Gaussian distribution. Our
results are based on a total of 2000 simulation runs.
In Figure 3.3 (a) and (c), Pfp is fixed as 10
−2 and we compare Pd of the TN
and Z statistics, respectively, under different collusion attacks. In Figure 3.3 (b)
and (d), E[Ffp] is fixed as 10
−2 and we compare E[Fd] of the TN and Z statistics,
respectively, under different attacks. The performance of the q statistics is similar
to that of TN and is not shown here. We compare different detection statistics
with Pfp = 10
−2 in Figure 3.3 (e) and E[Ffp] = 10−2 in Figure 3.3 (f). Note that
in Figure 3.3 (e) and (f), we only plot the performance of the minimum and that
of the modified negative attacks since the maximum attack yield the same result
as the minimum attack and all other attacks have a similar trend.
The simulation results shown in Figure 3.3 agree with our analysis. From
Figure 3.3 (a) and (b), with the TN or q statistics, the minimum, maximum, and
randomized negative attack are the most effective attacks followed by the modified
negative attack. The average, median, and minmax attacks are the least effective
attacks. From Figure 3.3 (c) and (d), with the Z statistics, the randomized negative
attack is the most effective attack followed by the modified negative attack. The
average, median, and minmax attacks have similar performance and they are the
least efficient attacks. The minimum and maximum attacks are the second least
effective attacks. From Figure 3.3 (e) and (f), the Z statistics are more resistant to
the minimum and maximum attacks than the TN and q statistics while the three
statistics have similar performance under other collusion attacks. Therefore, from
the colluders’ point view, the best strategy for them is to choose the randomized
negative attack. From the detector’s point of view, the Z statistics should be used
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to be more robust against the minimum and maximum attacks.
In Figure 3.4, we show the attacked images after the average and the minimum
attacks with 75 colluders. Although the minimum, maximum and randomized
negative attacks are more effective, they also introduce much larger noticeable
distortion in the host image. This is because the fingerprints are not bounded,
and in fact, such unbounded fingerprints can introduce noticeable distortion in the
fingerprinted copies even when without collusion.
3.3.2 Bounded Gaussian-like Fingerprints
Compared with uniform fingerprints, Gaussian fingerprints improve the detector’s
resistance to nonlinear collusion attacks [52] and are resilient to statistical and
histogram attacks [15]. Because Gaussian distribution is unbounded, it is possi-
ble that the embedded fingerprints exceed the JND and introduce perceptually
distinguishable distortion. However, imperceptibility is a requirement of digital
fingerprinting and the owner has to guarantee the perceptual quality of the fin-
gerprinted copies. In order to remove the perceptual distortion while maintaining
the robustness against collusion attacks, we introduce the bounded Gaussian-like
fingerprints and study their performance under collusion attacks.
Assume that fX(·) and FX(·) are the pdf and cdf of a Gaussian random variable







FX(1)−FX(−1) if − 1 ≤ x ≤ 1,
0 otherwise.
(3.38)
We can show that the variance of fingerprints following pdf (3.38) is σ2W , and
the embedded fingerprints introduce no perceptual distortion since MSEJND = 0
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Figure 3.4: Comparison of perceptual quality of the attacked images under different
attacks with 75 colluders. Fingerprints are generated from unbounded Gaussian distri-
bution with σ2W = 1/9. (Left) Lena. (Right) Baboon. (Top) The zoomed-in region of
the original 256× 256 images. (Middle) The colluded images under the average attack.
(Bottom) The colluded images under the minimum attack.
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and FJND = 0. By bounding the fingerprints in the range of [−1, 1], we maintain
the energy of the embedded fingerprints while achieving the imperceptibility.
For fingerprints following distribution (3.38), the analyses of the collusion at-
tacks and the detection statistics are similar to the unbounded case and thus
omitted. If we sort different collusion attacks according to their effectiveness, the
result is the same as that of the unbounded Gaussian fingerprints.
The simulation of the bounded Gaussian-like fingerprints under collusion at-
tacks is set up similarly to that in Section 3.3.1. Assume that there are a total of
M = 100 users and the host signal has N = 104 embeddable coefficients. The i.i.d.
fingerprints are generated from the distribution (3.38) with σ2W = 1/9. In Figure
3.5 (a) and (c), Pfp = 10
−2 and we compare Pd of the TN and Z statistics, respec-
tively, under different collusion attacks. In Figure 3.5 (b) and (d), E[Ffp] = 10
−2
and we compare E[Fd] of the TN and Z statistics, respectively, under different
collusion attacks. The performance of the q statistics is similar to that of TN . We
compare the performance of different detection statistics under the minimum and
the modified negative attacks with Pfp = 10
−2 in Figure 3.5 (e) and E[Ffp] = 10−2
in Figure 3.5 (f), respectively. The simulation results agree with the analysis and
we have the same observations as in the unbounded case. From the colluders’ point
of view, the most efficient attack is the randomized negative attack, and from the
detector’s point of view, the Z statistics are more robust.
3.4 Pre-Processing of the Extracted Fingerprints
The three detection statistics we have studied so far are not specifically designed
for collusion scenarios, and therefore do not take into account the characteristics
of the newly generated copies after the collusion attacks. Intuitively, utilizing the
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Figure 3.5: (a) Pd of the TN statistics under different attacks, (b) E[Fd] of the TN
statistics under different attacks, (c) Pd of the Z statistics under different attacks, (d)
E[Fd] of the Z statistics under different attacks, (e) Pd of different statistics, and (f) E[Fd]
of different statistics with bounded Gaussian-like fingerprints. Here σ2W = 1/9, M = 100,












































Figure 3.6: Histograms of the extracted fingerprints under the average, minimum and
randomized negative attacks, respectively. The original fingerprints follow the distribu-
tion in (3.38) with σ2W = 1/9. N = 10
4 and K = 45.
statistical features of the attacked copies may improve the detection performance,
and one of such features is the sample mean of the extracted fingerprint under
the collusion attacks. From the histogram plots of the extracted fingerprints under
different attacks as shown in Figure 3.6, we observe different patterns of the sample
means of the extracted fingerprints: the extracted fingerprints have approximately
zero sample mean under the average, median, minmax and modified negative at-
tacks; the minimum attack yields a negative sample mean, and the maximum
attack yields a positive sample mean; and under the randomized negative attack,
the histogram of the extracted fingerprint components have two clusters, one with
a negative mean and the other with a positive mean.
Recall from Section 3.2.1 that σ2g,H0 is proportional to the second moment of the
extracted fingerprint, subtracting the sample mean from the extracted fingerprint
will reduce its second-order moment, thus help improve the detection performance.
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Similarly, the detection performance under the randomized negative attack can be
improved by decreasing σ2g,H0 and σ
2
g,Y .
Motivated by this analysis, we propose a pre-processing stage in the detection
process: given the extracted fingerprint {g({W kj }k∈Sc)}Nj=1, we first investigate its
histogram. If a single non-zero sample mean is observed, we subtract it from the
extracted fingerprint, and then apply the detection statistics. If the fingerprint
components are merged from two (or more) distributions that have distinct mean
values, we need to cluster components and then subtract from each colluded fin-
gerprint component the sample mean of the corresponding cluster. In the later
case, the means can be estimated using a Gaussian-mixture approximation, and
the clustering is based on the nearest-neighbor principle. In our problem, under the
randomized negative attack, a simple solution is to first observe the bi-modality
in the histogram of {Yj}, and then cluster all negative components into one distri-
bution and cluster all positive components into the other distribution. Given the
extracted fingerprint {Yj}Nj=1, define µneg4=
∑
j Yj · I [Yl < 0]/
∑
l I [Yl < 0] as the
sample mean of the negative extracted fingerprint components where I[·] is the




j Yj · I [Yj > 0]/
∑
l I [Yl > 0] as the sample mean






Yj − µneg if Yj < 0,
Yj − µpos if Yj > 0,
(3.39)
and the detector applies the detection statistics to {Y ′j }Nj=1. The analysis of the
detection statistics with the pre-processing is the same as in Section 3.2 and is not
repeated.
The simulation is set up the same as before and the fingerprint components are
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Figure 3.7: (a) Pd under the minimum attack, (b) E[Fd] under the minimum attack,
(c) Pd under the randomized negative attack, and (d) E[Fd] under the randomized neg-
ative attack with and without pre-processing. Fingerprints are generated from bounded
Gaussian-like distribution (3.38) with σ2W = 1/9. M = 100 and N = 10
4. In (a) and (c),
Pfp = 10−2. In (b) and (d), E[Ffp] = 10−2.
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generated from the bounded Gaussian-like distribution (3.38) with σ2W = 1/9. In
Figure 3.7 (a) and (c), with Pfp = 10
−2, we compare Pd of the three statistics with
and without the pre-processing under the minimum and the randomized negative
attacks, respectively. In Figure 3.7 (b) and (d), with E[Ffp] = 10
−2, we com-
pare E[Fd] of the three statistics with and without the pre-processing under the
minimum and the randomized negative attacks, respectively. The detection per-
formance under the maximum attack is the same as that of the minimum attack
and is not shown here. We can see that the pre-processing substantially improves
the detection performance of the detector, and the three statistics have similar
performance under the minimum, maximum, and randomized negative attacks.
Note that the estimated correlation coefficient ρ(i) in the Z statistics removes
the mean of the extracted fingerprint before calculating the correlation between
the extracted fingerprint and the original fingerprint. This explains why the Z
statistics perform better than the TN and q statistics without pre-processing under
the minimum and maximum attacks, whereby the mean of the colluded fingerprint
components is substantially deviated from zero.
3.5 Simulation Results on Real Images
To study the performance of Gaussian based fingerprints under different nonlinear
collusion attacks on real images, we choose two 256 × 256 host images, Lena and
Baboon, which have a variety of representative visual features such as the texture,
sharp edges, and smooth areas. We use the human visual model based spread
spectrum embedding in [47], and embed the fingerprints in the DCT domain. The
generated fingerprints follow the bounded Gaussian-like distribution (3.38) with
σ2W = 1/9. We assume that the collusion attacks are also in the DCT domain.
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Figure 3.8: (a) Pd of Lena, (b) E[Fd] of Lena, (c) Pd of Baboon, and (d) E[Fd] of
Baboon with the Z statistics under different collusion attacks. The original fingerprints
follow the distribution in (3.38) with σ2W = 1/9. M = 100. In (a) and (b), the length
of the embedded fingerprints is N = 13691. In (c) and (d), the length of the embedded
fingerprints is N = 19497. In (a) and (c), Pfp = 10−2 and simulation results are based
on 10,000 simulation runs. In (b) and (d), E[Ffp] = 10−2 and simulation results are
based on 1,000 simulation runs.
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At the detector’s side, a non-blind detection is performed where the host signal is
first removed from the colluded copy. Then the detector applies the pre-processing
to the extracted fingerprint if a non-zero sample mean is observed. Finally, the
detector uses the detection statistics to identify the colluders.
Figure 3.8 shows the simulation results of the Z statistics. The TN and q
statistics have similar performance and are not shown here. We assume that there
are a total of M = 100 users. In Figure 3.8 (a) and (c), we fix Pfp = 10
−2 and
compare Pd of Lena and Baboon, respectively, under different nonlinear collusion
attacks. In Figure 3.8 (b) and (d), we fix E[Ffp] = 10
−2 and compare E[Fd] of
Lena and Baboon, respectively, under different nonlinear collusion attacks. The
simulation results from real images agree with our analysis in Section 3.2, and are
comparable to the simulation results in Section 3.3 and 3.4. In addition, a better
performance is observed in the Baboon example than in Lena. This is because the
length of the embedded fingerprints in Baboon, which is N = 19497, is larger than
that in Lena, which is N = 13691. Different characteristics of the two images, e.g.,
smooth regions and the texture, also contribute to the difference in performance.
3.6 A Few More Collusion Attacks
Besides of the attacks listed in (3.1), we further consider a few other possible
collusion attacks. One of them is the copy and paste attack where in generating
each component of the attacked copy Vj, the colluders equiprobably choose one
of the K different copies {X(k)j }k∈SC and take that value as Vj. In terms of the
effects on the energy reduction of the original fingerprints and the effect it has
upon the detection performance, this attack and the average attack have similar
performance.
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Another possible attack is on bounded fingerprints. Since all the K embedded
fingerprints are within the range of [−JND , JND ], so are the minimum and the
maximum of these K copies. The minimum and the maximum values also tell
the colluders the lower and upper bounds of the possible fingerprints that will
not introduce noticeable distortion. The colluders can randomly choose any value
between the minimum and the maximum as the colluded copy without introduc-
ing perceptual distortion. We call it the uniform attack, which can be modelled
as the minmax attack followed by an additive noise n. The extracted finger-






W maxj −W minj
2
]. When K is large, {nj} are approximately uniformly
distributed in [−1, 1]. Note that in addition to the collusion functions listed in
(3.1), the colluders can also add another additive noise to the attacked copy, as
long as the overall distortion introduced in the host signal (the extracted finger-
print plus the additive noise in this case) is bounded by JND. This additional noise
will hinder the detection performance without degrading the perceptual quality of
the attacked signal. We can show that given a fixed power of the overall noise intro-
duced in the host signal, different collusion attacks have comparable performance
in defeating the fingerprinting systems.
3.7 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have provided theoretical analysis on the effectiveness of dif-
ferent collusion attacks, and studied the perceptual quality of the attacked signals
under different collusion attacks. We have also studied several commonly used
detection statistics and compared their performance under collusion attacks. Fur-
thermore, we have proposed the pre-processing techniques specifically for collusion
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scenarios to improve the detection performance.
We first studied the effectiveness of average and various basic nonlinear col-
lusion attacks with unbounded Gaussian fingerprints. From both our analytical
and simulation results, we found that with the three detection statistics as defined
in the literature and without any modification, the randomized negative attack is
the most effective attack against the fingerprinting system. We showed that the
Z statistics are more robust against the minimum and maximum attacks than the
other two statistics by implicitly removing the mean of the extracted fingerprint.
We also showed that all three statistics have similar performance under other collu-
sion attacks. However, the unbounded Gaussian fingerprints may exceed JND and
introduce perceptual distortion in the host signal even when without collusion, and
the minimum, maximum, and randomized negative attacks introduce much larger
distortion in the attacked copies than others.
In order to remove the noticeable distortion introduced by the unbounded fin-
gerprints, we proposed the bounded Gaussian-like fingerprints, which maintain the
robustness against the collusion attacks. With the bounded Gaussian-like finger-
prints, the randomized negative attack is still the most effective attack, and the
Z statistic are more robust against the minimum and maximum attacks than the
other two statistics. The bounding improves the perceptual quality of the finger-
printed copies and that of the attacked copies, and both the fingerprint designer
and the colluders do not introduce noticeable distortion.
Observing that the extracted fingerprints under the minimum and the max-
imum attacks do not have a zero mean, we proposed the pre-processing of the
extracted fingerprints, which removes the mean from the extracted fingerprints
before applying the detection statistics. We also applied pre-processing to the
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extracted fingerprints after the randomized negative attacks, which have distinct
bimodal distribution as opposed to the single modality under other collusions. We
showed that these pre-processing techniques improve the detection performance,
and all detection statistics give similar performance after pre-processing.
We have also studied the effectiveness of different collusion attacks and the
performance of different statistics on real images. Our real image simulation results
agree with our analysis and are comparable with the ideal case simulation results.
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Chapter 4
Fair Collusion Attacks on Scalable
Fingerprinting Systems
All prior work on multimedia fingerprinting and collusion attacks assumed that all
users receive copies of the same quality. In practice, users access the multimedia
content through different communication links and have different bandwidth avail-
able. In addition, different users have various processing capability and different
computation constraints. To address the heterogeneity of the networks and the end
users, it is often required to have scalability during video coding and transmission.
“As we move to the convergence of wireless, Internet and multimedia, scalability
becomes increasingly important for rich media access from anywhere, by anyone,
at any time, with any device, and in any form.” [60]
In this chapter, we study the impact of scalability on multimedia fingerprinting
and collusion attacks. We first study the collusion attacks when different colluders
receive copies of different quality. In particular, we consider fair collusion attacks
where all colluders share the same risk and have equal probability of detection, and
analyze the effectiveness of the collusion attacks under the fairness constraints. We
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then investigate the collusion resistance of the scalable fingerprinting systems, and
evaluate the number of colluders that are required to undermine the tracing capa-
bility of the scalable fingerprinting systems under different system requirements.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 introduces the system model
of the scalable video coding systems and the digital fingerprinting systems. Sec-
tion 4.2 analyzes the fairness constraints on the collusion attacks when different
colluders receive copies of different quality. We study the effectiveness of the col-
lusion attacks on scalable fingerprinting systems in Section 4.3, and analyze the
collusion resistance of the fingerprinting systems in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 shows
the simulation results on real video sequences.
4.1 System Model
In this section, we first review temporally scalable video coding systems, and then
we introduce a digital fingerprinting system that consists of three parts: fingerprint
embedding, collusion attacks and fingerprint detection and colluder identification.
Finally, we discuss the performance criteria that we use in this chapter to measure
the effectiveness of the collusion attacks and the performance of the detectors.
4.1.1 Temporally Scalable Video Coding Systems
In the literature, scalable video coding is widely used to accommodate heteroge-
nous networks and users with different computation capabilities. One example of
scalable coding is the layered coding, where the video content is decomposed into
non-overlapping streams (layers) with different priorities [60]. The base layer con-




































Figure 4.1: A two-layer temporally scalable codec. Left: encoder, right: decoder.
resolution of the video, and is received by all users in the systems. The enhance-
ment layers contain less important information, gradually refine the reconstructed
video at the decoder’s side, and are only received by the users who have sufficient
bandwidth and computation capability.
In this chapter, we consider temporally scalable video coding, which provides
multiple versions of the same video with different temporal resolutions or frame
rates. Figure 1 shows the block diagrams of a two-layer temporally scalable codec.
At the encoder’s side, the raw video is temporally down-sampled and encoded to
generate the base layer bit stream. Then, the encoder calculates the difference
between the temporally up-sampled base layer and the original video sequence,
and encodes this residue to generate the enhancement layer bit stream. In a
temporally scalable decoder, to reconstruct a high-quality video, both the base
layer and the enhancement layer bit streams have to be received and decoded.
Then the temporally up-sampled base layer is combined with the enhancement
layer refinements to form the high-quality decoded video.
The simplest way to perform temporal down-sampling and temporal up-sampling
is by frame skipping and frame copying, respectively. For example, temporal down-
sampling with a ratio of 2:1 can be achieved by discarding one frame from every
two frames; and temporal up-sampling with a ratio of 1:2 can be realized by making
a copy of each frame and transmitting the two frames to the next stage.
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In this chapter, we consider a temporally scalable video coding system with
three-layer scalability, and use frame skipping and frame copying to implement
temporal down-sampling and up-sampling, respectively. In such a video coding
system, different frames are encoded in different layers. Assume that Fb, Fe1 and
Fe2 are the sets containing the indices of the frames that are are encoded in the
base layer, enhancement layer 1 and enhancement layer 2, respectively. As an
example, if |Fb| : |Fe1| : |Fe2| = 1 : 1 : 2 where |A| denotes the size of the set
A, Fb = {j = 4k + 1 : k = 0, 1, · · · }, Fe1 = {j = 4k + 3 : k = 0, 1, · · · } and
Fe2 = {j = 2k : k = 0, 1, · · · }.
Define F (i) as the set containing the indices of the frames that user u(i) receives.
Define Ub
4
={u(i) : F (i) = Fb} as the subgroup of users who subscribe to the low
quality and receive the base layer bit stream only; Ub,e1
4
={u(i) : F (i) = Fb ∪Fe1} is
the subgroup of users who subscribe to the medium quality and receive both the
base layer and the enhancement layer 1; and Uall
4
={u(i) : F (i) = Fb ∪ Fe1 ∪ Fe2}
is the subgroup of users who subscribe to the high quality and receive all three
layers. Ub, Ub,e1 and Uall are mutually exclusive, and M = |Ub|+ |Ub,e1|+ |Uall|
is the total number of users.
4.1.2 Digital Fingerprinting System and Collusion Attacks
We consider a digital fingerprinting system that consists of three parts: fingerprint
embedding, collusion attacks and fingerprint detection.
Fingerprint Embedding
Spread spectrum embedding has been widely used in the literature due to its
robustness against many attacks [13], [47]. For the jth frame in the video se-
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quence represented by a vector Sj of length Nj, and for each user u
(i) who sub-
scribes to frame j, the content owner generates a unique fingerprint W
(i)
j of




Sj(k) + JNDj(k) ·W (i)j (k), where X(i)j (k), Sj(k) and W (i)j (k) are the kth compo-
nents of the fingerprinted frame X
(i)
j , the host signal Sj and the fingerprint vector
W
(i)
j , respectively. JNDj is the just-noticeable-difference from human visual mod-
els [47], and it is used to control the energy and achieve the imperceptibility of the







that u(i) subscribes to.
Previous works have shown that Gaussian distributed fingerprints are more
robust against the nonlinear collusion attacks [52] and are resilient to the sta-







follow normal distribution with zero mean and variance σ2W .
In addition, to combat the intra-content collusion attacks [56], in each distributed











depends on the similarity between the two host frames
Sj1 and Sj2 . Finally, in this chapter, we use orthogonal fingerprint modulation [58]
and assign independent fingerprints to different users.
Collusion Attacks
Assume that K out of M users collude, and SC is the set containing the indices
of these colluders. The colluders apply collusion attacks to remove or attenuate
the original fingerprints. In a recent investigation [64], we have shown that order
statistics based nonlinear collusion attacks can be modeled as the averaging attack
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followed by an additive noise. Under the constraint that the colluded copies under
different collusion attacks have the same perceptual quality, different collusion
attacks have approximately identical performance. Therefore, in this chapter, we
focus on the averaging collusion attack.
During collusion, the colluders first divide themselves into three non-overlapping
subgroups:
• SCb4={i ∈ SC : F (i) = Fb} contains the indices of the colluders who receive
the base layer only;
• SCb,e14={i ∈ SC : F (i) = Fb ∪ Fe1} contains the indices of the colluders who
receive the base layer and the enhancement layer 1;
• and SCall4={i ∈ SC : F (i) = Fb ∪ Fe1 ∪ Fe2} contains the indices of the
colluders who receive all three layers.
Assume that Kb, Kb,e1 and Kall are the number of colluders in SCb, SCb,e1 and
SCall, respectively.
Then, the colluders apply the intra-group collusion attacks followed by the
inter-group collusion attacks to generate the colluded copy {Vj}, as shown in
Figure 4.2. The colluders first apply the intra-group collusion attacks:







• For each frame j ∈ Fb∪Fe1 that they received, the colluders in the subgroup






• For each frame j ∈ Fb ∪ Fe1 ∪ Fe2 that they received, the colluders in the







Define F c as the set containing the indices of the frames that are in the colluded
copy. For simplicity, we let F c ∈ {Fb, Fb ∪Fe1, Fb ∪Fe1 ∪Fe2}. Then, the colluders
apply the inter-group collusion attacks to generate the colluded copy {Vj}j∈F c :







j + nj, (4.1)
where β1 +β2 +β3 = 1 to maintain the average intensity of the colluded copy.
To guarantee that the energy of each of the original fingerprints is reduced,
we let 0 ≤ β1, β2, β3 ≤ 1. In (4.1), nj is the additive noise that the colluders
add to Vj to further hinder the detection.
• If Fe1 ⊂ F c and the colluded copy contains frames in the enhancement layers,





j + nj, (4.2)
where 0 ≤ α1, α2 ≤ α1 + α2 = 1 and nj is an additive noise.
• If Fe2 ⊂ F c and the colluded copy contains frames in all three layers, then
for each frame j ∈ Fe2 in the enhancement layer 2,
Vj = Z
all
j + nj, (4.3)
where nj is an additive noise.
Define nj(k) as the kth component of the additive noise vector nj. In practice,
the variance of nj(k) is usually proportional to JNDj(k), the corresponding just-
noticeable-difference. This is because from human visual models [47], a larger








































































Figure 4.2: The intra-group and the inter-group collusion attacks.
host signal component without introducing perceptually distinguishable distortion;
and the colluders usually maximize the energy of the additive noise nj under the
perceptual quality constraints in order to maximize the effectiveness of the collusion
attacks. In this chapter, we model { nj
JNDj
} as i.i.d. following distribution N (0, σ2n).
In addition, we assume that the collusion attacks is a fair attack where all
colluders share the same risk and are equally likely to be detected. The colluders
seek the collusion parameters, F c, {βk}k=1,2,3 and {αl}l=1,2, to satisfy the fair-
ness constraints. The analysis of the fairness constraints and the selection of the
parameters are in Section 4.2.
Fingerprint Detection and Colluder Identification
When the content owner discovers the unauthorized redistribution of {Vj}j∈F c , he
applies a fingerprint detection process to identify the colluders.
In digital fingerprinting applications, the host signal {Sj} is often made avail-
able to the detector. To improve the detection performance [58], [64], we consider
a non-blind detection scenario where the host signal is first removed from the col-
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luded copy before colluder identification. We assume that the detector has a frame
synchronization module that finds the corresponding original frame Sj for each
frame Vj in the colluded copy. Then for each frame j in the colluded copy, the
detector extracts the fingerprint Yj = (Vj − Sj) /JNDj. Finally, the detector
calculates the similarity between the extracted fingerprint {Yj}j∈F c and each of
the M original fingerprints {W(i)
j∈F (i)}, compares with a threshold and outputs a
set ŜC containing the estimated indices of the colluders.
We use the correlation based detection statistics [48] that have been widely
adopted in the literature. For each user u(i), the detector first calculates F̆ (i)
4
=F (i)∩
F c, where F (i) contains the indices of the frames received by user u(i) and F c
contains the indices of the frames in the colluded copy. For example, if F c =
Fb ∪ Fe1, then F̆ (i1) = Fb for u(i1) ∈ Ub; F̆ (i2) = Fb ∪ Fe1 for u(i2) ∈ Ub,e1; and













where ||W(i)j || is the Euclidean norm of W(i)j . Given the M detection statistics
{T (i)N }i=1,··· ,M and a pre-determined threshold h, the estimated colluder set is ŜC =
{i : T (i)N > h}.
4.1.3 Performance Criteria
To evaluate the effectiveness of the collusion attacks and the performance of the
detection statistics, we adopt the commonly used criteria in the literature [58, 64]
and use the following measurements:
• Pd: the probability of capturing at least one colluder;
• Pfp: the probability of accusing at least one innocent user;
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• Fd: the fraction of colluders that are successfully captured; and
• Ffp: the fraction of innocent users that are falsely accused.
To measure the quality of the colluded copy, we use the total number of frames
in the colluded copy Lc = |F c|. We let Lc ∈ {|Fb|, |Fb|+ |Fe1|, |Fb|+ |Fe1|+ |Fe2|}
for simplicity, which correspond to the three scenarios where the colluded copy has
the lowest, medium and highest temporal resolution, respectively. When Lc is
larger, the colluded copy has higher temporal resolution and better quality.
4.2 Fairness Constraints on the Collusion Attacks
In this section, given the system model as in Section 4.1, we analyze the fairness
constraints on the collusion attacks and study the selection of collusion parameters
during collusion.
4.2.1 Analysis of the Detection Statistics
For each frame j ∈ Fb in the base layer, from (4.1), the extracted fingerprint Yj






















j + nj/JNDj. (4.5)
If the colluded copy contains frames in the enhancement layers, from (4.2), for















j + nj/JNDj. (4.6)
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If the colluded copy contains frames in all three layers, from (4.3), for each frame








j + nj/JNDj. (4.7)
It is straightforward to show that given the colluder set SC, for each user u(i),








∼ N (µ(i), σ2n
)
, (4.8)
where σ2n is the variance of the additive noise nj/JNDj. For user u
(i), µ(i) = 0
when he is innocent, and µ(i) > 0 when he is guilty. For i ∈ SC, µ(i) depends on
the number of frames in the colluded copy and the number frames that colluder
u(i) receives.
Fc = Fb ∪ Fe1 ∪ Fe2











































if i ∈ SCall.
(4.9)
Define Nb, Ne1 and Ne2 as the lengths of the fingerprints that are embedded
in the frames in the base layer, enhancement layer 1 and enhancement layer 2, re-
spectively. Since {W(i)j } follow Gaussian distribution with zero mean and variance
σ2W , we can have the approximation that
∑
j∈Fb








||W(i)e1 ||2 ≈ Ne2σ2W for i ∈ SCall. (4.10)



















σW if i ∈ SCall.
(4.11)
Fc = Fb ∪ Fe1
When the colluded copy contains frames in the base layer and the enhancement



















σW if i ∈ SCall.
(4.12)
Fc = Fb



















σW if i ∈ SCall.
(4.13)
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4.2.2 Analysis of the Fairness Constraints
Given a threshold h, for colluder u(i) whose detection statistics follow distribution
N (µ(i), σ2n
)
, the probability that u(i) is captured is



















2 dt is the Gaussian tail function. Therefore, for a given
σ2n and a given threshold h, all colluders share the same risk and are equally likely
to be detected if their detection statistics have the same mean. In this section, we
will study the fairness constraints on the collusion attacks.
Fc = Fb ∪ Fe1 ∪ Fe2
When the colluded copy contains frames in all three layers, from (4.11), the col-
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√
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β1Nb
− 1− β2Nb + α1Ne1
β1Nb
.(4.17)
Plug (4.16) into (4.17), we have


















Therefore, to satisfy the fairness constraints, from (4.16) and (4.18), the colluders
should choose
β1 =









Nb + Ne1 + Kall
√
Nb + Ne1 + Ne2
(4.19)
and
β2Nb + α1Ne1 =
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√
Nb + Ne1 + Ne2
. (4.20)
From Section 4.1.2, the collusion parameters are required to be in the range of
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Given β1 as in (4.19), 0 ≤ β2 ≤ 1 − β1. Consequently, from (4.22), we have
α ≤ α1 ≤ α, where
α =
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√















Nb + Ne1 + Kall
√
Nb + Ne1 + Ne2
. (4.24)
If [0, 1]∩ [α, α] is not empty, then there exists at least one α∗1 such that 0 ≤ α∗1 ≤ 1
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√
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≥ Ne2
Nb + Ne1 + Ne2
. (4.25)
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To summarize, in order to generate a colluded copy with the highest tempo-




and (Nb, Ne1, Ne2)
have to satisfy (4.21) and (4.25), and the colluders should choose the collusion
parameters as in (4.19) and (4.20).
Fc = Fb ∪ Fe1
In this scenario, for colluder u(i1∈SC
all) and colluder u(i2∈SC
b,e1) who received copies
of the highest and the medium resolution, respectively, the overall lengths of their
fingerprints in the colluded copy are the same and equal to Nb + Ne1. To ensure



















(1− β1) , and β3 = 1− β1 − β2. (4.26)
Consequently, for these two colluders,
µ(i1) = µ(i2) =










































Given 0 ≤ β1 ≤ 1, from (4.26), it is straightforward to show that 0 ≤ β2, β3, α1, α2 ≤
1.




and (Nb, Ne1, Ne2)
have to satisfy (4.30) if the colluders wish to generate a colluded copy of the medium
temporal resolution. The colluders should choose the collusion parameters as in
(4.26) and (4.29).
Fc = Fb
When the colluded copy contains frames in the base layer only, the colluders choose
















and the solution is
β1 =
Kb
Kb + Kb,e1 + Kall
, β2 =
Kb,e1
Kb + Kb,e1 + Kall
, and β3 =
Kall
Kb + Kb,e1 + Kall
.
(4.32)




and (Nb, Ne1, Ne2),
and the colluders can always generate a colluded copy containing frames in the base
layer only.
4.2.3 Summary of the Fairness Constraints and the Selec-
tion of Collusion Parameters
From (4.21), (4.25) and (4.30), to check the fairness constraints and select the
collusion parameters, the colluders need to estimate Nb : Ne1 : Ne2, the ratio of
the lengths of the fingerprints embedded in different layers. Note that the adja-
cent frames in a video sequence are similar to each other and have approximately
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β3 = 1− β1 − β2, α2 = 1− α1.


































, α2 = 1− α1.
F c = Fb
Fairness
Constraints



















the same number of embeddable coefficients, the colluders can use the following
approximation Nb : Ne1 : Ne2 ≈ |Fb| : |Fe1| : |Fe2|.
Table 4.1 summarizes the fairness constraints on the collusion attacks and the
selection of the collusion parameters for three different scenarios, where the col-
luded copy has the highest, medium and lowest temporal resolution, respectively.




and (Nb, Ne1, Ne2), the
fairness constraints on the collusion attacks are the constraints on the best possible





and (Nb, Ne1, Ne2) are more severe, and
generating a colluded copy of higher quality requires that there are more colluders
in subgroups SCb,e1 and SCall who receive the enhancement layer bit streams.
4.3 Effectiveness of the Collusion Attacks under
the Fairness Constraints
4.3.1 Statistical Analysis
Assume that there are a total of M users in the system. From the analysis in the
previous section, if the colluders select the collusion parameters as in Table 4.1,











N (µ, σ2n) if i ∈ SC,
N (0, σ2n) if i /∈ SC,
(4.33)
where σ2n is the variance of nj/JNDj, and the M detection statistics {T (i)N }i=1,··· ,M
are independent of each other since the M fingerprints assigned to different users
are generated independently. It is straightforward to show that for i ∈ SC, µ in
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From (4.34-4.36), the effectiveness of the collusion attacks depends on the total
number of colluders K as well as the temporal resolution of the colluded copy Lc.
For a fixed Lc = |F c|, the colluders have a smaller probability to be captured and
the collusion attack is more effective when there are more colluders in the systems.
If the total number of colluders K is fixed, the colluders have a larger probability of
detection when the colluded copy has a higher temporal resolution, and therefore,
better quality. This is because the extracted fingerprint is longer and provides
more information of the colluders’ identities to the detector. The colluders have to
take into consideration the tradeoff between the probability of detection and the
perceptual quality of the colluded copy during collusion.
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4.3.2 Simulation Results
From human visual models [47], not all coefficients are embeddable due to im-
perceptibility constraints. For real video sequences like “akiyo”, “foreman” and
“carphone”, the number of embeddable coefficients in each frame varies from 3000
to 7000, depending on the characteristics of the video sequences. In our simula-
tions, we assume that the length of the fingerprints embedded in each frame is
5000, and we test on a total of 40 frames. We choose Fb = {j : j = 4k + 1, k =
0, · · · , 9}, Fe1 = {j : j = 4k + 3, k = 0, · · · , 9} and Fe2 = {j : j = 2k, k =
1, · · · , 20} as an example of the temporal scalability, and the lengths of the fin-
gerprints embedded in the base layer, enhancement layer 1 and enhancement layer
2 are Nb = 50000, Ne1 = 50000 and Ne2 = 100000, respectively. We assume
that there are a total of M = 450 users and |Ub| = |Ub,e1| = |Uall| = 150. Each
user is assigned a unique fingerprint following Guassian distribution N (0, σ2W ) with
σ2W = 1/9, and for each user, fingerprints embedded in adjacent frames are corre-
lated with each other. The fingerprints for different users are generated indepen-
dently.
We assume that 0 ≤ Kb, Kb,e1, Kall ≤ 150 are the number of colluders in sub-
groups SCb, SCb,e1 and SCall, respectively. During collusion, the colluders apply
the intra-group collusion attacks followed by the inter-group collusion attacks. Fur-
thermore, we assume that the additive noise nj/JNDj, which is introduced into




In Figure 4.3, we fix the ratio Kb : Kb,e1 : Kall = 1 : 1 : 1, and assume that the
colluded copy has temporal resolution F c = Fb ∪ Fe1, which satisfies the fairness
constraints in Table 4.1. In Figure 4.3 (a), we fix the probability of accusing at
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(a) Pd (b) E[Fd]
Figure 4.3: Effectiveness of the collusion attacks on scalable fingerprinting systems.
Assume that there are a total of M = 450 users and |Ub| = |Ub,e1| = |Uall| = 150.
Nb = 50, 000, Ne1 = 50, 000 and Ne2 = 100, 000. K
b : Kb,e1 : Kall = 1 : 1 : 1 and
F c = Fb ∪ Fe1. σ2n/σ2W = 2. Pfp = 10−3 in (a), and E[Ffp] = 10−3 in (b).
least one innocent user Pfp as 10
−3 and plot the probability of capturing at least
one colluder Pd when the total number of colluders K increases. In Figure 4.3 (b),
the fraction of the innocent users that are accused is E[Ffp] = 10
−3 and we plot the
fraction of the colluders that are captured E[Fd] when K increases. From Figure
4.3, the collusion attacks are more effective when the total number of colluders K
increases.
In Figures 4.4, we fix the total number of colluders K = 150, and compare the
effectiveness of the collusion attacks when the number of colluders in each subgroup
(Kb, Kb,e1, Kall) changes and when the temporal resolution of the colluded copy Lc
changes. We assume that the colluders generate a colluded copy of the best possible
quality under the fairness constraints. In Figure 4.4, 0 ≤ Kb, Kb,e1, Kall ≤ 150 and
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(a) Lc = |F c| (b) µ


























(c) Pd (d) E[Fd]
Figure 4.4: Effectiveness of the collusion attacks on scalable fingerprinting systems.
Assume that there are a total of M = 450 users and |Ub| = |Ub,e1| = |Uall| = 150.
(Nb, Ne1, Ne2) = (50000, 50000, 100000). K = 150 and (K
b, Kb,e1, Kall) are on Line
(4.37). σ2n/σ
2
W = 2. 0 ≤ Kb, Ke1, Ke2 ≤ 150. Pfp = 10−3 in (c), and E[Ffp] = 10−3
in (d).
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(a) Lc = |F c| (b) µ





























(c) Pd (d) E[Fd]
Figure 4.5: Effectiveness of the collusion attacks on scalable fingerprinting systems.
Assume that there are a total of M = 450 users and |Ub| = |Ub,e1| = |Uall| = 150.
(Nb, Ne1, Ne2) = (50000, 50000, 100000). K = 150 and (K
b, Kb,e1, Kall) are on Line
(4.38). σ2n/σ
2
W = 2. 0 ≤ Kb, Ke1, Ke2 ≤ 150. Pfp = 10−3 in (c), and E[Ffp] = 10−3
in (d).
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Nb + Ne1 + Kall
√
Nb + Ne1 + Ne2
=
Nb
Nb + Ne1 + Ne2
. (4.37)
Figure 4.4 (a) shows the number of frames in the colluded copy Lc for different
(Kb, Kb,e1, Kall), and Figure 4.4 (b) shows the corresponding means of the detection
statistics. In Figure 4.4 (c), Pfp = 10
−3 and we compare Pd of the collusion attacks
with different (Kb, Kb,e1, Kall). In Figure 4.4 (d), E[Ffp] = 10
−3 and we compare
E[Fd] of the collusion attacks when (K
b, Kb,e1, Kall) varies.
Similar to Figure 4.4, in Figure 4.5, the total number of colluders is fixed as
K = 150, and we assume that the colluders generate a colluded copy of the best
possible quality under the fairness constraints. In Figure 4.5, 0 ≤ Kb, Kb,e1, Kall ≤
150 and they are on another boundary of the fairness constraints (4.25), where
Kall
√





Nb + Ne1 + Kall
√
Nb + Ne1 + Ne2
=
Ne2
Nb + Ne1 + Ne2
. (4.38)
From Figures 4.4 and 4.5, under the fairness constraints, the colluders can
generate a colluded copy of higher quality when more colluders have received the
enhancement layers from the content owner. Furthermore, when the colluded
copy has higher temporal resolution and better quality, the colluders have a larger
probability to be captured and the collusion attack is less effective. This is due to
the fact that the extracted fingerprint is longer, and it is in agreement with our
statistical analysis in Section 4.3.1.
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4.4 Resistance of the Scalable Fingerprinting Sys-
tems to Collusion Attacks
Analysis of the collusion attacks helps to evaluate the traitor tracing capacity of
digital fingerprinting systems, and provide guidance to the digital rights enforcers
on the design of collusion resistant fingerprinting systems. In this section, we con-
sider the scalable fingerprinting systems in Section 4.1.2, analyze their collusion
resistance, and quantify their traitor tracing capacity by studying how many col-
luders are required for colluders to cause the failure of the fingerprinting systems.
Following the work in [64], we consider three different fingerprinting applica-
tions that have different goals of design and different performance criteria: catch
one, catch more and catch all ; and we will study the collusion resistance of the
scalable fingerprinting systems for these three scenarios. In particular, we ana-
lyze Kmax, the maximum number of colluders that the fingerprinting systems can
successfully resist under the system requirements.
4.4.1 Catch One
In the catch one applications, the goal is to maximize the chance to capture one
colluder while minimizing the probability of falsely accusing an innocent users. In
such applications, the performance criteria are the probability of capturing at least
one colluder Pd and the probability of accusing at least one innocent user Pfp. The
system requirements are
Pd ≥ γd, and Pfp ≤ γfp. (4.39)
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Figure 4.6: The collusion resistance of the catch one applications. |Ub| : |Ub,e1| :
|Uall| = 1 : 1 : 1 and (Nb, Ne1, Ne2) = (50000, 50000, 100000). σ2n/σ2W = 2. γd = 0.8
and γfp = 10
−3. In (a), there are a total of 300 users in the system, and |Ub| =
|Ub,e1| = |Uall| = 100. We plot PUd and PLd versus the total number of colluders
K. (b) illustrates KUmax and K
L
max versus the total number of users.
Upper and Lower Bounds of Kmax
From (4.34) and (4.35), if we fix the probability of accusing at least one innocent
user Pfp = γfp, the performance of the detector in Section 4.1.2 depends on many
parameters: (|Ub|, |Ub,e1|, |Uall|), the lengths of the embedded fingerprints in each
layer (Nb, Ne1, Ne2), the number of colluders in each subgroup (K
b, Kb,e1, Kall),
and the length of the extracted fingerprint (or the temporal resolution of the col-
luded copy Lc, equivalently). Given the system parameters (|Ub|, |Ub,e1|, |Uall|)






s.t. Kb + Kb,e1 + Kall = K,
0 ≤ Kb ≤ |Ub|, 0 ≤ Kb,e1 ≤ |Ub,e1|, 0 ≤ Kall ≤ |Uall|,
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s.t. Kb + Kb,e1 + Kall = K,
0 ≤ Kb ≤ |Ub|, 0 ≤ Kb,e1 ≤ |Ub,e1|, 0 ≤ Kall ≤ |Uall|,
fairness constraints in Table 4.1 are satisfied. (4.41)
PUd (K) and P
L
d (K) provide the upper and lower bounds of Pd, respectively, for a
fixed total number of colluders K. Figure 4.6 (a) shows an example of PUd (K) and
PLd (K) when there are a total of M = 300 users with |Ub| = |Ub,e1| = |Uall| = 100
and γfp = 10
−3.
In the catch one applications, given (|Ub|, |Ub,e1|, |Uall|) and the total number
of users, we further define
KUmax
4
= argK{PUd (K) ≥ γd, PUd (K + 1) < γd}
and KLmax
4
= argK{PLd (K) ≥ γd, PLd (K + 1) < γd}. (4.42)
Figure 4.6 (b) shows KUmax and K
L
max as functions of the total number of users M
under the system requirements γfp = 10
−3 and γd = 0.8. From Figure 4.6 (b),
the fingerprinting system can withstand collusion attacks with up to a few dozen
colluders.
For a given (|Ub|, |Ub,e1|, |Uall|) and (Nb, Ne1, Ne2), when the total number of
colluders K is smaller than KLmax, the system requirements can always be satisfied,
no matter what values of Lc and (Kb, Kb,e1, Kall) are. On the contrary, if the
total number of colluders K is larger than KUmax, for all possible values of L
c and
(Kb, Kb,e1, Kall), the detector will always fail. Therefore, KUmax and K
L
max provide
the upper and lower bounds of Kmax, respectively.
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Calculation of the Upper and Lower Bounds of Kmax
In this section, given (|Ub|, |Ub,e1|, |Uall|) and (Nb, Ne1, Ne2), we analyze how to
find KUmax and K
L
max.
Given (|Ub|, |Ub,e1|, |Uall|) and a fixed total number of colluders K, we define
the feasible region of the triplet (Kb, Kb,e1, Kall) as
FR 4=
{
(Kb, Kb,e1, Kall) : Kb + Kb,e1 + Kall = K, 0 ≤ Kb ≤ |Ub|,
0 ≤ Kb,e1 ≤ |Ub,e1|, 0 ≤ Kall ≤ |Uall|} . (4.43)
To calculate the upper and lower bounds of Kmax, we have to first calculate
PUd (K) and P
L
d (K). From the analysis in Section 4.3.1, the detector has the worst
performance when the colluded copy contains frames in the base layer only and
the extracted fingerprint is of length Nb. Therefore, P
L
d (K) is achieved when
F c = Fb. There are no constraints on (K
b, Kb,e1, Kall) and (Nb, Ne1, Ne2) except
(Kb, Kb,e1, Kall) ∈ FR.
From Section 4.3.1, for a given K, Pd is maximized when the colluded copy
has the highest possible temporal resolution under the fairness constraints. Given
(Nb, Ne1, Ne2) and the total number of colluders K, we define
RC3 4=
{








Nb + Ne1 + Kall
√
Nb + Ne1 + Ne2
≤ Nb









Nb + Ne1 + Kall
√
Nb + Ne1 + Ne2
≥ Ne2



















If (Kb, Kb,e1, Kall) ∈ RC3, the colluders can generate a colluded copy with the
highest temporal resolution F c = Fb ∪ Fe1 ∪ Fe2; and for (Kb, Kb,e1, Kall) ∈ RC2,
the colluders can generate a colluded copy with F c = Fb ∪ Fe1.
If FR∩RC3 6= ∅, there exist at least one (Kb∗, Kb,e1∗, Kall∗) ∈ FR such that the
colluders can generate a colluded copy of the highest resolution F c = Fb∪Fe1∪Fe2
under the fairness constraints, and
PUd (K) = max
F c=Fb∪Fe1∪Fe2,(Kb,Kb,e1,Kall)
Pd, (4.46)
s.t. Kb + Kb,e1 + Kall = K,








Nb + Ne1 + Kall
√
Nb + Ne1 + Ne2
≤ Nb









Nb + Ne1 + Kall
√
Nb + Ne1 + Ne2
≥ Ne2
Nb + Ne1 + Ne2
.
From (4.35), maximize Pd when F
c = Fb ∪Fe1 ∪Fe2 is equivalent to maximize the
corresponding mean of the detection statistics
µ =





Nb + Ne1 + Kall
√
Nb + Ne1 + Ne2
, (4.47)
and it is further equivalent to minimize the denominator of µ. Consequently, the








Nb + Ne1 + K
all
√
Nb + Ne1 + Ne2, (4.48)
s.t. Kb + Kb,e1 + Kall = K,








Nb + Ne1 + Kall
√
Nb + Ne1 + Ne2
≤ Nb









Nb + Ne1 + Kall
√
Nb + Ne1 + Ne2
≥ Ne2
Nb + Ne1 + Ne2
.
We use linear programming [17] to solve the optimization problem of (4.49), and
then calculate the corresponding µ and PUd (K).
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If FR ∩ RC3 = ∅ and FR ∩ RC2 6= ∅, the colluders cannot generate a colluded
copy with F c = Fb∪Fe1∪Fe2 under the fairness constraints, but they can generate
a copy with F c = Fb ∪ Fe1. In this scenario, PUd (K) = max{PU,1d (K), PU,2d (K)}
where
PU,1d (K) = max
F c=Fb∪Fe1,(Kb,Kb,e1,Kall)
Pd, (4.49)
s.t. Kb + Kb,e1 + Kall = K,



















Nb + Ne1 + Kall
√
Nb + Ne1 + Ne2
≥ Nb
Nb + Ne1 + Ne2
,
and PU,2d (K) = max
F c=Fb∪Fe1,(Kb,Kb,e1,Kall)
Pd, (4.50)
s.t. Kb + Kb,e1 + Kall = K,



















Nb + Ne1 + Kall
√
Nb + Ne1 + Ne2
≤ Ne2
Nb + Ne1 + Ne2
.








Nb + Ne1, (4.51)
s.t. Kb + Kb,e1 + Kall = K,



















Nb + Ne1 + Kall
√
Nb + Ne1 + Ne2
≥ Nb
Nb + Ne1 + Ne2
,








Nb + Ne1, (4.52)
s.t. Kb + Kb,e1 + Kall = K,
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Nb + Ne1 + Kall
√
Nb + Ne1 + Ne2
≤ Ne2
Nb + Ne1 + Ne2
.
If FR ∩ RC3 = ∅ and FR ∩ RC2 = ∅, then the colluders can only generate a
colluded copy of the lowest resolution where F c = Fb, and P
U




Given PUd (K) and P
L




max is the same as in [64]
and is omitted here.
Physical Meanings of KUmax and K
L
max
From the colluders’ point of view, if colluders can collect no more than KLmax
independent copies, no matter how they collude, they can never succeed in passing
the detector without being captured. However, if they manage to collect more
than KUmax copies, they can be guaranteed success even if they generate a colluded
copy of the highest resolution and best quality. In the scenario where the colluders
collect more than KLmax but fewer than K
U
max copies, they can still successfully
remove all trace of the fingerprints by generating a colluded copy of the lowest
resolution and worst quality. If the colluders wish to generate a colluded copy of
better quality, they must take the risk of being captured.
From the content owner’s point of view, if he can ensure that potential colluders
cannot collect more than KLmax independent copies, the fingerprinting system is
essentially collusion resistant.
88





































































Figure 4.7: The collusion resistance of the catch more applications. |Ub| =
|Ub,e1| = |Uall| = 300 and (Nb, Ne1, Ne2) = (50000, 50000, 100000). σ2n/σ2W = 2. In




d versus the total number of colluders. In




max under different requirements of λfp.
4.4.2 Catch More
In the catch more fingerprinting applications, the goal is to capture as many col-
luders as possible, though possibly at a cost of accusing more innocent users. The
set of performance criteria consists of the fraction of colluders that are successfully
captured E[Fd], and the fraction of innocent users that are falsely placed under
suspicion E[Ffp]. The system requirements for such applications are
E[Fd] ≥ λd, and E[Ffp] ≤ λfp. (4.53)
Similar to the catch one applications, given (|Ub|, |Ub,e1|, |Uall|) and (Nb, Ne1, Ne2),






s.t. Kb + Kb,e1 + Kall = K,
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0 ≤ Kb ≤ |Ub|, 0 ≤ Kb,e1 ≤ |Ub,e1|, 0 ≤ Kall ≤ |Uall|,






s.t. Kb + Kb,e1 + Kall = K,
0 ≤ Kb ≤ |Ub|, 0 ≤ Kb,e1 ≤ |Ub,e1|, 0 ≤ Kall ≤ |Uall|,
fairness constraints in Table 4.1 are satisfied. (4.55)
Given the total number of colluders K, FUd (K) and F
L
d (K) are the upper and
lower bounds of E[Fd],respectively. Figure 4.7 (a) shows an example of F
U
d (K)
and FLd (K) when λfp = 0.01.
For the catch more applications, we define
KUmax
4
= argK{FUd (K) ≥ λd, FUd (K + 1) < λd}
and KLmax
4
= argK{FLd (K) ≥ λd, FLd (K + 1) < λd}, (4.56)
which are the upper and lower bounds of Kmax under the system requirements,
respectively. Figure 4.7 (b) shows KUmax and K
L
max under different system require-
ments of λfp when λd = 0.5. From Figure 4.7 (b), for the catch more applications,
the fingerprinting system can resist collusion attacks with a few dozen or even
around one hundred colluders, depending on the system requirements.









catch more applications is similar to that in the catch one applications and will be
not be repeated.
4.4.3 Catch All
In this scenario, the fingerprints are designed to maximize the probability of cap-
turing all colluders, while maintaining an acceptable amount of innocents being
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Figure 4.8: The collusion resistance of the catch all applications. |Ub| : |Ub,e1| :
|Uall| = 1 : 1 : 1 and (Nb, Ne1, Ne2) = (50000, 50000, 100000). σ2n/σ2W = 2. θd =
0.99 and θr = 0.01. In (a), M = 300 and |Ub| = |Ub,e1| = |Uall| = 100. We plot
RU and RL versus the total number of colluders. (b) shows KUmax and K
L
max versus
the total number of users M .
falsely accused. The set of performance criteria for these applications consists of
measuring the efficiency rate
R =
(M −K) · E[Ffp]
K · E[Fd] (4.57)
that describes the number of innocents accused per colluder, and the probability










The system requirements for these applications are
R ≤ θr, and Pd,all ≥ θd. (4.59)
Similar to the catch one applications, given (|Ub|, |Ub,e1|, |Uall|) and (Nb, Ne1, Ne2),
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s.t. Kb + Kb,e1 + Kall = K,
0 ≤ Kb ≤ |Ub|, 0 ≤ Kb,e1 ≤ |Ub,e1|, 0 ≤ Kall ≤ |Uall|,






s.t. Kb + Kb,e1 + Kall = K,
0 ≤ Kb ≤ |Ub|, 0 ≤ Kb,e1 ≤ |Ub,e1|, 0 ≤ Kall ≤ |Uall|,
fairness constraints in Table 4.1 are satisfied. (4.61)
Given the total number of colluders K, RU(K) and RL(K) are the upper and lower
bounds of R, respectively. Figure 4.8 (a) shows an example of RU(K) and RL(K)
when there are a total of M = 300 users with |Ub| = |Ub,e1| = |Uall| = 100 and
θd = 0.99.
In the catch all applications, define
KUmax
4
= argK{RU(K) ≤ θr, RU(K + 1) > θr}
and KLmax
4
= argK{RL(K) ≤ θr, RL(K + 1) > θr}, (4.62)
which are the upper and lower bounds of Kmax. Figure 4.8 (b) shows K
U
max and
KLmax as functions of the total number of users M under the system requirements
of θd = 0.99 and θr = 0.01. For the catch all applications, from Figure 4.8 (b),
the fingerprinting systems are robust against collusion attacks with a few dozen
colluders.
Given θr and θd, the analysis of (R
U(K), RL(K)) and (KUmax, K
U
max) in the catch
all applications is similar to that in the catch one applications and will be not be
repeated.
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4.5 Simulation Results on Real Video Sequences
To verify the correctness of our analysis on real videos, we choose a typical video
sequence “carphone” and use the first 40 frames as an example. Similar to the sim-
ulation setup in Section 4.3.2, we choose Fb = {j : j = 4k+1, k = 0, · · · , 9}, Fe1 =
{j : j = 4k + 3, k = 0, · · · , 9} and Fe2 = {j : j = 2k, k = 1, · · · , 20} as an example
of the temporal scalability, and the lengths of the embedded fingerprints in the base
layer, enhancement layer 1 and enhancement layer 2 are Nb = 72222, Ne1 = 71926
and Ne2 = 143820, respectively. We assume that there are a total of M = 450 users
and |Ub| = |Ub,e1| = |Uall| = 150. We adopt the human visual model based spread
spectrum embedding in [47], and embed the fingerprints in the DCT domain. The
fingerprints follow Gaussian distribution N (0, 1/9), and the fingerprints assigned
to different users are generated independently. In one fingerprinted copy, similar
to that in [55], the fingerprints embedded in different frames are correlated with
each other, depending on the similarity between the host frames.
During collusion, we assume that there are a fixed total number of K = 150
colluders and the collusion attack is also in the DCT domain. In our simulations,
we assume that the colluders use the approximation N̂b : N̂e1 : N̂e2 ≈ |Fb| : |Fe1| :
|Fe2| = 1 : 1 : 2, and apply the intra-group collusion attacks followed by the inter-
group attacks as in Section 4.1.2. They further introduce an additive noise nj to
each frame j in the colluded copy. To be consistent with the simulation setup in




for every frame j ∈ F c in the colluded copy. JNDj here is the jth frame’s just-
noticeable-difference from human visual models [47]. In our simulations, we assume
that the colluders generate a colluded copy of the best possible quality under the
fairness constraints, the same as in Section 4.3.2.
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(a) Lc = |F c| of line (4.37) (b) Lc = |F c| of line (4.38)





























(c) Pd of line (4.37) (d) Pd of line (4.38)


























(e) E[Fd] of line (4.37) (f) E[Fd] of line (4.38)
Figure 4.9: Simulation results of the collusion attacks on the first 40 frames of
“carphone”. (|Fb|, |Fe1|, |Fe2|) = (10, 10, 20). M = 450, |Ub| = |Ub,e1| = |Uall| =
150 and K = 150. In (a), (c) and (e), (Kb, Kb,e1, Kall) are on Line (4.37), and in
(b), (d) and (f), (Kb, Kb,e1, Kall) are on Line (4.38). Pfp = 10
−3 in (c) and (d),
and E[Ffp] = 10
−3 in (e) and (f).
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At the detector’s side, we consider a non-blind detection scenario where the host
signal is removed from the colluded copy before fingerprint detection and colluder
identification process. The detector follows the detection process in Section 4.1.2
and estimates the indices of the colluders ŜC.
Figure 4.9 shows the simulation results. In Figure 4.9 (a), (c) and (e), 0 ≤
Kb, Kb,e1, Kall ≤ 150 and they are on Line (4.37); and in Figure 4.9 (b), (d) and
(f), 0 ≤ Kb, Kb,e1, Kall ≤ 150 and they are on Line (4.38). In Figure 4.9 (c) and
(d), we fix Pfp = 10
−3 and compare Pd when (Kb, Kb,e1, Kall) changes. In Figure
4.9 (e) and (f), E[Ffp] is fixed as 10
−3, and we compare E[Fd] of the collusion
attacks with different (Kb, Kb,e1, Kall). From Figure 4.9, the effectiveness of the
collusion attacks depends on the perceptual quality of the colluded copy: if the
colluded copy has higher resolution and better quality, the extracted fingerprint is
longer, and therefore, the colluders have larger probability to be captured. Also,
the simulation results on real video sequences are comparable with that in Section
4.3.2.
4.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have studied the performance of scalable fingerprinting systems
where different users received fingerprinted copies of different quality. We have
analyzed the fairness constraints on the collusion attacks and provided statistical
analysis on the effectiveness of the collusion attacks. We have also investigated the
collusion resistance of the scalable fingerprinting systems and studied the maximum
number of colluders that the fingerprinting systems can withstand.
We first studied the fairness constraints on the collusion attacks when colluders
received fingerprinted copies of different quality. We found that higher resolution
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and better quality of the colluded copy puts more severe constraints on the number
of colluders in each subgroup. We then analyzed the effectiveness of the collusion
attacks. Both our analytical and simulation results have shown that the colluders
are more likely to be captured when the colluded copy has higher resolution and
better quality. The colluders have to take into consideration the tradeoff between
the probability of detection and the perceptual quality of the colluded copy during
collusion.
We also studied the collusion resistance of the scalable fingerprinting systems for
three different applications with different system requirements, and provided the
lower and upper bounds of the maximum number of colluder that the fingerprinting
systems can resist. From the colluders’ point of view, the upper bound tells the
colluders how many independent copies are required to guarantee the success even
if the colluded copy has the highest quality. From the content owner’s point of view,
to achieve collusion-free, a desired security requirement is to make the potential
colluders very unlikely to collect copies more than the lower bound.
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Chapter 5
Traitors within Traitors: Strategy
and Performance Analysis
Most prior work assumed that during collusion, all colluders would like to share
the risk, and they adjust the collusion attack to guarantee that all of them have
the same probability of detection. However, there exist selfish colluders who want
to minimize their own probability of detection while still profiting from collusion.
In order to achieve this goal, they hide from other colluders information of the
fingerprinted copies that they received, and process their fingerprinted copies before
multiuser collusion.
In this chapter, we investigate this “traitors within traitors” problem in mul-
timedia fingerprinting. We examine the possible pre-collusion processing tech-
niques by the selfish colluders, analyze their effectiveness, and find the optimal
pre-collusion processing strategy to minimize their probability of detection un-
der the quality constraints. We also investigate the possible countermeasures by
other colluders to protect their own interest and prevent the selfish colluders from
processing the copies before collusion.
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This chapter is organized as follows. We begin, in Section 5.1, with the system
model of traitors within traitors. In Section 5.2, we consider a simple scenario
where all colluders receive copies of the same quality, and investigate the possible
pre-collusion processing strategy by the selfish colluders. In Section 5.3, we study
the pre-collusion processing technique in scalable fingerprinting systems, where
different users receive copies of different resolution. Section 5.4 investigates the
preliminary countermeasures against pre-collusion processing by other colluders.
5.1 System Model
5.1.1 General Framework of Digital Fingerprinting Sys-
tems for Multimedia Forensics
We consider a digital fingerprinting system that consists of three parts: finger-
print embedding, multiuser collusion attacks, and fingerprint detection and col-
luder identification.
Fingerprint Embedding
Spread spectrum embedding has been widely used in multimedia fingerprinting
systems due to its robustness against many attacks [13, 47]. In additive spread
spectrum embedding for video applications, for the jth frame in the video sequence
represented by a vector Sj of length Nj, the content owner generates a unique
fingerprint W
(i)
j of length Nj for each user u
(i) in the system. The fingerprinted
copy that is distributed to u(i) is X
(i)
j (k) = Sj(k) + JNDj(k) · W (i)j (k), where
X
(i)
j (k), Sj(k) and W
(i)
j (k) are the kth components of the fingerprinted frame X
(i)
j ,
the host signal Sj and the fingerprint vector W
(i)
j , respectively. JNDj is the just-
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noticeable-difference from human visual models [47], and it is used to control the
energy and achieve the imperceptibility of the embedded fingerprints. Finally, the







Previous work has shown that Gaussian distributed fingerprints are more robust
against nonlinear collusion attacks [52] and are resilient to the statistical/histogram







follow normal distribution with zero mean and variance σ2W .
Furthermore, we apply orthogonal fingerprint modulation [58] and generate the
fingerprints for different users independently. In this chapter, to be resistant to
intra-content collusion attacks on video watermarking [55,56], in each fingerprinted
copy {X(i)j }, the fingerprints W(i)j1 and W
(i)
j2
that are embedded in adjacent frames







depends on the similarity between the two host frames Sj1 and Sj2 .
This is similar to the work in [55].
Multiuser Collusion Attacks
Assume that there are a total of K colluders and SC is the set containing their
indices. The colluders first collect a total of K copies of the same content but
embedded with different fingerprints, and then apply a multiuser collusion attack
to reduce the energy of each of the original fingerprints. In a recently investigation,
it has been shown that a nonlinear collusion attack can be modeled as the averaging
collusion attack followed by an additive noise [64]. Under the constraints that the
colluded copies under different collusion attacks have the same perceptual quality,
all collusion attacks have approximately the same performance. Therefore, in this
chapter, we consider the averaging based collusion attacks for the simplicity of
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analysis.
Fingerprint Detection and Colluder Identification
Once the content owner discovers the existence of the illegal copy in the market, he
applies a fingerprint detection and colluder identification process on the suspicious
copy. For each frame Vj in the colluded copy, the detector first extracts the
fingerprint Yj from Vj. Then, he calculates the similarity between the extracted
fingerprint {Yj} and each of the original fingerprints {W(i)j }, compares with a
pre-determined threshold h, and outputs the identities of the estimated colluders
ŜC.
To measure the similarity between the extracted fingerprint and the original fin-











where ||W(i)j || is the Euclidean norm of W(i)j . For a given threshold h, the estimated
colluder set is ŜC = {i : T (i)N > h}.
5.1.2 Traitors within Traitors
Before collusion, the colluders have to exchange information of the received copies
with each other. The correctness of this information is critical to guarantee the
fairness of the collusion and ensure that all colluders have equal probability of
detection. In most prior work on multimedia fingerprinting and collusion attacks,
it was assumed that all colluders would like to share the risk and have the same
probability of detection, and they tell each other the correct information of their
received fingerprinted copies. In practice, there are selfish colluders who want to
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minimize their own risk of being captured, while they still wish to participate in the
collusion in order to profit from the unauthorized redistribution. To achieve this
goal, the selfish colluders hide from other colluders information of the fingerprinted
copies that they received from the content owner.
Assume that X(i) is the fingerprinted copy that is received by colluder u(i).
In the scenario where all colluders are willing to share the risk and have equal
probability of detection, the multiuser collusion attack is applied to {X(k)}i∈SC ,





where g(·) is the collusion function and n is an additive noise introduced by the
colluders to further hinder the detection. Figure 5.1 (a) shows an example of the
collusion attack in this scenario.
When there are selfish colluders who wish to minimize their risk, those self-
ish colluders process their fingerprinted copies before multiuser collusion. During
collusion, if other colluders do not discover this pre-collusion processing behavior,
and if they use these processed copies instead of the originally received copies, the
pre-collusion processing could help the selfish colluders to further reduce their own
risk of being captured.
Shown in Figure 5.1 (b) is an example of this scenario. Without loss of general-
ity, assume that colluder u(i1) is the selfish colluder who wants to minimize his own
risk, and X(i1) is the fingerprinted copy that he received from the content owner.
Based on X(i1), u(i1) generates another copy X̃(i1) that is perceptually similar to
X(i1), and use X̃(i1) during collusion. If the other colluders fail to discover u(i1)’s













































Figure 5.1: (a) The collusion attack when all colluders are willing to share the
same risk of being captured. (b) The collusion attack when some selfish colluders
want to further reduce their own probability of detection.
where g(·) is the collusion function and n is an additive noise.
5.1.3 Performance Criteria
To measure the effectiveness of pre-collusion processing in reducing the selfish
colluders’ probability of detection, we use the following criteria:
• P (i)d : the probability that a colluder u(i) is successfully captured; and
• Pfa: the probability that an innocent user is falsely accused.
For a fixed Pfa, we compare a selfish colluder’s probability of detection in two
scenarios: when the selfish colluder does not apply pre-collusion processing (i.e.,
he is willing to share the risk with other colluders), and when the selfish colluder
processes his fingerprinted copy before collusion. From the selfish colluder’s point
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of view, the pre-collusion processing technique is more effective when the difference
between these two probabilities is larger.
In the example shown in Figure 5.1 (b), in order to cover up the fact that he
processes his fingerprinted copy before multiuser collusion, the selfish colluder u(i1)
has to guarantee that the newly generated copy X̃(i1) has high quality. We use the
mean square error (MSE) between X̃(i1) and X(i1), or equivalently the PSNR for
image and video applications, to measure the effect of pre-collusion processing on
the perceptual quality of the fingerprinted copies.
5.2 Energy Attenuation of the Embedded Fin-
gerprints During Pre-collusion Processing
For a selfish colluder, to further reduce his own probability of detection, one pos-
sible solution is to apply pre-collusion processing to attenuate the energy of the
embedded fingerprint. An example is to replace each segment of the fingerprinted
signal with another, seemingly similar segment from different spatial or temporal
regions of the content, e.g., averaging or swapping consecutive frames of similar
content [56].
In this section, we take frame averaging as an example, and analyze its effects
on the probability of detection as well as the perceptual quality of the fingerprinted
copies. We consider a simple scenario where all users in the system receive fin-
gerprinted copies of the same quality. Our analysis can be extended to scalable












































Figure 5.2: Applying weighted average during pre-collusion processing.
5.2.1 Pre-collusion Processing Using Weighted Average
In this chapter, we assume that the selfish colluder uses a simple linear interpolation
based average during pre-collusion processing.1 For a selfish colluder u(i1), assume







j+1 are three consecutive frames. As shown in Figure














j ·X(i1)j−1 + λ0j ·X(i1)j−1 + λ+1j ·X(i1)j+1, (5.4)
where 0 ≤ λ−1j , λ0j , λ+1j ≤ 1 and λ−1j + λ0j + λ+1j = 1. For simplicity, we let
λ−1j = λ
+1
j = (1 − λ0j)/2, and give equal weights to the neighboring frames X(i1)j−1
and X
(i1)
j+1. The selfish colluder u
(i1) repeats this process for every frame in the
video sequence and generates {X̃(i1)j }j=1,2,···.
For simplicity, we assume that there is only one selfish colluder u(i1) in this
section.2 If the other colluders do not discover u(i1)’s pre-collusion processing
1A selfish colluder can also apply more complicated motion based interpolation [2,8], and the
analysis will be similar.
2When there are multiple selfish colluders using weighted average during pre-collusion pro-
cessing, the analysis is similar and not repeated here.
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λ−1j ·X(i1)j−1 + λ0j ·X(i1)j−1 + λ+1j ·X(i1)j+1
K
+ nj, (5.5)
where nj is an additive noise.
5.2.2 Performance Analysis and Selection of the Optimal
Weight Vector
By processing the fingerprinted frames before collusion, the selfish colluder wishes
to minimize his own probability of detection while maintaining the perceptual
quality of {X̃(i1)j }. In this section, we will first analyze the quality of the newly
generated frames {X̃(i1)j } and the selfish colluder’s probability of detection, and
then study the selection of the optimal weight vector [λ01, λ
0
2, · · · ].
Analysis of Perceptual Quality
If X̃
(i1)











where φj = 4||X(i1)j ||2 + ||X(i1)j−1||2 + ||X(i1)j+1||2
−4〈X(i1)j−1,X(i1)j 〉 − 4〈X(i1)j ,X(i1)j+1〉+ 2〈X(i1)j−1,X(i1)j+1〉. (5.6)





j . From (5.6), a larger λ
0
j implies a smaller MSEj.
Consequently, from the perceptual quality’s point of view, u(i1) should choose a
larger λ0j . When λ
0
j = 1 and colluder u





j and it has the best possible quality.
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Analysis of Probability of Detection
Given the colluded copy as in (5.5), the fingerprint that is extracted from frame j








λ−1j ·W(i)j−1 + λ0j ·W(i)j−1 + λ+1j ·W(i)j+1
K
+ dj, (5.7)
where dj contains terms that are independent of the embedded fingerprints {W(i)j }.
For simplicity, we assume that dj are i.i.d. and follow Gaussian distribution
N (0, σ2n).
It is straightforward to show that given the colluder set SC and the index of
the selfish colluder i1, the detection statistics follow Gaussian distribution with







∼ N (µ(i), σ2n
)
. (5.8)
The detection statistics have a zero mean for an innocent user and a positive mean
for a guilty colluder. Consequently, the probability of accusing an innocent user














respectively, where Q(·) is the Gaussian tail function. Therefore, for fixed σ2n and
Pfa, a colluder u
(i) has a smaller probability of detection when µ(i) is smaller, and
minimizing the probability of detection is equivalent to minimizing the mean of
the detection statistics.






































In (5.10), 〈W(i)j−1,W(i)j 〉 is the correlation between W(i)j−1 and W(i)j , and 〈W(i)j ,W(i)j+1〉




j+1. From the fingerprint design in Section
5.1.1,
〈W(i)j−1,W(i)j 〉 ≤ ||W(i)j ||2, and 〈W(i)j ,W(i)j+1〉 ≤ ||W(i)j ||2. (5.11)
From (5.10) and (5.11), if λ01, · · · , λ0j−1, λ0j+1, · · · are fixed, µ(i1) is a non-decreasing
function of λ0j and is minimized when λ
0
j = 0. Consequently, from the detection
probability’s point of view, u(i1) should choose a smaller λ0j to reduce his own
probability of detection.
Selection of the Optimal Weight Vector
During pre-collusion processing, the selfish colluders wish to minimize their own
probability of detection while maintaining the quality of the fingerprinted copies.
Consequently, for a selfish colluder u(i1), the selection of the weight vector [λ01, λ
0
2, · · · ]











s.t. MSEj ≤ ε, 0 ≤ λ0j ≤ 1, j = 1, 2, · · · , (5.12)
where ε is the threshold on the perceptual quality. In our model of weighted av-
erage, {λ0j} for different frames are selected independently. Thus, minimizing µ(i1)
over the entire video sequence is equivalent to minimizing µ
(i1)
j in (5.10) for each
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frame j independently. Therefore, the optimization problem in (5.12) is equivalent




s.t. MSEj ≤ ε, 0 ≤ λ0j ≤ 1, (5.13)
Given φj as defined in (5.6), we can show that the solution to (5.13) is
λ∗j = max
{






In our simulations, we choose sequence “carphone”, and use the first 40 frames as
an example. At the content owner’s side, we adopt the human visual model based
spread spectrum embedding [47], and embed fingerprints in the DCT domain. The
fingerprints follow Gaussian distributionN (0, σ2W ) with σ2W = 1/9, and fingerprints
for different users are generated independently. In each fingerprinted copy, similar
to the work in [55], fingerprints embedded in adjacent frames are correlated with
each other, and the correlation depends on the similarity between the two host
frames.
At the colluder’s side, we assume that there are a total of 150 colluders. For
simplicity, we assume that there is only one selfish colluder and he applies weighted
average as in (5.4) during pre-collusion processing. In addition, we assume that
after the multiuser collusion attack, the colluders add an additive noise to further
hinder the detection. In this chapter, we let the noise term dj in (5.7) have variance
σ2n = 2σ
2
W , and other values of σ
2
n will give the same trend.
At the detector’s side, we consider a non-blind detection scenario. The detector
first registers the test signal with respect to the host signal, then removes the host
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Figure 5.3: Simulation results of the weighted average on sequence “carphone”.
Assume that there are a total of K = 150 colluders and there is only one self-
ish colluder u(i1). {λ∗j} are the solution of (5.14) where ε is chosen to satisfy
PSNRj ≥ 40dB for all frame j. (Left): PSNR of the newly generated copy {X̃(i1)j }
compared with the originally received fingerprinted frames {X(i1)j }. (Right): the
selfish colluder’s probability of detection P
(i1)
d .
signal from the test copy, and finally applies the fingerprint detection process in
Section 5.1.1.
Figure 5.3 shows the simulation results of weighted average on sequence “car-





j . In Figure 5.3, {λ∗j} are the solution of (5.14) where ε is chosen to satisfy
PSNRj ≥ 40dB for all frames. In our simulations, we consider four different sce-
narios where λ0j = 1, λ
0




j , and λ
0
j = 0, respectively
3. Figure 5.3 (a)
and (b) compare the perceptual quality of {X̃(i1)j } and the selfish colluder u(i1)’s
probability of detection, respectively, when {λ0j} take different values.
3λ0j = 1 corresponds to the scenario where the selfish colluder u
(i1) does not apply pre-collusion
processing before multiuser collusion.
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Figure 5.4: λ∗j of (5.14) for different sequences where ε is chosen to satisfy
PSNRj ≥ 40dB for all frames in {X̃(i1)j }.
From Figure 5.3, a selfish colluder can reduce his own probability of detection
by applying the weighted average before multiuser collusion. By choosing {λ0j}
of smaller values, the selfish colluder has a smaller probability of detection while
sacrificing the quality of the newly generated copy. Therefore, during pre-collusion
processing, the selfish colluder has to consider the tradeoff between the probability
of detection and the perceptual quality.
We then compare the solution of {λ0j} in (5.14) for different sequences. We
choose four representative video sequences: “miss america” that has large smooth
region and slow motion, “carphone” and “foreman” that are moderately compli-
cated, and “flower” where the high frequency band has large energy and the camera
moves quickly. We choose the threshold ε in (5.14) such that PSNRj ≥ 40dB for
all frames in {X̃(i1)j }. Figure 5.4 shows the solutions of (5.14) for various sequences.
From Figure 5.4, for sequences that have slow motion (“miss america”), a selfish
colluder can choose {λ0j} with small values, e.g., around 0, without significant
quality degradation; for sequences that have moderate motion (“carphone” and
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“foreman”), λ∗j is around 0.5; while for sequences with fast movement (“flower”),
a selfish colluder has to choose large {λ0j}, e.g., larger than 0.9, to ensure the
perceptual quality.
5.3 Modifying Resolution of Received Copies Dur-
ing Pre-collusion Processing
In the previous section, we have shown how a selfish colluder can modify the
content of the received frames to minimize his probability of detection under the
quality constraints, and it can be applied to all video fingerprinting systems. In this
section, we consider scalable fingerprinting systems in which users receive copies of
different quality, and study how a selfish colluder can modify the resolution of his
fingerprinted copy to minimize his risk. For simplicity, in this section, we assume
that the selfish colluders only change the resolution of their received copies and do
not further apply weighted average during pre-collusion processing.
5.3.1 Changing the Resolution of the Fingerprinted Copies
Before Collusion
Assume that F (i1) contains the indices of the frames that a selfish colluder u(i1)
subscribes to, and {X(i)j } are the fingerprinted frames that he receives from the
content owner. Before collusion, the selfish colluder u(i1) processes his received
copy and generates another copy {X̃(i1)j }, whose temporal resolution is different
from that of {X(i1)j }. Assume that F̃ (i1) contains the indices of the frames in
{X̃(i1)j } and F̃ (i1) 6= F (i1). During collusion, u(i1) uses the newly generated copy



















































Figure 5.5: An example of cheat upward where F (i1) = Fb and F̃
(i1) = Fb∪Fe1∪Fe2.
We consider a simple scenario where F̃ (i1) ∈ {Fb, Fb∪Fe1, Fb∪Fe1∪Fe2}. For
simplicity, we assume that there is only one selfish colluder u(i1) who changes the
resolution of his copy before multiuser collusion, and no colluders apply weighted
average. Our analysis can be extended to complicated scenarios where there are
multiple selfish colluders.
For a selfish colluder u(i1) who changes the resolution of his received copy during




F (i1), F̃ (i1)
)
.
If F̃ (i1) ⊃ F (i1), i.e., a selfish colluder u(i1) subscribes to the low quality version
and he tells other colluders that he has a copy of higher frame rate, we call it
“cheat upward”. If F̃ (i1) ⊂ F (i1), i.e., u(i1) subscribes to the high quality version
and he tells others that he only has a copy of lower resolution, we call it “cheat
downward”.
Cheat Upward
In this type of pre-collusion processing, a selfish colluder u(i1) subscribes to a copy
of low frame rate while telling other colluders that he received a copy of higher
resolution. As an example, we consider a scenario where the processing parameter
is CP (i1) =
(
F (i1) = Fb, F̃
(i1) = Fb ∪ Fe1 ∪ Fe2
)
. In the example shown in Figure
5.5, a selfish colluder receives the fingerprinted base layer only, and applies cheat
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upward to generate a copy {X̃(i1)j } that contains frames in all three layers. He then
tells the other colluders that {X̃(i1)j }j∈Fb∪Fe1∪Fe2 is the copy that he received.
Pre-collusion Processing
We assume that for every frame j ∈ F (i1) = Fb that u(i1) received, the selfish
colluder simply copies X
(i1)




j . During pre-collusion processing,
u(i1) needs to forge X̃
(i1)
j for frame j ∈ Fe1 ∪ Fe2 in the enhancement layers that






are two adjacent frames in the




layers where j2 ∈ Fe1 ∪ Fe2 and j1 < j2 < j3, in this chapter, we consider a simple










j3 − j1 and λ2 =
j2 − j1
j3 − j1 . (5.15)
Other complicated algorithms, e.g., motion based interpolation [2, 8], can also be
used to improve the quality of the forged frames, and the analysis will be similar.
Perceptual Quality
When the selfish colluder applies cheat upward, he has to forge frames in the
enhancement layers that he did not receive from the content owner. To cover
up the fact he processed his fingerprinted copy before collusion and make other
colluders believe him, the selfish colluder must ensure that the fake enhancement
layers generated by himself have high quality.
In this section, we examine the perceptual quality of the forged enhancement
layers and study the quality constraints on cheat upward. As an example, we
consider a scenario where the processing parameter is CP (i1) = (Fb, Fb∪Fe1∪Fe2),
and use the simple interpolation based method in (5.15).
For a selfish colluder u(i1) in subgroup SCb and for a frame j ∈ Fe1∪Fe2 in the
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Figure 5.6: The quality of the enhancement layers that is forged by the selfish
colluder during pre-collusion processing. The processing parameter is CP (i1) =
(Fb, Fb ∪ Fe1 ∪ Fe2) and the interpolation based method in (5.15) is used. Fb =
{1, 5, 9, · · · }, Fe1 = {3, 7, 11, · · · } and Fe2 = {2, 4, 6, 8, · · · }.
enhancement layers, assume that X
(i1)
j is the fingerprinted frame that he would
have received if he had subscribed to frame j. In our simulations, we choose X
(i1)
j
as the ground truth and calculate the PSNR of X̃
(i1)




Figure 5.6 shows the results on the first 40 frames of sequence “miss america”,
“carphone” and “flower”. From Figure 5.6, for sequence “miss america” with flat
regions and slow motion, the selfish colluder can forge enhancement layers of high
quality (around 40dB in PSNR); for sequence “flower” that has fast movement,
the selfish colluder can only generate low-quality enhancement layers (only 15dB
in PSNR), and therefore, might not be able to apply cheat upward due to the
4In practice, the selfish colluder u(i1) does not have X(i1)j and cannot use objective criteria
to measure the quality of X̃(i1)j . He can only subjectively judge the quality himself. The results
shown here is only for the purpose of performance comparison.
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quality constraints.5
Analysis of the Probability of Detection
For a selfish colluder, to analyze the effectiveness of cheat upward on reducing
his risk of being captured, we compare his probability of detection when the selfish
colluder applies cheat upward with that when he does not process his fingerprinted
copy before collusion. We use the example in Figure 5.5 where the processing
parameter is CP (i1) = (Fb, Fb ∪ Fe1 ∪ Fe2).
We first consider the scenario where u(i1) does not apply pre-collusion process-
ing, and we assume that
• SCb = {i ∈ SC : F (i) = Fb} contains the indices of the colluders who
subscribes to copies of lowest resolution and only receive the base layer from
the content owner;
• SCb,e1 = {i ∈ SC : F (i) = Fb∪Fe1} contains the indices of the colluders who
receive both the base layer and the enhancement layer 1 from content owner;
• and SCall = {i ∈ SC : F (i) = Fb ∪ Fe1 ∪ Fe2} contains the indices of the
colluders who receive all three layers.
Kb, Kb,e1 and Kall are the number of colluders in SCb, SCb,e1 and SCall, respec-
tively.
Given (Kb, Kb,e1, Kall) and (Nb, Ne1, Ne2), the colluders first decide the resolu-
tion of the colluded copy F c, and then choose the collusion parameters {βk}k=1,2,3
5Motion based interpolation [2, 8] can be used to improve the quality. However, for some
sequences with fast movement and complex scene composition, e.g., “football” and “flower”, even
with motion based interpolation, the selfish colluder may still not be able to forge enhancement
layers of good enough quality to use. Therefore, the selfish colluders may not be able to apply
cheat upward on those complicated sequences.
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and {αl}l=1,2 according to Table 4.1. In this scenario, for each frame j ∈ Fb in the





















where nj is the additive noise. We assume that nj follows Gaussian distribution
N (0, σ2n) for simplicity.
At the detector’s side, following the detection procedure in Section 5.1.1, F̆ (i) =












compares it with the threshold h and decides if u(i1) is a possible colluder. It is
straightforward to show that given the colluder set SC and the extracted finger-














We then consider the scenario where u(i1) applies cheat upward during pre-
collusion processing, and assume that
• S̃Cb = {i ∈ SC : F̃ (i)} contains the indices of the colluders who claim that
they received the base layer only;
• S̃Cb,e1 = {i ∈ SC : F̃ (i) = Fb ∪ Fe1} is the set containing the indices of
the colluders who claim that they have received both the base layer and
enhancement layer 1;
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• and S̃Call = {i ∈ SC : F̃ (i) = Fb∪Fe1∪Fe2} is the set containing the indices
of the colluders who claim that they have received all three layers.








If u(i1) is the only selfish colluder and the processing parameter is CP (i1) =
(Fb, Fb ∪Fe1 ∪Fe2), then we have S̃C
b
= SCb \ {i1}6, S̃C
b,e1
= SCb,e1 and S̃C
all
=
SCall∪{i1}. Consequently, K̃b = Kb−1, K̃b,e1 = Kb,e1 and K̃all = Kall+1. If other
colluders do not discover u(i1)’s processing before collusion, given (K̃b, K̃b,e1, K̃all)
and (Nb, Ne1, Ne2), following Table 4.1, the colluders first decide on the indices of
the frames in the colluded copy F̃ c, and then choose the parameters {β̃k}k=1,2,3 and
{α̃l}l=1,2 accordingly. For fair comparison, if (K̃b, K̃b,e1, K̃all) and (Nb, Ne1, Ne2)
satisfy the fairness constraints listed in Table 4.1, we choose F̃ c = F c .






















Under the assumption that nj follows the same Gaussian distribution N (0, σ2n) as
in (5.16), given the colluder set SC, the identity of the selfish colluder i1, and the






N |SC, i1, CP (i1)
)







6For two sets A and B where B ⊆ A, A \B4={i : i ∈ A, i /∈ B}.
117












) without pre−collusion processing
with pre−collusion processing
without pre−collusion processing 
with pre−collusion processing 













(a) F c = Fb ∪ Fe1 ∪ Fe2 (b) F c = Fb
Figure 5.7: Means of the selfish colluder’s detection statistics when he applies cheat
upward. (Fb, Fe1, Fe2) = (10, 10, 20), and (Nb, Ne1, Ne2) = (50000, 50000, 100000).
There are a total of M = 450 users in the system and a total of K = 150 colluders.
0 ≤ Kb, Kb,e1, Kall ≤ 150 and (Kb, Kb,e1, Kall) are on the line (5.21). CP (i1) =
(Fb, Fb ∪ Fe1 ∪ Fe2).
From (5.18) and (5.20), if the same threshold h is used at the detector’s side,
comparing P
(i1)
d of these two scenarios is equivalent to comparing µ
(i1) in (5.18)
with µ̃(i1) in (5.20).
To compare the values of the two means, we consider the following scalable
fingerprinting systems. We observe that for video sequences like “miss america”,
“carphone” and “foreman”, each frame has approximately 3000 ∼ 7000 embed-
dable coefficients, depending on the characteristics of the video sequence. As an
example, we assume that the length of the embedded fingerprints in each frame is
5000, and we test on a total of 40 frames. We choose Fb = {j : j = 4k + 1, k =
0, · · · , 9}, Fe1 = {j : j = 4k + 3, k = 0, · · · , 9} and Fe2 = {j : j = 2k, k =
1, · · · , 20} as an example of the temporal scalability, and the lengths of the fin-
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gerprints embedded in the base layer, enhancement layer 1 and enhancement layer
2 are Nb = 50000, Ne1 = 50000 and Ne2 = 100000, respectively. We assume
that there are a total of M = 450 users and |Ub| = |Ub,e1| = |Uall| = 150. Each
user is assigned a unique fingerprint following Guassian distribution N (0, σ2W ) with
σ2W = 1/9.
We assume that there are a total of K = 150 colluders, 0 ≤ Kb, Kb,e1, Kall ≤
150 and (Kb, Kb,e1, Kall) are on the line
Kall
√





Nb + Ne1 + Kall
√
Nb + Ne1 + Ne2
=
Ne2
Nb + Ne1 + Ne2
, (5.21)
which is the boundary of the fairness constraints for F c = Fb ∪ Fe1 ∪ Fe2 in Table
4.1. Other values of (Kb, Kb,e1, Kall) and (Nb, Ne1, Ne2) give the same trend.
Given the above scalable fingerprinting system, Figure 5.7 compares µ(i1) in
(5.18) with µ̃(i1) in (5.20). In Figure 5.7 (a), F c = Fb ∪ Fe1 ∪ Fe2 and the colluded
copy has the highest resolution; and in Figure 5.7 (b), F c = Fb and the colluded
copy contains frames in the base layer only. From Figure 5.7, cheat upward can help
the selfish colluder to further reduce his probability of detection when the colluded
copy is of high quality; while it can not lower the selfish colluder’s risk when the
colluders decide to generate a copy of low resolution. This is because when F c = Fb,
no matter how many frames that u(i1) claims that he has received, only those in the
base layer are used during collusion. Therefore, in such a scenario, cheat upward
cannot help the selfish colluders to further reduce his risk. To generalize, cheat
upward is effective in reducing a selfish colluder u(i1)’s probability of detection only




















































Figure 5.8: An example of cheat downward where F (i1) = Fb ∪ Fe1 ∪ Fe2 and
F̃ (i1) = Fb.
Cheat Downward
In cheat downward, a selfish colluder receives a copy of high resolution and tells
other colluders that he only has a copy of low quality. Shown in Figure 5.8 is an
example of cheat downward where u(i1) subscribes to all three layers while claiming
that he only has the fingerprinted base layer. In this example, during pre-collusion
processing, u(i1) simply keeps frames in the base layer and drops those in the
enhancement layers.
In cheat downward, the selfish colluder does not need to forge any frames, and
therefore, the quality constraints are satisfied. For cheat downward, the analysis
of the selfish colluder’s probability of detection is similar to that for cheat upward,
and is not repeated here.
Figure 5.9 compares the means of the selfish colluder’s detection statistics when
he uses cheat downward with that when he does not apply pre-collusion processing.
The setup of the scalable fingerprinting system in Figure 5.9 is the same as that in
Figure 5.7. In Figure 5.9, the processing parameter is CP (i1) = (Fb∪Fe1∪Fe2, Fb),
and F c = Fb∪Fe1∪Fe2 and F c = Fb in Figure 5.9 (a) and (b), respectively. Similar
to cheat upward, when the colluded copy has high resolution, the selfish colluder
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(a) F c = Fb ∪ Fe1 ∪ Fe2 (b) F c = Fb
Figure 5.9: Means of the selfish colluder’s detection statistics when he ap-
plies cheat downward. (Fb, Fe1, Fe2) = (10, 10, 20) and (Nb, Ne1, Ne2) =
(50000, 50000, 100000). There are a total of M = 450 users in the system and
a total of K = 150 colluders. 0 ≤ Kb, Kb,e1, Kall ≤ 150 and (Kb, Kb,e1, Kall) are
on the line (5.21). CP (i1) = (Fb ∪ Fe1 ∪ Fe2, Fb).
can reduce his own probability of detection by applying cheat downward before
multiuser collusion; while when the resolution of the colluded copy is low, cheat
downward cannot further lower the selfish colluder’s risk. Cheat downward can
reduce the selfish colluder’s probability of detection only when the colluded copy
has high resolution and F c ⊃ F̃ (i1).
5.3.2 Performance Comparison of Different Strategy
For each selfish colluder, if he wants to modify the resolution of his fingerprinted
copy during pre-collusion processing, he has two choices. For example, for a selfish
colluder u(i1∈SC
b) who receives the base layer only, he can apply cheat upward
with two different processing parameters: CP
(i1)
1 = (Fb, Fb ∪ Fe1) and CP (i1)2 =
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(Fb, Fb ∪ Fe1 ∪ Fe2). We assume that the fake enhancement layers generated in
cheat upward satisfy the quality constraints, and other colluders do not discover
the selfish colluder’s pre-collusion processing behavior. In this section, we compare
the effectiveness of different processing parameters in reducing the selfish colluder’s
risk of being captured.
From the analysis in the previous section, neither cheat upward nor cheat down-
ward can further reduce the selfish colluder’s probability of detection when F c = Fb
and the colluded copy contains the base layer only. Therefore, in this section, we
only consider the scenario where the colluded copy contains the enhancement layers
and F c equals to either Fb ∪ Fe1 or Fb ∪ Fe1 ∪ Fe2.
Our simulation setup is similar to that in Section 5.3.1. We assume each frame
has 5000 embeddable coefficients and we test on a total of 40 frames. We con-
sider a temporally scalable video coding system where Fb = {j : j = 4k + 1, k =
0, · · · , 9}, Fe1 = {j : j = 4k + 3, k = 0, · · · , 9} and Fe2 = {j : j = 2k, k =
1, · · · , 20}, and the lengths of the fingerprints embedded in the base layer, en-
hancement layer 1 and enhancement layer 2 are Nb = 50000, Ne1 = 50000 and
Ne2 = 100000, respectively. We further assume that there are a total of M = 450
users in the system, and |Ub| = |Ub,e1| = |Uall| = 150. For each user, we generate a
unique fingerprint following Gaussian distribution N (0, σ2W ) where σ2W = 1/9, and
in each fingerprinted copy, we embed correlated fingerprints in adjacent frames. In
addition, fingerprints for different users are independent of each other.
During collusion, we assume that there are a total of K = 150 colluders. 0 ≤
Kb, Kb,e1, Kall ≤ 150 and (Kb, Kb,e1, Kall) are on the line (5.21). We further assume
that the additive noise nj follows distribution N (0, σ2n) where σ2n = 2σ2W . In
our simulations, we assume that there is only one selfish colluder u(i1) and other
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colluders do not discover the pre-collusion processing by the selfish colluder.
At the detector’s side, we assume that there is a registration module that
registers each frame in the colluded copy with respect to the corresponding frame
in the host signal, and we consider a non-blind detection scenario where the host
signal is first removed from the test copy before detection.
For Selfish Colluders in Subgroup SCb
For a selfish colluder u(i1) where i1 ∈ SCb and F (i1) = Fb, he can use cheat
upward with two different processing parameters: CP
(i1)
1 = (Fb, Fb ∪ Fe1) and
CP
(i1)
2 = (Fb, Fb ∪Fe1 ∪Fe2). In this section, we compare the effectiveness of these
two parameters in reducing u(i1)’s probability of detection P
(i1)
d .
Figure 5.10 shows our simulation results. In Figure 5.10, we fix the probability
of accusing an innocent user Pfa as 0.01, and compare P
(i1)
d of different processing
parameters. F c = Fb ∪ Fe1 and F c = Fb ∪ Fe1 ∪ Fe2 in Figure 5.10 (a) and
(b), respectively. From the selfish colluder’s point of view, when F c = Fb ∪ Fe1,
the two parameters have almost identical performance. If F c = Fb ∪ Fe1 ∪ Fe2,
CP
(i1)
2 = (Fb, Fb ∪ Fe1 ∪ Fe2) gives the selfish colluder a smaller probability of
detection than CP
(i1)
2 = (Fb, Fb ∪ Fe1). Therefore, under the quality constraints,
a selfish colluder in SCb should choose cheat upward with processing parameter
CP
(i1)
2 to minimize his own risk of being detected.
For Selfish Colluders in Subgroup SCb,e1
For a selfish colluder u(i1∈SC
b,e1) who receives the base layer and the enhancement
layer 1 from the content owner, he can apply cheat downward with processing
parameter CP
(i1)
1 = (Fb ∪ Fe1, Fb) during pre-collusion processing, or use cheat
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(a) F c = Fb ∪ Fe1 (b) F c = Fb ∪ Fe1 ∪ Fe2
Figure 5.10: Performance comparison of different processing parameters for
selfish colluders in SCb. (Fb, Fe1, Fe2) = (10, 10, 20) and (Nb, Ne1, Ne2) =
(50000, 50000, 100000). Assume that there are a total of M = 450 users and
|Ub| = |Ub,e1| = |Uall| = 150. The total number of colluders is K = 150.
0 ≤ Kb, Kb,e1, Kall ≤ 150 and (Kb, Kb,e1, Kall) are on the line (5.21). Pfa = 0.01.
upward with parameter CP
(i1)
2 = (Fb ∪ Fe1, Fb ∪ Fe1 ∪ Fe2).
Figure 5.11 shows the simulation results. When F c = Fb ∪ Fe1, CP (i1)1 reduces
u(i1)’s probability of detection while CP
(i1)
2 cannot lower the selfish colluder’s risk.
This is because when F c = Fb∪Fe1, F c ⊃ F̃ (i1) for cheat downward with parameter
CP
(i1)
1 , while F
c 6⊃ F (i1) for cheat upward with parameter CP (i1)2 . The simulation
results are in agreement with our analysis in the previous section. When F c =





2 is smaller than that of CP
(i1)
1 .
Consequently, in order for a selfish colluder in subgroup SCb,e1 to minimize
his own risk, when the colluded copy has medium resolution, he should use cheat
downward with processing parameter CP
(i1)
1 = (Fb ∪ Fe1, Fb); and when the col-
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(a) F c = Fb ∪ Fe1 (b) F c = Fb ∪ Fe1 ∪ Fe2
Figure 5.11: Performance comparison of different processing parameters for
selfish colluders in SCb,e1. (Fb, Fe1, Fe2) = (10, 10, 20) and (Nb, Ne1, Ne2) =
(50000, 50000, 100000). Assume that there are a total of M = 450 users and
|Ub| = |Ub,e1| = |Uall| = 150. The total number of colluders is K = 150.
0 ≤ Kb, Kb,e1, Kall ≤ 150 and (Kb, Kb,e1, Kall) are on the line (5.21). Pfa = 0.01.
luded copy has high resolution, he should apply cheat upward with CP
(i1)
2 =
(Fb ∪ Fe1, Fb ∪ Fe1 ∪ Fe2).
For Selfish Colluders in SCall
For a selfish colluder u(i1) in subgroup SCall who receives all three layers, during
pre-collusion processing, he can use cheat downward with two different parameters:
CP
(i1)
1 = (Fb ∪ Fe1 ∪ Fe2, Fb) and CP (i1)2 = (Fb ∪ Fe1 ∪ Fe2, Fb ∪ Fe1). Figure 5.12
shows the simulation results.
From Figure 5.12, when F c = Fb ∪ Fe1, CP (i1)1 reduces u(i1)’s probability of
detection, while CP
(i1)
2 does not change the selfish colluder’s risk of being captured.
When F c = Fb∪Fe1∪Fe2, both processing parameters reduce u(i1)’s probability of
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(a) F c = Fb ∪ Fe1 (b) F c = Fb ∪ Fe1 ∪ Fe2
Figure 5.12: Performance comparison of different processing parameters for
selfish colluders in SCall. (Fb, Fe1, Fe2) = (10, 10, 20) and (Nb, Ne1, Ne2) =
(50000, 50000, 100000). Assume that there are a total of M = 450 users and
|Ub| = |Ub,e1| = |Uall| = 150. The total number of colluders is K = 150.





1 is smaller than that of CP
(i1)
2 . Consequently, from
the selfish colluder’s point of view, for colluder u(i1) in subgroup SCall, he should
always choose cheat downward with parameter CP
(i1)
1 = (Fb∪Fe1∪Fe2, Fb) during
pre-collusion processing to minimize his own probability of detection.
5.3.3 Simulation Results on Real Video
We verify the correctness of our analysis on real videos, and choose the first 40
frames of the sequence “carphone” as an example. Similar to that in Section
5.3.1, we consider a temporally scalable video coding system where Fb = {j :
j = 4k + 1, k = 0, · · · , 9}, Fe1 = {j : j = 4k + 3, k = 0, · · · , 9} and Fe2 =
{j : j = 2k, k = 1, · · · , 20}. The length of the embedded fingerprints in the base
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(c) CP (i1) = (Fb ∪ Fe1, Fb ∪ Fe1 ∪ Fe2) (d) CP (i1) = (Fb ∪ Fe1 ∪ Fe2, Fb)
Figure 5.13: Simulation results of changing the resolution of the received copies
during pre-collusion processing on the first 40 frames of sequence carphone.
(Fb, Fe1, Fe2) = (10, 10, 20). The total number of users is M = 450 and
|Ub| = |Ub,e1| = |Uall| = 150. There are a total number of K = 150 collud-
ers, 0 ≤ Kb, Kb,e1, Kall ≤ 150 and (Kb, Kb,e1, Kall) are on the line (5.21). Pfa is
fixed as 10−2. In (a) and (c), F c = Fb ∪ Fe1 ∪ Fe2. In (b) and (d), F c = Fb ∪ Fe1.
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layer, enhancement layer 1 and enhancement layer 2 are Nb = 72222, Ne1 = 71926
and Ne2 = 143820, respectively. We assume that the total number of users is
M = 450 and |Ub| = |Ub,e1| = |Uall| = 150. We adopt the human visual model
based spread spectrum embedding in [47], and embed the fingerprints in the DCT
domain. The fingerprints follow Gaussian distribution N (0, σ2W ) with σ2W = 1/9,
and the fingerprints assigned to different users are generated independently. In each
fingerprinted copy, the fingerprints embedded in different frames are correlated
with each other, depending on the similarity between the host frames.
During collusion, we assume that there are a total of K = 150 colluders. 0 ≤
Kb, Kb,e1, Kall ≤ 150 and they are on the line (5.21). We consider a simple scenario
where there is only one selfish colluder who changes the resolution of his received
copy before collusion, and no colluders apply weighted average. Furthermore,
we assume that no colluders discover the pre-collusion processing by the selfish
colluder. In our simulations, we adjust the power of the additive noise nj such
that ||nj||2/||W(i)j ||2 = 2 for every frame j ∈ F c in the colluded copy.
We simulate the non-blind detection scenario where the detector first subtracts
the host signal from the test copy before fingerprint detection, and then follows
the procedure in Section 5.1.1.
Figure 5.13 shows the simulation results. In Figure 5.13 (a), the selfish colluder
u(i1) is in subgroup SCb and the processing parameter is CP (i1) = (Fb, Fb ∪ Fe1 ∪
Fe2). In Figure 5.13 (b) and (c), the selfish colluder is in subgroup SC
b,e1 and the
processing parameters are CP (i1) = (Fb∪Fe1, Fb) and CP (i1) = (Fb∪Fe1, Fb∪Fe1∪
Fe2), respectively. In Figure 5.13 (d), the selfish colluder is in subgroup SC
all, and
the processing parameter is CP (i1) = (Fb ∪ Fe1 ∪ Fe2, Fb). In Figure 5.13 (a) and
(c), F c = Fb ∪ Fe1 ∪ Fe2 and the colluded copy has high resolution, and in Figure
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5.13 (b) and (d), F c = Fb ∪ Fe1 and the colluded copy has medium quality.
From Figure 5.13, under the quality constraints, if the colluded copy contains
the enhancement layers and if the processing parameter is chosen properly, chang-
ing the resolution of the received copies can significantly reduce the selfish col-
luder’s risk of being detected. In addition, the simulation results on real video
agree with our analysis in Section 5.3, and are comparable with the simulation
results in Section 5.3.2.
5.4 Countermeasures against Pre-collusion Pro-
cessing
From the previous sections, by processing his fingerprinted copy before multiuser
collusion, a selfish colluder can reduce his probability of detection, especially when
the colluded copy has high quality. To prevent such pre-collusion processing and
protect his own interest, before collusion, each colluder has to check the integrity
of all the fingerprinted frames from the other colluders. In this section, we dis-
cuss some preliminary countermeasures against pre-collusion processing by selfish
colluders.
In this chapter, we assume that when transmitting the fingerprinted copies
through networks, the the service provider enables the users to authenticate each
fingerprinted frame that is distributed to them. Possible authentication methods
include [36,37,50,53,66,67,74]. If the content owner or the service provider provides
such verification tools for the receivers, then before collusion, for each fingerprinted
frame X̃
(i)
j from colluder u
(i), all other colluders should verify whether it has been
tampered using the same verification tools. This integrity check can help to detect
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pre-collusion processing using weighted average. Furthermore, it will also assist
the other colluders to detect cheat upward by a selfish colluder, who has to forge
the enhancement layers that he did not subscribe to. Consequently, verification of
each fingerprinted frame before multiuser collusion will help to detect and prevent
a selfish colluder from applying both weighted average and cheat upward before
multiuser collusion.
To detect cheat downward, if the content owner also provide tools to verify the
indices of the frames that user u(i) received during transmission, then the other
colluders can use the same tools to verify F̃ (i) before multiuser collusion. If the
content owner does not provide methods to verify F̃ (i), the colluders have to find
other ways to guarantee the fairness of the collusion attacks. Note that for a selfish
colluder u(i1), cheat downward will not further reduce his probability of detection
if F c ⊂ F̃ (i1). Consequently, after the colluders verify each fingerprinted frame




to guarantee the absolute fairness of collusion. This implies that it is very likely
that the colluders can only generate a colluded copy of low quality.
5.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have studied the traitors within traitors problem in multimedia
fingerprinting, where some selfish colluders process their fingerprinted copies before
multiuser collusion to minimize their own probability of detection under the quality
constraints. We have studied the possible pre-collusion processing strategy by the
selfish colluders, and analyzed their effects on both the selfish colluders’ probability
of detection and the perceptual quality of the fingerprinted copies. We have also
studied possible countermeasures by other colluders to detect and prevent such
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pre-collusion processing in order to protect their own interest.
We first proposed to use weighted average to attenuate the energy of the origi-
nally embedded fingerprints, and analyzed its performance. From both our analysis
and simulation results, this pre-collusion processing technique reduces the selfish
colluder’s probability of detection at the cost of quality degradation. We then
studied the selection of the optimal weight vector to minimize the selfish colluder’s
risk under the quality constraints. This type of pre-collusion processing can be
applied to all video fingerprinting systems.
We also studied a specific pre-collusion processing technique on scalable fin-
gerprinting systems, in which different colluders receive copies of different quality.
In such fingerprinting systems, a selfish colluder can also modify the resolution of
his received copy during pre-collusion processing. From our analytical and sim-
ulation results, with careful selection of the processing parameter, this type of
pre-collusion processing can decrease the selfish colluder’s risk of being captured
when the colluded copy is of medium or high resolution. For this type of pre-
collusion processing, we also analyzed the optimal processing parameter for selfish
colluders in different subgroups to minimize their probability of detection under
the quality constraints.
Finally, we studied some preliminary countermeasures for other colluders to
detect and prevent pre-collusion processing. To detect weighted average and cheat
upward, each colluder should check the integrity and verify the authenticity of
each fingerprinted frame from other colluders. To prevent cheat downward, if the
content owner does not provide tools for users to verify the indices of the received
frames, the colluders have to generate a colluded copy of low quality in order to
guarantee the absolute fairness of collusion.
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Chapter 6
Secure Fingerprint Multicast for
Video Streaming
In video streaming applications, a large amount of data has to be transmitted to
a large number of users with limited bandwidth available under stringent latency
constraints. This requires the service provider to minimize the communication
cost in transmitting each copy in order to support as many users as possible. The
uniqueness of each distributed copy in digital fingerprinting makes it even more
critical to have secure fingerprint multicast schemes, which reduce the bandwidth
requirement while protecting the secrecy of the multimedia content as well as each
embedded fingerprint.
All the prior work on secure fingerprint multicast considered applications where
the goal of the fingerprinting system is to be resistant to collusion attacks with a few
colluders, e.g., seven or ten traitors, and designed the efficient distribution schemes
accordingly. In video streaming applications, there are usually a large number of
users (e.g., several thousand users), and therefore, potentially a large number of
colluders (e.g., a few dozen or maybe even a hundred colluders). Some prior work
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[58, 61, 62] has shown that with proper design and embedding of the fingerprints,
the fingerprinting systems can resist collusion attacks with dozens of colluders,
e.g., up to 60 colluders. In this chapter, we consider video applications where
the fingerprinting system aims to survive collusion attacks with dozens of or even
a hundred colluders, adopt the fingerprinting systems with strong traitor tracing
capability [58, 62], and study the secure and efficient distribution of fingerprinted
copies in such applications.
In this chapther, we consider the group-oriented fingerprint design in [62] as
an example, and study the secure fingerprint multicast schemes for tree based fin-
gerprinting systems. Section 6.2 introduces the tree based fingerprint design and
Section 6.1 analyzes the security requirement in video streaming applications. In
Section 6.3, we discuss the simple solution of pure unicast scheme, where each fin-
gerprinted copy is unicasted to the corresponding user. In Section 6.4, we propose
a general fingerprint multicast scheme that can be used with most spread spec-
trum embedding based fingerprinting systems, and in Section 6.5, we propose a
joint fingerprint design and distribution scheme which utilizes the special structure
of the fingerprint design to further improve the bandwidth efficiency.
6.1 Secure Video Streaming
In video streaming applications, to protect the welfare and interests of the content
owner, it is critical to ensure the proper distribution and authorized usage of
multimedia content. To be specific, the desired security requirements in video
streaming applications are1:
1Note that depending on the applications, there might be other security requirements except
these listed in this chapter, e.g., sender authentication and data integrity verification [45]. It
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1. Secrecy of the video content : Only legitimate users who have registered with
the content owner/service provider can have access to the content of video
sequences. Proper encryption should be applied to prevent outsiders who do
not subscribe to the service from estimating the video’s content.
2. Traitor tracing : After the data are distributed to the legitimate users, the
content owner has to protect multimedia from unauthorized redistribution.
Digital fingerprinting is one possible solution to trace traitors and thwart the
illegal information leakage.
3. Robustness of the embedded fingerprints : If digital fingerprinting is used for
traitor tracing, it is required that the embedded fingerprints can survive
common signal processing (e.g., compression), attacks on a single copy [14,
28], as well as multiuser collusion attacks [13,52].
4. Anti-framing : The clear text of a fingerprinted copy is known only by the
corresponding legitimate user whose fingerprint is embedded in that copy,
and no other users of the service can access that copy in clear text and frame
an innocent user.
In particular, we will explain the anti-framing requirement in detail. In digital
fingerprinting applications, different fingerprinted copies do not differ significantly
from each other. If the content owner or the service provider does not protect
the transmitted bit streams appropriately, it is very easy for an attacker, who
subscribes to the video streaming service, to impersonate an innocent user of the
service.
is out of the scope of this chapter and we assume that the distribution systems have already






































Figure 6.1: An example of framing attack on fingerprinting systems.
Figure 6.1 shows an example of the framing attack. Assume that K(i) and K(j)
are the secret keys of user u(i) and u(j), respectively; X(i) and X(j) are the clear
text versions of two fingerprinted copies for u(i) and u(j), respectively; and Z(i) and
Z(j) are the cipher text versions of X(i) and X(j) encrypted with K(i) and K(j), re-
spectively. u(i) first decrypts Z(i) that is transmitted to him and reconstructs X(i).
Assume that he also intercepts Z(j) that is transmitted to u(j). Without appropri-
ate protection by the content owner or the service provider, u(i) can compare Z(j)
with X(i), estimates X(j) without knowledge of K(j), and generates X̃(j) of good
quality, which is an estimated version of X(j). u(i) can then redistribute X̃(j) or
use X̃(j) during collusion. This framing puts innocent user u(j) under suspicion
and disables the content owner from capturing attacker u(i). The content owner
must prohibit such framing attacks.
In summary, before transmission, the content owner should embed unique and
robust fingerprints in each distributed copy, and apply proper encryption to the
bit streams to protect both the content of the video as well as each fingerprinted
coefficient in every fingerprinted copy.
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6.2 Tree Based Fingerprint Design
From Section 6.1, traitor tracing capability is a fundamental requirement for con-
tent protection and digital rights enforcement in networked video applications.
This section introduces the tree based fingerprint design [62], which can resist
collusion attacks by a few dozen colluders.
It was observed in [62] that a subgroup of users are more likely to collude
with each other than others due to geographical or social reasons. A tree based
fingerprint design was proposed in [61], [62] to explore the hierarchical relationship
among users. In their fingerprint design, users that are more likely to collude with
each other are assigned correlated fingerprints to improve the robustness against
collusion attacks.
For simplicity, a symmetric tree structure is used where the depth of each leaf
node is L and each node at level l − 1 (l = 1, · · · , L) has the same number of
children nodes Dl. In a simple example of the tree structure shown in Figure 6.2,
it is assumed that
• the users in the subgroup U1,1 are equally likely to collude with each other
with probability p3;
• each user in the subgroup U1,1 is equally likely to collude with the users in
the subgroup U1,2 with probability p2 < p3;
• and each user in the subgroup U1,1 ∪ U1,2 is equally likely to collude with
the users in other subgroups with probability p1 < p2 < p3.
A unique basis fingerprint a(i1,··· ,il) following Gaussian distribution N (0, σ2W )
is generated for each node [i1, · · · , il] in the tree except the root node and all










































































Figure 6.2: A tree-structure based fingerprinting scheme with L = 3, D1 = D2 = 2
and D3 = 3.
fingerprints that are on the path from its corresponding leaf node to the root node
are assigned to him. For example, in Figure 6.2, the fingerprints a1, a1,1 and a1,1,1
are embedded in the fingerprinted copy X(1) that is distributed to user u(1).
Assume that there are a total of K colluders and SC is the set containing the
indices of the colluders. Given K different copies {X(i)}i∈SC , the colluders generate
the colluded copy V = g
({X(i)}i∈SC
)
where g(·) is the collusion function.
In the detection process, the detector first extracts the fingerprint Y from V.
In [61], [62], a multi-stage colluder identification scheme was proposed and is as
follows.
Detection at the first level of the tree: The detector correlates the ex-
tracted fingerprint Y with each of the D1 fingerprints {ai1}i1=1,··· ,D1 at level 1 and
calculates the detection statistics
T i1 =< Y, ai1 > /||ai1||, i1 = 1, · · · , D1, (6.1)
where ||a|| is the Euclidean norm of a. The estimated guilty regions at level 1 are
GR(1) = {[i1] : T i1 > h1}, (6.2)
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where h1 is a predetermined threshold for fingerprint detection at the first level in
the tree.
Detection at level 2 ≤ l ≤ L in the tree: Given the previously estimated
guilty regions GR(l−1), for each [i1, · · · , il−1] ∈ GR(l−1), the detector calculates
the detection statistics
T i1,··· ,il−1,il =< Y, ai1,··· ,il−1,il > /||ai1,··· ,il−1,il ||, il = 1, · · · , Dl, (6.3)
and narrows down the guilty regions to
GR(l) =
{
[i1, · · · , il] : [i1, · · · , il−1] ∈ GR(l − 1), T i1,··· ,il ≥ hl
}
(6.4)
where hl is a predetermined threshold for fingerprint detection at level l in the
tree. Finally, the detector outputs the estimated colluder set
ŜC =
{
u(i) : i = [i1, · · · , iL] ∈ GR(L)
}
. (6.5)
6.3 The Pure Unicast Distribution Scheme
The most straightforward way to distribute the fingerprinted copies is the pure
unicast scheme, where each fingerprinted copy is encoded independently, encrypted
with the corresponding user’s secret key and unicasted to him. It is simple and
has limited requirement on the receivers’ computation capability. However, from
the bandwidth’s point of view, it is inefficient because the required bandwidth is
proportional to the number of users while the difference between different copies
is small.
In this chapter, in the pure unicast scheme, to prevent outside attackers from
estimating the video content, the generalized index mapping [21], [70] is used to
encrypt portions of the compressed bit streams that carry the most important
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information of the video content: the DC coefficients in the Intra blocks and the
motion vectors in the Inter blocks. Applying the generalized index mapping to the
fingerprinted AC coefficients can prevent the attackers from framing an innocent
user at the cost of inroducing significant bit rate overhead.2 In this chapter, to
protect the fingerprinted coefficients without significant bit rate overhead, similar
to the encryption scheme in [49], we apply the stream cipher [39] from traditional
cryptography to the compressed bit streams of the AC coefficients.3 It has no im-
pact on the compression efficiency. In addition, the bit stuffing scheme [70] is used
to prevent the encrypted data from becoming identical to some headers/markers.
6.4 The General Fingerprint Multicast Distribu-
tion Scheme
In this section, we propose a general fingerprint multicast distribution scheme that
can be used with most multimedia fingerprinting systems where the spread spec-
trum embedding is adopted. We consider a video fingerprinting and distribution
system that uses MPEG-2 encoding standard. For simplicity, we assume that all
the distributed copies are encoded at the same bit rate and have approximately
the same perceptual quality. To reduce the computation cost at the sender’s side,
fingerprints are embedded in the DCT domain. The block based human visual
models [47] are used to guarantee the imperceptibility and control the energy of
the embedded fingerprints.
2From [70], the bit rate is increased by more than 5.9% if two nonzero AC coefficients in each
Intra block are encrypted.
3We only encrypt the content-carrying fields and the headers/markers are transmitted in clear
text.
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From human visual models [47], not all DCT coefficients are embeddable due to
the imperceptibility constraints on the embedded fingerprints, and a non-embeddable
coefficient has the same value in all copies. To reduce the required bandwidth in
transmitting the non-embeddable coefficients, we propose a general fingerprint
multicast scheme: the non-embeddable coefficients are multicasted to all users,
and the coefficients left are embedded with unique fingerprints and unicasted to
each user.4
In the general fingerprint multicast scheme, the transmitted video sequences
are encrypted in the same way as in the pure unicast scheme. To guarantee that no
outsiders can access the video content, a key that is shared by all users is used to en-
crypt the multicasted bit stream by applying the generalized index mapping to the
DC coefficients in the Intra blocks and the motion vectors in the Inter blocks. To
protect the fingerprinted coefficients, each unicasted bit stream is encrypted with
the corresponding user’s secret key. The stream cipher [39] is applied to the uni-
casted bit streams with headers/markers intact. Finally, the bit stuff scheme [70]
is used to ensure that the cipher text does not duplicate MPEG headers/markers.
Figure 6.3 shows the MPEG-2 based general fingerprint multicast scheme for
video on demand applications where the video is stored in compressed format.
Assume that Km is a key that is shared by all users, and K(i) is user u(i)’s secret
key. The key steps in the fingerprint embedding and distribution at the server’s
side are as follows.
1. A unique fingerprint is generated for each user.
4We assume that each receiver has moderate computation capability and can listen to at least
2 channels simultaneously to reconstruct one video sequence. We also assume that the receivers
have large enough buffers to smooth out the jittering of delays among different channels.
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2. The compressed bit stream is split into two parts: the first one includes
motion vectors, quantization factors and other side information and is not
altered, and the second one contains the coded DCT coefficients and is vari-
able length decoded.
3. Motion vectors, quantization factors and other side information are left in-
tact, and only the values of the DCT coefficients are changed. For each
DCT coefficient, if it is not embeddable, it is variable length coded with
other non-embeddable coefficients. Otherwise, first, it is inversely quantized.
Then for each user, the corresponding fingerprint component is embedded
using spread spectrum embedding, and the resulting fingerprinted coefficient
is quantized and variable length coded with other fingerprinted coefficients.
4. The non-embeddable DCT coefficients are encrypted with Km and multicas-
ted to all users, together with the positions of the embeddable coefficients
in the 8 × 8 DCT blocks, motion vectors and other shared information; the
coded fingerprinted DCT coefficients are encrypted with each user’s secret
key {K(i)} and unicasted to them.
For live applications where the video is compressed and transmitted at the
same time, the fingerprint embedding and distribution process is similar to that
for video on demand applications.
The decoder at user u(i)’s side is the same for both types of applications and is
similar to a standard MPEG-2 decoder. After decrypting, variable length decoding
and inversely quantizing both the unicasted bit stream to user u(i) and the multi-
casted bit stream to all users, the decoder puts each reconstructed DCT coefficient
in its original position in the 8× 8 DCT block. Then, it applies inverse DCT and














































































Figure 6.3: The MPEG-2 based general fingerprint multicast scheme for video on
demand applications. Top: the fingerprint embedding and distribution process at
the server’s side, bottom: the decoding process at the user’s side.
6.5 The Tree Based Joint Fingerprint Design and
Distribution Scheme
The general fingerprint multicast scheme proposed in the previous section is design
for the general fingerprinting applications that use spread spectrum embedding.
In this section, to further improve the bandwidth efficiency, we utilize the tree
structure of the embedded fingerprints and propose a joint fingerprint design and
distribution scheme.
In this section, we first compare two fingerprint modulation schemes commonly
used in the literature: the CDMA based and the TDMA based fingerprint modula-
tion. We compare their bandwidth efficiency and their robustness against collusion
attacks in the tree based fingerprinting systems. Then in Section 6.5.2, we propose
a joint fingerprint design and distribution scheme that achieves both the robust-
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ness against collusion attacks and the bandwidth efficiency of the distribution
scheme. In Section 6.5.3, we take the computation constraints into consideration,
and adjust the joint fingerprint design and distribution scheme to minimize the
communication cost under the computation constraints.
6.5.1 The CDMA Based and The TDMA Based Finger-
print Modulation
In the tree based fingerprint design, a unique basis fingerprint ai1,··· ,il following
Gaussian distribution N (0, σ2W ) is generated for each node [i1, · · · , il] in the tree,
and the basis fingerprints {a} are independent of each other. For user u(i) whose
index is i = [i1, · · · , iL], a total of L fingerprints ai1 , ai1,i2 , · · · , ai1,··· ,iL are embed-
ded in the fingerprinted copy X(i) that is distributed to him. Assume that the
host signal S has a total of N embeddable coefficients. There are two different
methods to embed the L fingerprints into the host signal S: the CDMA based and
the TDMA based fingerprint modulation.
The CDMA Based Fingerprint Modulation
In the CDMA based fingerprint modulation, the basis fingerprints {a} are of the







i1,i2 + · · ·+√ρL ai1,i2,··· ,iL , (6.6)
and the fingerprinted copy distributed to u(i) is X(i) = S + W(i) where S is the
host signal. In (6.6), {0 ≤ ρl ≤ 1}Ll=1 with
∑L
j=1 ρj = 1 are determined by the
probabilities of users under different tree branches to collude with each other. They
are used to control the energy of the embedded fingerprints at each level and the
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Figure 6.4: An example of the partitioning of the host signal for a tree with L = 3
and [ρ1, ρ2, ρ3] = [1/4, 1/4, 1/2].
The TDMA Based Fingerprint Modulation
In the TDMA based fingerprint modulation, the host signal S is divided into L
non-overlapping parts S1, · · · ,SL, such that the number of embeddable coefficients
in Sl is Nl = ρlN with
∑L
l=1 Nl = N . An example of the partitioning of the host
signal is shown in Figure 6.4 for a tree with L = 3, [ρ1, ρ2, ρ3] = [1/4, 1/4, 1/2]
and [N1, N2, N3] = N [1/4, 1/4, 1/2]. For every 4 seconds, all the frames in the
1st second belong to S1, all the frames in the 2nd second are in S2 and all the
frames in the last two seconds are in S3. If the video sequence is long enough, the
number of embeddable coefficients in Sl is approximately Nl.
In the TDMA based fingerprint modulation, the basis fingerprints {ai1,··· ,il} at
level l are of length Nl. In the fingerprinted copy X
(i) that is distributed to user
u(i), the basis fingerprint ai1,··· ,il at level l is embedded in the lth part of the host
signal Sl, and the lth part of the fingerprinted copy X
(i) is X
(i)
l = Sl + a
i1,··· ,il .
Comparison of the Performance of the CDMA Based and the TDMA
Based Fingerprint Modulation
To compare the CDMA based and the TDMA based fingerprint modulation schemes
in the tree based fingerprinting systems, we measure the energy of the fingerprints
that are embedded in different parts of the fingerprinted copies. Assume that the
host signal S is partitioned into L non-overlapping parts {Sl}l=1,··· ,L where there
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are Nl embeddable coefficients in Sl, the same as in the TDMA based modulation.
We also assume that for user u(i), W
(i)
l is the fingerprint that is embedded in Sl,
and X
(i)
l = Sl + W
(i)
l is the lth part of the fingerprinted copy that is distributed
to u(i). Define Ek,l as the energy of the basis fingerprint a
i1,··· ,ik at level k that is
embedded in X
(i)




k=1 Ek,l is the energy of W
(i)
l . We further define a
matrix P whose element at row k and column l is pk,l
4
=Ek,l/El, and it is the ratio
of the energy of the kth level fingerprint ai1,··· ,ik embedded in X(i)l over the energy
of W
(i)
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respectively. In addition, in the TDMA based fingerprint modulation scheme,
PTDMA
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l=1 Nl = N , where N is the total number of embeddable coefficients in S.
Comparison of Bandwidth Efficiency
First, in the TDMA based modulation scheme, pk,l = 0 for k > l, and there-
fore, the lth part of the fingerprinted copy X
(i)
l is only embedded with the basis
fingerprints at level k ≤ l in the tree. Note that the basis fingerprints {ai1,··· ,ik}k≤l
are shared by all the users in the subgroup Ui1,··· ,il
4
={u(j), j = [j1, · · · , jl, · · · , jL] :
j1 = i1, · · · , jl = il}, so is X(i)l . Consequently, in the TDMA based fingerprint
modulation, the distribution system can not only multicast the non-embeddable
coefficients to all users, it can also multicast part of the fingerprinted coefficients
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that are shared by a subgroup of users to them. In the CDMA based fingerprint
modulation, pk,l > 0 for k > l and the distribution system can only multicast
the non-embeddable coefficients. Therefore, from the bandwidth efficiency’s point
of view, the TDMA based modulation is more efficient than the CDMA based
fingerprint modulation.
Comparison of Resistance to Collusion
Second, in the TDMA based modulation scheme, pk,l = 0 for k 6= l and the basis
fingerprint ai1,··· ,il at level l are only embedded in the lth part of the fingerprinted
copy X
(i1,··· ,il)
l . With the TDMA based modulation scheme, by comparing all the
fingerprinted copies that they have, the colluders can distinguish different parts
of the fingerprinted copies that are embedded with fingerprints at different levels
in the tree. They can also figure out the structure of the fingerprint tree and the
positions of all colluders in the tree. Based on the information they collect, they
can apply a specific attack against the TDMA based fingerprint modulation, the
interleaving based collusion attack.
Assume that SC is the set containing the indices of all colluders, and {X(k)}k∈SC
are the fingerprinted copies that they received. In the interleaving based collusion
attacks, the colluders divide themselves into L subgroups {SCl ⊆ SC}l=1,··· ,L,
and there exists at least one 1 ≤ l < L such that the lth subgroup SCl and
the (l + 1)th subgroup SCl+1 are under different branches in the tree and are
non-overlapping, i.e., SCl ∩ SCl+1 = ∅. The colluded copy V contains L non-
overlapping parts {Vl}l=1,··· ,L, and the colluders in the subgroup SCl generate the




where g(·) is the collu-
sion function. Figure 6.5 shows an example of the interleaving based collusion































































Figure 6.5: An example of the interleaving based collusion attack on the tree
based fingerprinting system shown in Figure 6.2 with the TDMA based fingerprint
modulation.
{1 = [1, 1, 1], 2 = [1, 1, 2], 4 = [1, 2, 1], 7 = [2, 1, 1]} is the set containing the indices
of the colluders. The colluders choose SC1 = {7} , SC2 = {4} and SC3 = {1, 2},
and generate the colluded copy V where
V1 = X
(7)




2 = S2 + a
1,2,









In the detection process, at the first level in the tree, although both a1 and
a2 are guilty, the detector can only detect the existence of a2 because a1 is not in
any part of the colluded copy V. The detector outputs the estimated guilty region
GR(1) = [2]. At the second level, the detector tries to detect whether [2, 1] and
[2, 2] are the guilty sub-regions, and finds out neither of these two are guilty since
a2,1 and a2,2 are not in V. To continue the detection process, the detectors has to
check the existence of each of the four fingerprints {ai1,i2} in V. This detection
process is equivalent to the detection of independent fingerprints. The performance
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of the detection process in the TDMA based fingerprint modulation is worse than
that of the CDMA based fingerprint modulation [62], and it is due to the special
structure of the fingerprint design and the unique “multi-stage” detection process
in the tree based fingerprinting systems.
To summarize, in the tree based fingerprinting systems, the TDMA based fin-
gerprint modulation improves the bandwidth efficiency of the distribution system
at the cost of the robustness against collusion attacks.
6.5.2 The Joint Fingerprint Design and Distribution Scheme
In the joint fingerprint design and distribution scheme, the content owner first
applies the tree based fingerprint design and generates the fingerprint tree, the same
as in [61], [62]. Then, he embeds the fingerprints using the joint TDMA and CDMA
fingerprint modulation scheme, which improves the bandwidth efficiency without
sacrificing the robustness. Finally, the content owner distributes the fingerprinted
copies to users using the proposed distribution scheme.
Design of the Joint TDMA and CDMA Fingerprint Modulation
To achieve both the robustness against collusion attacks and the bandwidth effi-
ciency of the distribution scheme, we propose a joint TDMA and CDMA fingerprint
modulation scheme, whose P matrix is an upper triangular matrix. In PJoint, we
let pk,l = 0 for k > l to achieve the bandwidth efficiency. For k ≤ l, we choose
0 < pk,l ≤ 1 to achieve the robustness. Take the interleaving based collusion
attack shown in Figure 6.5 as an example, in the joint TDMA and CDMA finger-
print modulation, although a1 is not in V1, it can still be detected from V2 and
V3. Consequently, the detector can apply the “multi-stage” detection and narrow
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down the guilty-region step by step, the same as in the CDMA based fingerprint
modulation.
At level 1, p1,1 = 1. At level 2 ≤ l ≤ L, given pl,l, we seek {pk,l}k<l to satisfy
E1,l : E2,l : · · · : El−1,l = ρ1 : ρ2 : · · · , ρl−1. (6.10)
We can show that
pk,l =
ρk
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Given {pl,l}l=1,··· ,L and PJoint as in (6.11), we seek N1, N2, · · · , NL to satisfy
PJoint
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Nl = N, 0 ≤ Nl ≤ N. (6.12)
From (6.11), when pL,L = ρL, it is the CDMA based fingerprint modulation.
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Given {pl,l}l=1,··· ,L, if Q is of full rank, then the least square solution to (6.14) is
[
N1 N2 · · · NL−1
]T








Q is the pseudo inverse of Q. Finally, we need to verify the
feasibility of the solution (6.16), i.e., if 0 ≤ Nl ≤ N for all 1 ≤ l ≤ L. If not,
another set of {pl,l}l=1,··· ,L has to be used.
Fingerprint Embedding and Detection in the Joint TDMA and CDMA
Modulation
In the joint TDMA and CDMA fingerprint modulation scheme, given PJoint as in
(6.11) and {Nl}l=1,··· ,L as in (6.16), for each basis fingerprint ai1,··· ,il at level l in
the tree,
ai1,··· ,il = ai1,··· ,ill d a
i1,··· ,il
l+1 d · · · d ai1,··· ,ilL , (6.17)
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where {ai1,··· ,ilk }k=l,··· ,L follow Gaussian distribution N (0, σ2W ) and are independent
of each other. ai1,··· ,ilk for k ≥ l is of length Nk, and is embedded in Sk. “d” is
the concatenation operator. For user u(i=[i1,··· ,iL]), the lth part of the fingerprinted
copy that u(i) receives is
X
(i1,··· ,il)



















During collusion, assume that there are a total of K colluders and SC is the
set containing the indices of all colluders. Assume that the colluders divide them
into L subgroups {SCl ⊆ SC}l=1,··· ,L. For each 1 ≤ l ≤ L, given the K copies





. Assume that V = V1 d · · · d VL is the colluded copy that
is generated by the colluders.
At the detector’s side, given the colluded copy V, for each 1 ≤ l ≤ L, the
detector first extracts the fingerprint Yl from Vl, and the detection process is
similar to that in Section 6.2.
Detection at the first level of the tree: The detector correlates the ex-
tracted fingerprint {Yl}l=1,··· ,L with each of the D1 fingerprints {ai1}i1=1,··· ,D1 at










||ai1||2, i1 = 1, · · · , D1. (6.20)
The estimated guilty regions at level 1 are
GR(1) = {[i1] : T i1 > h1}, (6.21)
where h1 is a predetermined threshold for fingerprint detection at the first level in
the tree.
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Detection at level 2 ≤ l ≤ L in the tree: Given the previously estimated
guilty regions GR(l− 1), for each [i1, i2, · · · , il−1] ∈ GR(l− 1), the detector calcu-
lates the detection statistics









||ai1,··· ,il−1,il||2, il = 1, · · · , Dl, (6.22)
and narrows down the guilty regions to
GR(l) =
{
[i1, · · · , il] : [i1, · · · , il−1] ∈ GR(l − 1), T i1,··· ,il ≥ hl
}
, (6.23)
where hl is a predetermined threshold for fingerprint detection at level l in the
tree. Finally, the detector outputs the estimated colluder set
ŜC =
{
u(i) : i = [i1, · · · , iL] ∈ GR(L)
}
. (6.24)
Fingerprint Distribution in the Joint Fingerprint Design and Distribu-
tion Scheme
In the joint fingerprint design and distribution scheme, given the fingerprinted copy
{X(i)} as in (6.18), the MPEG-2 based fingerprint distribution scheme for video
on demand applications is shown in Figure 6.6. Assume that Km is a key that is
shared by all users, K(i1,··· ,il) is a key shared by a subgroup of users U(i1,··· ,il), and
K(i) is user u(i)’s secret key. The encryption method in the joint fingerprint design
and distribution scheme is the same as that in the general fingerprint multicast
and is not repeated. The key steps in the fingerprint embedding and distribution
process at the server’s side are as follows.
• For each user u(i), the fingerprint W(i) is generated as in (6.19).
• The compressed bit stream is split into two parts: the first one includes
























































































































Figure 6.6: The MPEG-2 based joint fingerprint design and distribution scheme for
video on demand applications. Top: the fingerprint embedding and distribution
process at the server’s side, bottom: the decoding process at the user’s side.
altered, and the second one contains the coded DCT coefficients and is vari-
able length decoded.
• Only the values of the DCT coefficients are modified, and the first part of the
compressed bit stream is left unchanged. For each DCT coefficient, if it is
not embeddable, it is variable length coded with other non-embeddable DCT
coefficients. If it is embeddable, first, it is inversely quantized. If it belongs
to Sl, for each subgroup U
i1,··· ,il , the corresponding fingerprint component in
W
(i1,··· ,il)
l is embedded using spread spectrum embedding, and the resulting
fingerprinted coefficients is quantized and variable length coded with other




• The coded non-embeddable DCT coefficients are encrypted with key Km and
multicasted to all users, together with the positions of the embeddable coeffi-
cients in the 8×8 DCT blocks, motion vectors and other shared information.
For 1 ≤ l < L, the coded fingerprinted coefficients in X(i1,··· ,il)l are encrypted
with key K(i1,··· ,il) and multicasted to the users in the subgroup Ui1,··· ,il . The
coded fingerprinted coefficient in X
(i)
L are encrypted with user u
(i)’s secret
key and unicasted to him.
The decoder at user u(i)’s side is similar to that in the general fingerprint
multicast scheme. The difference is that the decoder has to listen to L + 1 bit
streams in the joint fingerprint design and distribution scheme instead of 2 in the
general fingerprint multicast scheme.
6.5.3 Joint Fingerprint Design and Distribution under Com-
putation Constraints
Compared with the general fingerprint multicast scheme, the joint fingerprint de-
sign and distribution scheme further reduces the communication cost by multicas-
ting some of the fingerprinted coefficients that are shared by a subgroup of users to
them. However, it increases the total number of multicast groups that the sender
needs to manage and the number of channels that each receiver downloads data
from.
In the general fingerprint multicast scheme shown in Figure 6.3, the sender sets
up and manages 1 multicast group, and each user listens to 2 bit streams simul-
taneously to reconstruct the fingerprinted video sequence. In the joint fingerprint
design and distribution scheme, the sender has to set up a multicast group for every
subgroup of users represented by a node in the upper L− 1 levels in the tree. For
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a tree structure with L = 4 and [D1, D2, D3, D4] = [4, 5, 5, 100], the total number
of multicast groups needed is 125. Also, each user has to listen to L = 4 different
multicast groups and 1 unicast channel. In practice, the underlying network might
not be able to support so many multicast groups simultaneously, and it could be
beyond the sender’s capability to manage this huge number of multicast groups at
one time. It is also possible that the receivers can only receive data from a small
number of channels simultaneously due to computation and buffer constraints.
To address this computation constraints, we adjust the joint fingerprint design
and distribution scheme to minimize the overall communication cost under the
computation constraints.
For a fingerprint tree of level L and degrees [D1, · · · , DL], if the sender sets up
a multicast group for each subgroup of users represented by a node in the upper l
levels in the tree, then the total number of multicast groups is MG(l)
4
=1 + D1 +
· · ·+∏lm=1 Dm. Also, each user listens to RB(l)
4
=l+2 channels. Assume that MG
is the maximum number of multicast groups that the network can support and the
sender can manage at once. We further assume that each receiver can only listen









l : MG(l) ≤ MG,RB(l) ≤ RB} . (6.25)




, we adjust the fingerprint
distribution scheme in 6.5.2 as follows. Step 1, 2 and 3 in the distribution scheme
in 6.5.2 are not changed, and Step 4 is modified to:
• The coded non-embeddable DCT coefficients are encrypted with key Km and
multicasted to all users, together with the positions of the embeddable coeffi-
cients in the 8×8 DCT blocks, motion vectors and other shared information.
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• For each subgroup of users Ui1,··· ,il corresponding to a node at level l ≤ L′
in the tree, a multicast group is set up and the fingerprinted coefficients in
X
(i1,··· ,il)
l are encrypted with key K
(i1,··· ,il) and multicasted to users in Ui1,··· ,il .
• For L′ < m ≤ L − 1, there are two possible methods to distribute the fin-
gerprinted coefficients in X
(i1,··· ,iL′ ,··· ,im)
m to a subgroup of users Ui1,··· ,iL′ ,··· ,im ,
and the one that has a smaller communication cost is chosen.
– First, after encrypting the encoded fingerprinted coefficients in X
(i1,··· ,im)
m
with key K(i1,··· ,im), the encrypted bit stream can be multicasted to the
users in the subgroup Ui1,··· ,iL′ . Since K(i1,··· ,im) is known only to the
users in the subgroup Ui1,··· ,im , only they can decrypt the bit stream
and reconstruct X(i1,··· ,im). This is similar to the distribution scheme
in [10].
– The fingerprinted coefficients in X(i1,··· ,im) can also be unicasted to each
user in the subgroup Ui1,··· ,im after encryption, the same as in the general
fingerprint multicast scheme.
• The fingerprinted coefficients in X(i1,··· ,iL)L are encrypted with user u(i=[i1,··· ,iL])’s
secret key K(i) and unicasted to him.






In this chapter, we have studied the secure distribution of fingerprinted copies for
video streaming applications where a large amount of data have to be transmitted
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to a large number of users in real time. In particular, we consider applications that
require strong traitor tracing capability and can survive collusion attacks with up
to a few dozen colluders, and we have proposed two secure fingerprint multicast
schemes: a general fingerprint multicast scheme and a joint fingerprint design and
distribution scheme.
We first observed that not all coefficients are embeddable in spread spectrum
embedding due to perceptual constraints, and a non-embeddable coefficient has the
same value in all copies. To reduce the communication cost in transmitting these
non-embeddable coefficients, we proposed a general fingerprint multicast scheme
that can be used with most spread spectrum embedding based fingerprinting sys-
tems. In this scheme, the non-embeddable coefficients that are shared by all users
are multicasted, while the embeddable coefficients are embedded with each user’s
unique fingerprint and unicasted to the corresponding user.
We then proposed a joint fingerprint design and distribution scheme that ex-
plores the special structure of the fingerprint design to further improve the band-
width efficiency. We first proposed a joint TDMA and CDMA fingerprint modu-
lation scheme for the tree based fingerprint design. It enables the service provider
to further multicast some fingerprinted coefficients that are shared by a subgroup
of users to them, while maintaining the robustness of the embedded fingerprints
against collusion. Based on the proposed fingerprint modulation scheme, we pro-
posed a fingerprint multicast scheme that minimizes the overall communication






In Chapter 6, we have studied the secure distribution of fingerprinted copies in
video streaming applications, and we have proposed two secure fingerprint multi-
cast schemes: a general fingerprint multicast scheme that can be used with most
spread spectrum embedding based fingerprinting systems, and a joint fingerprint
design and distribution scheme that utilizes the special structure of the fingerprint
design to further improve the bandwidth efficiency.
In this chapter, we analyze the performance of these two fingerprint multi-
cast schemes, including the bandwidth efficiency, the robustness of the embedded
fingerprints and the perceptual quality of the reconstructed fingerprints at the
decoder’s side. In Section 7.1, we analyze the bandwidth efficiency of the two
multicast schemes and compare it with that of the pure unicast scheme, where
each fingerprinted copy is unicasted to the corresponding user. In Section 7.2, we
158
compare the robustness of the embedded fingerprints using the joint TDMA and
CDMA fingerprint modulation with that of the fingerprint embedded using the
CDMA based fingerprint modulation, and equivalently, the resistance of the em-
bedded fingerprints in the three schemes. In Section 7.3, we analyze the perceptual
quality of the reconstructed video sequence at the decoder’s side, and propose a
fingerprint drift compensation scheme for the two fingerprint multicast schemes.
7.1 Analysis of Bandwidth Efficiency
To analyze the bandwidth efficiency of the secure fingerprint multicast schemes
proposed in Chapter 6, we compare their communication costs with that of the
pure unicast scheme. In this section, we assume that the fingerprinted copies in
all schemes are encoded at the same targeted bit rate R.
To be consistent with general Internet routing where hop-count is the widely
used metric for route cost calculation [11], we use the hop-based link usage to
measure the communication cost and set the cost of all edges to be the same. To
transmit a package of length Lenunit to a multicast group of size M , it was shown
in [7, 11] that the normalized multicast communication cost can be approximated
by Cunitmulti(M)/C
unit
uni (M) = M
EoS, where Cunitmulti(M) is the communication cost using
multicast, Cunituni (M) is the average communication cost per user using unicast and
EoS is the economies-of-scale factor. It was shown in [7] that EoS is between 0.66
and 0.7 for realistic networks. In this chapter, we choose EoS ≈ 0.7.
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7.1.1 The “multicast only” scenario
For the purpose of performance comparison, we consider another special scenario
where the video streaming applications require the service provider to prevent out-
siders from estimating the video’s content, but do not require the traitor tracing
capability. In this scenario, we apply the general index mapping to encrypt the
DC coefficients in the Intra blocks and the motion vectors in Inter block; and the
AC coefficients are left unchanged and transmitted in clear text. Since the copies
that are distributed to different users are the same, the service provider can use
a single multicast channel for the distribution of the encrypted bit stream to all
users. We call this particular scenario, which does not require the traitor tracing
capability and uses multicast channels only, the “multicast only”; and we compare
the communication cost of the “multicast only” with that of the proposed secure
fingerprint multicast schemes to illustrate the extra communication overhead in-
troduced by the traitor tracing requirement.
For a given video sequence and a targeted bit rate R, we assume that in the pure
unicast scheme, the average size of the compressed bit streams that are unicasted
to different users is Lenpu. Define Lenmo as the length of the bit stream that is
multicasted to all users in the “multicast only” scenario. Note that in the pure
unicast scheme, the streaming cipher that we applied to the AC coefficients in
each fingerprinted copy does not increase the bit rate and keep the compression
efficiency unchanged. Consequently, we have Lenmo ≈ Lenpu.
For a multicast group of size M , we further assume that the communication
cost of the pure unicast scheme is Cpu, and Cmo is the communication cost in the
“multicast only”. We have
Cpu(M) = M × Cunituni (M)× Lenpu/Lenunit,
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and Cmo(M) = Cunitmulti(M)× Lenmo/Lenunit. (7.1)







and it depends only on the total number of users M .
7.1.2 The General Fingerprint Multicast Scheme
For a given video sequence and a targeted bit rate R, we assume that in the general
fingerprint multicast scheme, the bit stream that is multicasted to all users is of
length Lenfmmulti, and the average size of different bit streams that are unicasted to
different users is Lenfmuni. For a multicast group of size M , we further assume that
the communication cost of the general fingerprint multicast scheme is Cfm. We
have
Cfm(M) = Cunitmulti(M)× Lenfmmulti/Lenunit + M × Cunituni (M)× Lenfmuni/Lenunit.(7.3)








/Lenpu, and the uni-








. Then the communica-






≈ CP {UR + (1− UR)M−0.3} . (7.4)
The smaller the communication cost ratio γfm, the more efficient the general fin-
gerprint multicast scheme. Given the multicast group size M , the efficiency of the




Four factors affect the coding parameters.
• For each fingerprinted copy, two different sets of motion vectors and quanti-
zation factors are used: the general fingerprint multicast scheme uses those
calculated from the original unfingerprinted copy, while the pure unicast
scheme uses those calculated from the fingerprinted copy itself. Note that
the original unfingerprinted copy and the fingerprinted copy are similar to
each other, so are both sets of parameters. Therefore, the difference between
these two sets of motion vectors and quantization factors has negligible effect
on the coding parameters.
• In the general fingerprint multicast scheme, headers and side information
have to be inserted in each unicasted bit stream for synchronization. We
follow the MPEG-2 standard and observe that this extra overhead consumes
no more than 0.014 bit per pixel (bpp) per copy and is much smaller than
the targeted bit rate R. Therefore, its effect on the coding parameters can
be ignored.
• In the variable length coding stage, the embeddable and the non-embeddable
coefficients are coded together in the pure unicast scheme while they are
coded separately in the general fingerprint multicast scheme. Figure 7.1
shows the histograms of the (run length, value) pairs of the “carphone”
sequence at R = 1Mbps(1.3bpp) in both schemes. From Figure 7.1, the (run
length, value) pairs generated by the two schemes have approximately the
same distribution. Thus, encoding the embeddable and the non-embeddable
coefficients together or separately does not affect the coding parameters. The
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Coding all coefficients together
Coding embeddable & nonembeddable coefficients separately


















Coding all coefficients together
Coding embeddable & nonembeddable coefficients separately
Figure 7.1: Histograms of the (run length, value) pairs of the “carphone” sequence
that are variable length coded in the two schemes. R = 1Mbps. The indices of the
(run length, value) pairs are sorted first in the ascending order of the run length,
and then in the ascending order of the value. Left: in the Intra coded blocks, right:
in the Inter coded blocks.
same conclusion can be drawn for other sequences and for other bit rates.
• In the general fingerprint multicast scheme, the positions of the embeddable
coefficients have to be encoded and transmitted to the decoders. The encod-
ing procedure is as follows.
– For each 8 × 8 DCT block, first, an 8 × 8 mask is generated where a
bit ‘0’ is assigned to each non-embeddable coefficient and a bit ‘1’ is
assigned to each embeddable coefficient. Since DC coefficients are not
embedded with fingerprints [47], the mask bit at the DC coefficient’s
position is skipped and only the 63 mask bits at the AC coefficients’
positions are encoded.
– Observing that most of the embeddable coefficients are in the low fre-
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quencies, the 63 mask bits are zigzag scanned in the same way as in the
JPEG baseline compression.
– Run length coding is applied to the zigzag scanned mask bits followed
by huffman coding.
– An “End of Block” (EOB) marker is inserted after encoding the last
mask bit whose value is 1 in the block.
Communication Cost Ratio
We choose three representative sequences: “miss america” with large smooth re-
gions, “carphone” that is moderately complicated and “flower” that has large high
frequency coefficients. Listed in Table 7.1 are the coding parameters, the unicast
ratios and the communication cost ratios of these sequences at R = 1.3bpp. Figure
7.2 (a) also shows the communication cost ratios of the three sequences.
For M in the range between 1000 and 10000, compared with the pure unicast
scheme, the general fingerprint multicast scheme reduces the communication cost
by 48% to 84%, depending on the values of M and the characteristics of sequences.
Given a sequence and a targeted bit rate R, the performance of the general fin-
Table 7.1: Performance of the general fingerprint multicast scheme at R = 1.3bpp.
Sequence
Parameters γfm(γmo) M̄
CP UR M = 1000 M = 5000 M = 104 γ̄ = 0.7 γ̄ = 0.8
miss america 1.23 0.07 0.23 0.18 0.16 8 5
carphone 1.40 0.19 0.41 0.35 0.34 25 13
flower 1.65 0.23 0.52 0.46 0.44 76 32
multicast only – – 0.13 0.08 0.06 – –
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gerprint multicast scheme improves as the multicast group size M increases. For
example, for the “carphone” sequence at R = 1.3bpp, γfm = 0.41 when there are a
total of M = 1000 users, and it drops to 0.34 when M is increased to 10000. Also,
given M , the performance of the general fingerprint multicast scheme depends on
the characteristics of video sequences. For sequences with large smooth regions,
the embedded fingerprints are shorter. Therefore, fewer bits are needed to encode
the positions of the embeddable coefficients, and fewer DCT coefficients are trans-
mitted through unicast channels. So the general fingerprint multicast scheme is
more efficient. On the contrary, for sequences where the high frequency band has
large energy, more DCT coefficients are embeddable. Thus, the general fingerprint
multicast scheme is less efficient since the coding parameter and the unicast ratio
are larger. When there are a total of M = 5000 users, the communication cost
ratio is 0.18 for sequence “miss america” and is 0.46 for sequence “flower”.
From Table 7.1 and Figure 7.2, if we compare the communication cost of the
general fingerprint multicast with that of the “multicast only” scenario, enabling
traitor tracing in video streaming applications introduces an extra communication
overhead of 10% to 40%, depending on the characteristics of video sequences. For
sequences with fewer embeddable coeffients, e.g, “miss america”, the length of
the embedded fingerprints is shorter, and applying digital fingerprinting increases
the communication cost by a smaller percentage (around 10%). For sequences
that have much more embeddable coefficients, e.g., “flower”, more DCT coeffi-
cients have to be transmitted through unicast channels in the general fingerprint
multicast scheme, and it increases the communication cost by a larger percentage
(approximately 40%).

























































(a) γfm(M) and γmo(M) versus M (b) M̄ versus γ̄
Figure 7.2: Performance of the general fingerprint multicast scheme at R = 1.3bpp.
pure unicast scheme when M is small. Therefore, given the coding parameter and
the unicast ratio, the pure unicast scheme is preferred when the communication







The ceil function dxe returns the minimum integer that is not smaller than x. M̄
of different sequences for different γ̄ are listed in Table 7.1 and shown in Figure
7.2 (b). For γ̄ = 0.8 and R = 1.3bpp, M̄ is 5 for sequence “miss america”, 13 for
“carphone” and 32 for “flower”.
7.1.3 Joint Fingerprint Design and Distribution Scheme
For a given video sequence and a targeted bit rate R, we assume that in the
joint fingerprint design and distribution scheme, the bit stream that is multicasted




multi. For any two nodes
[i1, · · · , il] 6= [j1, · · · , jl] at level l in the tree, we further assume that the bit
streams that are transmitted to the users in the subgroups Ui1,··· ,il and Uj1,··· ,jl are
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approximately of the same length Lenjointl .
In the joint fingerprint design and distribution scheme, all the fingerprinted
coefficients inside one frame are variable length coded together. Therefore, the
histograms of the (run length, value) pairs in the joint fingerprint design and dis-
tribution scheme are the same as that in the general fingerprint multicast scheme.
If we ignore the impact of the headers/markers that are inserted in each bit stream,
we have









Furthermore, fingerprints at different levels are embedded into the host signal
periodically. In the simple example shown in Figure 6.4, the period is 4 seconds.
If this period is small compared with the overall length of the video sequence, we
can have the approximation that




· Lenfmuni, 1 ≤ l ≤ L. (7.7)
In the joint fingerprint design and distribution scheme, to multicast the non-





where M is the total number of users. For l ≤ L′, to multicast the fingerprinted
coefficients in X
(i1,··· ,il)
l to the users in U
i1,··· ,il , the communication cost is
Cjointl = C
unit






m=l+1 Dm. There are M/Ml such subgroups. For L
′ < l ≤ L− 1, to
distribute the fingerprinted coefficients in X
(i1,··· ,iL′ ,··· ,il)
l to the users in the subgroup
Ui1,··· ,iL′ ,··· ,il , the communication cost is
Cjointl = min
{




where the first term is the communication cost if they are multicasted to users in
the subgroup Ui1,··· ,iL′ , and the second term is the communication cost if they are
unicasted to each user in the subgroup Ui1,··· ,iL′ ,··· ,il . Finally, the communication
cost of distributing the fingerprinted coefficients in X
(i1,··· ,iL)
L to user u
(i1,··· ,iL) is
CjointL = M · Cunituni (M)× LenjointL /Lenunit. (7.11)
The overall communication cost of the joint fingerprint design and distribution
scheme is





· Cjointl , (7.12)





























Listed in Table 7.2 are the communication cost ratios of the joint fingerprint
design and distribution scheme under different L′ for sequence “miss america”,
“carphone” and “flower”. L′ = 0 corresponds to the general fingerprint multicast
scheme. We consider three scenarios where the numbers of users are 1000, 5000 and
10000 respectively. The tree structures of the three scenarios are listed in Table
7.2. In the three cases considered, compared with the pure unicast scheme, the
168
Table 7.2: The communication cost ratios of the joint fingerprint design and dis-
tribution scheme. L′ = 0 is the general fingerprint multicast scheme. R = 1.3bpp,
p = 0.95.




M = 1000, L = 3,
D = [2, 5, 100],
ρ = [1/4, 1/4, 1/2]
0 1 2 0.23 0.41 0.52
0.131 3 3 0.22 0.34 0.43
2 13 4 0.20 0.31 0.39
M = 5000, L = 4,
D = [2, 5, 5, 100],
ρ = [1/6, 1/6, 1/6, 1/2]
0 1 2 0.18 0.35 0.46
0.081 3 3 0.16 0.30 0.39
2 13 4 0.15 0.27 0.35
3 65 5 0.14 0.25 0.32
M = 10000, L = 4,
D = [4, 5, 5, 100],
ρ = [1/6, 1/6, 1/6, 1/2]
0 1 2 0.16 0.34 0.43
0.061 5 3 0.14 0.28 0.37
2 25 4 0.13 0.26 0.33
3 125 5 0.13 0.23 0.30
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joint fingerprint design and distribution scheme reduces the communication cost
by 57% to 87%, depending on the total number of users, network and computation
constraints, and the characteristics of video sequences.
Given a sequence, the larger the L′, i.e., the larger the MG and RB, the
more efficient the joint fingerprint design and distribution scheme. This is because
more fingerprinted coefficients can be multicasted. Take the “carphone” sequence
with M = 1000 users as an example, in the general fingerprint multicast scheme,
γfm = 0.41. If L′ = 1, the joint fingerprint design and distribution scheme reduces
the communication cost ratio to 0.34, and it is further dropped to 0.31 if MG ≥ 13
and RB ≥ 4.
Also, compared with the general fingerprint multicast scheme, the extra com-
munication cost saved by the joint fingerprint design and distribution scheme varies
from sequence to sequence. For sequences that have more embeddable coefficients,
the joint fingerprint design and distribution improves the bandwidth efficiency by
a much larger percentage. For example, for M = 5000 and L′ = 2, compared with
the general fingerprint multicast scheme, the joint fingerprint design and distribu-
tion scheme further reduces the communication cost by 10% for sequence “flower”,
while it only further improves the bandwidth efficiency by 3% for sequence “miss
america”. However, for sequence “miss america” with M = 5000 users, the general
fingerprint multicast scheme has already reduced the communication cost by 82%.
Therefore, for sequences with fewer embeddable coefficients, the general fingerprint
multicast scheme is recommended to reduce the bandwidth requirement at a low
computation cost. The joint fingerprint design and distribution scheme is preferred
on sequences with much more embeddable coefficients to achieve the bandwidth
efficiency under network and computation constraints.
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Compared with the “multicast only” scenario, the joint fingerprint design and
distribution scheme enables the traitor tracing capability by increasing the commu-
nication cost by 6% to 30%, depending on the characteristics of the video sequence
as well as the network and computation constraints. Compared with the “multi-
cast only”, for sequences with fewer embeddable coefficients, the joint fingerprint
design and distribution scheme increases the communication cost by a smaller per-
centage (around 6% to 10% for sequence “miss america”); while for sequences with
much more embeddable coefficients, the extra communication overhead introduced
is larger (around 24% to 30% for sequence “flower”).
7.2 Robustness of the Embedded Fingerprints
In this section, we take the tree based fingerprint design as an example, and com-
pare the robustness of the embedded fingerprints in different schemes. In the pure
unicast scheme and the general fingerprint multicast scheme, we use the CDMA
based fingerprint modulation to be robust against interleaving based collusion at-
tacks; and in the joint fingerprint design and distribution scheme, the joint TDMA
and CDMA fingerprint modulation scheme proposed in Section 6.5.2 In Chapter
6 is used. In this section, we compare the collusion resistance of the fingerprints
embedded using the joint TDMA and CDMA fingerprint modulation scheme with
that of the fingerprints embedded using the CDMA based fingerprint modulation.
7.2.1 Digital Fingerprinting System Model
Spread spectrum embedding [14,47] is widely used in digital fingerprinting systems
due to its robustness against many single-copy attacks. In spread spectrum em-
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bedding, the fingerprint is additively embedded into the host signal, and human
visual models are used to control the energy and the imperceptibility of the the
embedded fingerprints. In this chapter, we use the the block based human visual
models and follow the embedding method in [47].
At the attackers’ side, since spread spectrum embedding has been proven to
be robust against attacks on a single copy, e.g., compression and lower pass filter-
ing, we focus on the multiuser collusion which is more challenging. Under those
single-copy attacks, the performance of the joint TDMA and CDMA fingerprint
modulation is similar to that of the watermarking systems in [14, 47] and is not
repeated here.
During collusion, we assume that there are a total of K colluders and SC is the
set containing the indices of all colluders. In the joint TDMA and CDMA finger-
print modulation, the colluders can apply the interleaving based collusion attacks,
where the colluders divide themselves into L subgroups and {SCl ⊆ SC}l=1,··· ,L
contain the indices of the colluders in the L subgroups, respectively. The colluders




where g(·) is the collusion function. In the CDMA based fingerprint modulation,
the colluders cannot distinguish fingerprints at different levels in the tree and can-
not apply interleaving based collusion attacks. Consequently, SC1 = · · · = SCL =
SC for collusion attacks on the CDMA based fingerprint modulation.
In a recent investigation [63], we have shown that nonlinear collusion attacks
can be modeled as the averaging collusion attack followed by an additive noise.
Under the constraint that the perceptual quality of the attacked copies under
different collusion attacks are the same, different collusion attacks have almost
identical performance. Therefore, we only consider the averaging collusion attack.
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At the detector’s side, we consider a non-blind detection scenario, where the
host signal S is available to the detector and is first removed from the colluded copy
V before fingerprint detection and colluder identification. Note that different from
other data hiding applications where the host signal is not available to the detector
and blind detection is preferred or required, in many fingerprinting applications,
the fingerprint verification and colluder identification process is usually handled by
the content owner or an authorized third party who can have access to the original
host signal. In addition, prior work has shown that the non-blind detection has a
better performance than the blind detection [58], [63]. Therefore, in this chapter,
we consider non-blind detection to improve the detection performance and the
collusion resistance of the fingerprinting systems.
From the other point of view, with spread spectrum embedding, in the blind
detection, the host signal serves as an additional noise with very large energy
during the detection process, and the blind detection can be regarded as a non-
blind scenario with very low watermark to noise ratio (WNR). Thus, the analysis
of the detection statistics for the blind scenario will be similar, and we will observe
similar trend. Consequently, for the purpose of comparing the robustness of the
joint TDMA and CDMA fingerprint modulation with that of the CDMA based
modulation, our assumption of the non-blind detection scenario is justified.
7.2.2 Performance Criteria
To measure the robustness of the joint TDMA and CDMA fingerprint modulation
scheme against collusion attacks, we adopt the commonly used criteria in the
literature [58], [63]: the probability of capturing at least one colluder (Pd), and the
probability of accusing at least one innocent user (Pfp).
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In this chapter, we assume that the colluders collude under the fairness con-
straint, i.e., all colluders share the same risk and are equally likely to be detected.
Assume that A and B are two non-overlapping subgroups of colluders, and SCA
and SCB are the sets containing the indices of the colluders in A and B, respec-














i∈SCB I[i ∈ ŜC]
|SCB| . (7.14)
In (7.14), I[·] is the indication function, |SCA| and |SCB| are the number of col-
luders in SCA and SCB, respectively, and ŜC is the estimated colluder set output
by the detector. If FP (SCA, SCB) ≈ 1 for any (SCA, SCB) with SCA ∩ SCB = ∅,
then the collusion attack is fair and each colluder is equally likely to be detected.
If FP (SCA, SCB) À 1 or FP (SCA, SCB) ¿ 1 for some pair of (SCA, SCB), some
colluders are more likely to be detected than others and the collusion attack is not
fair.
7.2.3 Statistical Analysis of the Probability of Detection
The work in [62] provided detailed analysis of the probability of detection for the
CDMA based fingerprint modulation, and it is not repeated here. In this section,
we focus on the analysis of the joint TDMA and CDMA fingerprint modulation.
At the detector’s side, given the lth part of the colluded copy Vl, the detector
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pk,l · ai1,··· ,ikl + nl. (7.15)




j=[j1,··· ,jL]∈SCl I[j1 = i1, · · · , jk = ik] is the number of collud-





is the number of colluders in SCl, and nl is the additive noise that the colluders
add to the colluded copy Vl to further hinder the detection performance. In this
chapter, for simplicity, we assume that the additive noise nl are i.i.d. and follow
Gaussian distribution N (0, σ2n).
Following the statistical analysis in [62], given PJoint as in (6.11) and {Nl}l=1,··· ,L
as in (6.16), we can show that at level l, T i1,··· ,il can be approximated by a normal
distribution
T i1,··· ,il ∼ N (µi1,··· ,il , σ2n
)
,
















In (7.16), σ2W is the variance of {a}, and σ2n is the variance of the additive noise
nl. The analysis of Pd and Pfp is similar to that in [62] and is omitted.
We then analyze the robustness of the joint TDMA and CDMA fingerprint
modulation scheme under the interleaving based collusion attacks. From (7.16), if
σ2n and the thresholds used during detection {hl} are fixed, comparing the proba-
bility of detection is equivalent to comparing the means of the detection statistics.
Therefore, in this paper, we focus on the analysis of the detection statistics’ means.
We first analyze the means of the detection statistics when detecting guilty
regions at upper levels in the fingerprint tree. Under the interleaving based col-
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lusion attacks, we consider a colluder u(i) where i = [i1, · · · , ik, · · · iL] ∈ SCl. For
a guilty node [i1, · · · , ik] at upper level k < l in the tree, we have K i1,··· ,ikl > 0.
Consequently, from (7.16), even if i 6∈ SCk and K i1,··· ,ikk = 0, we still have










Nt > 0. (7.17)
Therefore, in the joint TDMA and CDMA fingerprint modulation scheme, the
guilty region [i1, · · · , ik] at the upper level of the tree can be detected even under
the interleaving based collusion.
We then analyze the means of the detection statistics when detecting guilty re-
gions at lower levels in the fingerprint tree. Assume that the depth of the fingerprint
tree is L. First, we consider a Type I interleaving based collusion attacks where
colluders in subgroup SCL−1 and colluders in subgroup SCL are under different
branches of the tree and SCL−1∩SCL = ∅. In addition, for any [i1, · · · , iL−1, iL] ∈
SCL−1 and [j1, · · · , jL−1, jL] ∈ SCL, [i1, · · · , iL−1] 6= [j1, · · · , jL−1]. The example
shown in Figure 6.5 belongs to this type of collusion attacks.
We consider two colluder u(i) and u(j) where i = [i1, · · · , iL] /∈ SCL and j =
[j1, · · · , jL] ∈ SCL. At level L in the tree, for colluder u(i) who is not in the
subgroup SCL, K
i1,··· ,iL
L = 0; while K
j1,··· ,jL
L > 0 for colluder u
(j) who is in the
subgroup SCL. Therefore, from (7.16), at level L in the tree, the means of the
detection statistics for user u(i) and user uj) are





respectively. Consequently, in the joint TDMA and CDMA fingerprint modulation
scheme, under the Type I interleaving based collusion attacks, the colluders in the
subgroup SCL are more likely to be detected than other colluders. So the Type I
interleaving based collusion attacks are not fair collusion attacks.
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Then, we consider a Type II interleaving based collusion attacks where SCL =
SC but SCl ⊂ SC for some l < L. As an example, we consider the scenario where
SCL−1 ⊂ SCL = SC, and for any i ∈ SCL−1 and j ∈ SCL\SCL−1, [i1, · · · , iL−1] 6=
[j1, · · · , jL−1].1 This corresponds to the scenario where all colluders participate in
the generation of VL, but some of the colluders do not participate in the generation
of VL−1. Take the fingerprint tree in Figure 6.2 as an example, if user u(1),u(2),u(4)
and u(7) are the colluders, and if the colluders choose SC1 = {7}, SC2 = {4} and
SC3 = {1, 2, 4, 7}, then this is a Type II interleaving based collusion attack.
We consider two colluders u(i) and u(j), where i ∈ SCL−1, i ∈ SCL and j 6∈
SCL−1, j ∈ SCL. Under the Type II interleaving based collusion, for colluder u(i)
K
i1,··· ,iL−1
L−1 > 0 and K
i1,··· ,iL−1
L > 0, (7.19)
and for colluder u(j),
K
i1,··· ,iL−1
L−1 = 0 and K
i1,··· ,iL−1
L > 0. (7.20)






























L−1 > 0, we have µ
j1,··· ,jL−1 < µi1,··· ,iL−1 in almost all cases. So in the joint
TDMA and CDMA fingerprint modulation, under the Type II interleaving based
collusion attacks, the colluders in SCL−1 are more likely to be detected than other
colluders. Consequently, the Type II interleaving based collusion attacks are not
fair collusion attacks either.
1For two sets A and B where A ⊇ B, A \B4={i : i ∈ A, i 6∈ B}.
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Figure 7.3: Performance of the joint TDMA and CDMA fingerprint modulation
scheme under interleaving based collusion attacks. L = 4, [D1, D2, D3, D4] =
[4, 5, 5, 100] and [ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, ρ4] = [1/6, 1/6, 1/6, 1/2]. N = 10




−2. p = 0.95. Top: under Type I interleaving based collusion attacks,
bottom: under Type II interleaving based collusion attacks.
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7.2.4 Simulation Results
Resistance to Interleaving Based Collusion Attacks
Figure 7.3 shows the simulation results of the joint TDMA and CDMA fingerprint
modulation scheme under both types of interleaving based collusion attacks. Our
simulation is set up as follows. For the tested video sequences, the number of
embeddable coefficients is in the order of 106 per second. So we choose N = 106
and assume that there are a total of M = 104 users. Following the tree based
fingerprint design in [61], [62], we consider a symmetric tree structure with L = 4
levels, [D1, D2, D3, D4] = [4, 5, 5, 100] and [ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, ρ4] = [1/6, 1/6, 1/6, 1/2]. In
our simulations, the basis fingerprints {a} in the fingerprint tree follow Gaussian
distribution N (0, σ2W ) with σ2W = 1/9. In the joint TDMA and CDMA fingerprint
modulation scheme, for simplicity, we let p2,2 = · · · = pL,L = p for the matrix
PJoint in (6.11) and choose p = 0.95 for the above fingerprint tree structure. A
smaller value of p should be used if L is larger or the total number of nodes at the
upper L− 1 levels in the tree is larger.
At the attackers’ side, we consider the most effective collusion pattern on the
tree based fingerprint design, where colluders are from all the 100 subgroups at level
3. We assume that each of the 100 subgroups has the same number of colluders.
In the joint TDMA and CDMA fingerprint modulation scheme, for both types of
interleaving based collusion attacks, we choose different subgroups of colluders as
SC1 = {i = [i1, i2, i3, i4] ∈ SC : i1 = 1}, SC2 = {i = [i1, i2, i3, i4] ∈ SC : i1 = 2}
and SC3 = {i = [i1, i2, i3, i4] ∈ SC : i1 = 3}. In the Type I interleaving based
collusion attacks, we choose SC4 = SC \ SC3. In the Type II interleaving based
collusion attacks, SC4 = SC. In the CDMA based fingerprint modulation scheme,
similarly, we assume that colluders are from all the 100 subgroups at level 3 in the
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tree, and each subgroup at level 3 in the tree has equal number of colluders. In the
CDMA based fingerprint modulation, the colluders cannot distinguish fingerprints
at different levels, and they apply the pure averaging collusion attack where SC1 =
· · · = SCL = SC. Also, we choose σ2n = 2σ2W for all collusion attacks in (7.16).
Other values of σ2n give the same trend and are not shown here.
Figure 7.3 (a) and (b) show the simulation results of the Type I interleaving
base collusion, while Figure 7.3 (c) and (d) show the simulation results of the Type
II interleaving based collusion.
In Figure 7.3 (a) and (c), given the total number of colluders K, we compare Pd
of the joint TDMA and CDMA fingerprint modulation under the interleaving based
collusion attacks with that of the CDMA based fingerprint modulation scheme
under the pure averaging collusion attacks. As an example, we fix Pfp as 10
−2.
From Figure 7.3 (a) and (c), the performance of the joint TDMA and CDMA
fingerprint modulation under the interleaving based collusion is approximately the
same or even better than that of the CDMA based fingerprint modulation under
the pure averaging collusion attacks.
Figure 7.3 (b) and (d) show the fairness parameters of the two types of inter-
leaving based collusion attacks in the joint TDMA and CDMA fingerprint modu-
lation. From Figure 7.3 (b), under the Type I interleaving based collusion attacks,
FP (SCL−1, SCL) ¿ 1. Therefore, the colluders in the subgroup SCL are much
more likely to be detected than those in SCL−1, which is in agreement with our
analysis. From 7.3 (d), under the Type II interleaving based collusion attacks,
FP (SCL−1, SC \SCL−1) ≈ 1.9, and the colluders in the subgroup SCL−1 are more
likely to be detected than other colluders, which is also consistent with the analysis.
Therefore, the performance of the joint TDMA and CDMA fingerprint modu-
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lation scheme under the interleaving based collusion attacks is approximately the
same as, and may be even better than, that of the CDMA fingerprint modulation
scheme under the pure averaging collusion attacks. Furthermore, we have shown
that neither of the two types of interleaving based collusion attacks are fair in the
joint TDMA and CDMA fingerprint modulation scheme, and some colluders are
more likely to be captured than others. Consequently, to guarantee the fairness
of the collusion attacks, the colluders cannot use the interleaving based collusion
attacks in the joint TDMA and CDMA fingerprint modulation.
Resistance to the Pure Averaging Collusion Attacks
In this section, we study the detection performance of the joint TDMA and CDMA
fingerprint modulation under the pure averaging collusion attacks where SC1 =
SC2 = · · · = SCL = SC. We compare the detection performance of the Joint
TDMA and CDMA fingerprint modulation with that of the CDMA fingerprint
modulation. In both fingerprint modulation schemes, all colluders have equal
probability of detection under this type of collusion, and the pure averaging attacks
are fair collusion attacks. The simulation setup is the same as in the previous
section and Figure 7.4 shows the simulation results. We consider two possible
collusion patterns. In the first one, we assume that one region at level 1 is guilty
and it has two guilty sub-regions at level 2. For each of the two guilty regions at
level 2, we assume that all its five children at level 3 are guilty and colluders are
present in 10 out of 100 subgroups at level 3. This collusion pattern corresponds
to the case where the fingerprint tree matches the hierarchical relationship among
users. In the second one, we assume that all the 100 subgroups at level 3 are guilty,
and this collusion pattern happens when the fingerprint tree does not reflect the
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Figure 7.4: Pd of the joint TDMA and CDMA fingerprint modulation scheme
under the pure average attacks. L = 4, [D1, D2, D3, D4] = [4, 5, 5, 100] and
[ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, ρ4] = [1/6, 1/6, 1/6, 1/2]. N = 10
6, σ2n = 2σ
2
W and Pfp = 10
−2. p = 0.95.
Left: colluders are from 10 subgroups at level 3 in the tree, right: colluders are
from all the 100 subgroups at level 3 in the tree.
real hierarchical relationship among users. We further assume that each guilty
subgroup at level 3 has the same number of colluders in both collusion patterns.
From Figure 7.4, the joint TDMA and CDMA fingerprint modulation scheme
has approximately the same performance as the CDMA based fingerprint modula-
tion scheme under the pure averaging collusion attacks. Both fingerprint modula-
tion schemes perform better when the fingerprint tree design matches the hierar-
chical relationship among users and the colluders are present in fewer subgroups
in the tree.
To summarize, under the constraint that all colluders share the same risk and
have equal probability of detection, the joint TDMA and CDMA fingerprint mod-
ulation has approximately identical performance as the CDMA based fingerprint
modulation, and the embedded fingerprints in the three secure fingerprint distri-
bution schemes have the same collusion resistance.
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7.3 Fingerprint Drift Compensation
In both the general fingerprint multicast scheme and the joint fingerprint design
and distribution scheme, the video encoder and the decoder use the reconstructed
unfingerprinted and fingerprinted copies, respectively, as references for motion
compensation. The difference, which is the embedded fingerprint, will propagate to
the next frame. Fingerprints from different frames will accumulate and cause the
perceptual quality degradation of the reconstructed frames at the decoder’s side.
A drift compensation signal, which is the embedded fingerprint in the reference
frame(s) with motion, has to be transmitted to each user. It contains confidential
information of the embedded fingerprint in the reference frame(s) and is unique to
each user. Therefore, it has to be transmitted seamlessly with the host signal to
the decoder through unicast channels. Since the embedded fingerprint propagates
not only to the embeddable coefficients but also to the non-embeddable ones, fully
compensating the drifted fingerprint will significantly increase the communication
cost.
To reduce the communication overhead introduced by full drift compensation,
we propose to compensate the drifted fingerprint that propagates to the embed-
dable coefficients only and ignore the rest. Shown in Figure 7.5 is the fingerprint
drift compensation scheme in the general fingerprint multicast scheme for video
on demand applications. The one in the joint fingerprint design and distribution
scheme is similar and omitted. The calculation of the drift compensation signal
is similar to that in [26]. Step 3 in the fingerprint embedding and distribution
process is modified as follows. For each DCT coefficient, if it is not embeddable, it
is variable length coded with other non-embeddable coefficients. Otherwise, first,































































Figure 7.5: The proposed fingerprint drift compensation scheme in the general
fingerprint multicast for VoD applications.
nent is embedded, the corresponding drift compensation component is added, and
the resulting fingerprinted and compensated coefficient is quantized and variable
length coded with other fingerprinted and compensated coefficients.
In Table 7.3, we compare the quality of the reconstructed sequences at the de-
coder’s side in three scenarios: PSNRf is the average PSNR of the reconstructed
frames with full drift compensation; PSNRn is the average PSNR of the recon-
structed frames without drift compensation; and PSNRp is the average PSNR
of the reconstructed frames in the proposed drift compensation scheme. Com-
pared with the reconstructed frames with full drift compensation, the reconstructed
frames without drift compensation have an average of 1.5 ∼ 2dB loss in PSNR,
and those using the proposed drift compensation have an average of 0.5dB loss.
Therefore, the proposed drift compensation scheme improves the quality of the
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Table 7.3: Perceptual quality of the reconstructed frames at the decoder’s side at
bit rate R = 1.3bpp.
Sequence PSNRf (dB) PSNRn(dB) PSNRp(dB)
miss america 44.89 42.73 44.31
carphone 40.45 38.05 39.88
flower 31.53 30.01 30.92
reconstructed frames at the decoder’s side without extra communication overhead.
7.4 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have analyzed the performance of the two fingerprint multicast
schemes proposed in Chapter 6, including the bandwidth efficiency, the robust-
ness of the embedded fingerprints, and the perceptual quality of the reconstructed
sequence at the decoder’s side.
We first analyzed the bandwidth efficiency of the two fingerprint multicast
schemes. Compared with the pure unicast scheme, the general fingerprint multicast
scheme reduces the communication cost by 48% to 84%, depending on the total
number of users and the characteristics of sequences; and the joint fingerprint
design and distribution scheme reduces the bandwidth requirement by 57% to 87%,
depending on the number of users, the characteristics of sequences, and network
and computation constraints.
If we compare the three distribution schemes: the pure unicast scheme, the
general fingerprint multicast scheme, and the joint fingerprint design and distribu-
tion scheme, the pure unicast scheme is preferred when there are only a few users
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in the system, e.g., around ten or twenty users; and the other two schemes should
be used when there are a large number of users, e.g., thousands of users. Com-
pared with the general fingerprint multicast scheme, the joint fingerprint design
and distribution scheme further improves the bandwidth efficiency by increasing
the complexity of the underlying network and that of the receivers. Therefore, for
sequences that have fewer embeddable coefficients, e.g., sequence “miss america”,
the general fingerprint multicast scheme is preferred to achieve the bandwidth ef-
ficiency at a low computation cost. For sequences with much more embeddable
coefficients, e.g., sequence “flower”, the joint fingerprint design and distribution
scheme is recommended to reduce the communication cost under network and
computation constraints.
We then analyzed the collusion resistance of the embedded fingerprints in dif-
ferent schemes. We have shown that with the joint TDMA and CDMA fingerprint
modulation, although the colluders can still apply the interleaving based collusion,
some colluders have larger probability to be detected than the others. To guar-
antee that all colluders share the same risk and have equal probability of being
captured, the colluders can only apply the pure averaging collusion, under which
the proposed joint TDMA and CDMA fingerprint modulation has approximately
identical performance as the CDMA based fingerprint modulation scheme.
Finally, we analzyed the perceptual quality of the reconstructed sequences at
the receiver’s side. We have shown that the proposed fingerprint drift compensation
scheme improves PSNR of the reconstructed frames by an average of 1 ∼ 1.5 dB
without increasing the communication cost.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Research
In this thesis, we have examined and explored various aspects of multimedia finger-
printing, including the analysis of collusion resistance as well as secure fingerprint
multicast for video streaming.
We first investigated order statistics based nonlinear collusion attacks and an-
alyzed their effectiveness in defeating multimedia fingerprinting systems. We also
analyzed the detection performance of several commonly used detectors in the lit-
erature and compared their performance under nonlinear collusion attacks. To
improve the performance of the detection statistics under collusion attacks, during
fingerprint detection, we utilized the statistical features of the extracted finger-
prints and proposed a preprocessing technique specifically for collusion scenario.
We showed that the preprocessing techniques improve the collusion resistance of
multimedia fingerprinting systems.
We then investigated collusion attacks on scalable fingerprinting systems, where
users received copies of different quality due to bandwidth and computation con-
straints. We first analyzed the fairness constraints on the collusion attacks, which
requires all colluders share the same risk and have equal probability of detection.
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We then investigated the tradeoff between the probability of detection and the
perceptual quality during collusion. Finally, we analyzed the collusion resistance
of the scalable fingerprinting systems for different applications with different re-
quirements, and provided the lower and upper bounds of Kmax.
We also investigated the traitors within traitors problem in multimedia fin-
gerprinting, where selfish colluders process their received copies before multiuser
collusion to further reduce their own probability of detection. We explored the
possible strategy by those selfish colluders, analyzed their performance, and in-
vestigated the optimal pre-collusion processing technique for selfish colluders to
minimize their risk of being captured under the quality constraints. For other
colluders who wish to protect their own interest, we also provided preliminary
countermeasures to detect and prevent such pre-collusion processing.
In this thesis, we also address the secure distribution of uniquely fingerprinted
copies for video streaming applications with stringent latency constraints. We pro-
posed two secure fingerprint multicast schemes: the general fingerprint multicast
scheme that can be used with most spread spectrum embedding based fingerprint-
ing systems, and the joint fingerprint design and distribution scheme that explores
the special structure of fingerprint design to further reduce the communication
cost. We compared their performance, including the communication cost and the
robustness against collusion attacks, and analyzed the tradeoff between the band-
width efficiency and computation complexity. We also proposed a fingerprint drift
compensation scheme to improve the quality of the reconstructed sequences at the
decoder’s side without extra communication overhead.
Digital fingerprinting and traitor tracing in multimedia forensics is at its young
age, and there are many more interesting research directions that need to be further
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investigated.
First, our current work on secure fingerprint multicast considered a simple sce-
nario where all users receive copies of the same quality. As we have pointed out
in Chapter 4, scalability is usually required for video coding and transmission to
address the heterogeneity of networks as well as the variation of users’ compu-
tation capability. Consequently, it is important to investigate secure fingerprint
multicast for scalable video fingerprinting and coding, which is more realistic and
practical. In addition, observing that both Internet and wireless networks change
dynamically over time, the service provider is obliged to adjust the distribution
schemes according to the bandwidth fluctuations, and it is crucial to have flexible
secure fingerprint multicast schemes that can address both the heterogeneity and
the dynamically changing nature of networks.
In addition, in our work, we assumed that the networks are error-free for sim-
plicity and considered simple scenarios where users receive bit streams correctly.
In practice, data transmitted through networks suffer from bit errors and packet
losses, especially for wireless networks. For video applications, the extensive use
of predictive and variable-length coding in video compression techniques renders
the compressed bit streams especially vulnerable to transmission errors, and the
sender has to undergo a channel encoding stage to protect compressed video from
transmission errors. Therefore, it is important to investigate the error control
and error concealment mechanisms in secure fingerprint multicast, and examine
the Quality of Service (QoS) management for secure distribution of fingerprinted
copies in video streaming applications.
Finally, in digital rights management systems, traditional cryptography and
multimedia forensics are tightly connected with each other, and neither can stand
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alone. It will be fruitful to investigate the combination of multimedia forensics and
traditional cryptography, and examine the benefit of this combination in order to
complement each other. This investigation will lead to the general framework of
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